Why do they hate us?

Now how am I supposed to keep up with you when you still haven't responded to my last, laborious reply to your previous rhetorical ejaculations.

To refresh your recollection:

http://www.elitetrader.com/vb/showthread.php?s=&postid=268870#post268870

As for this latest:

The sanctions policy certainly made frequent appearances in anti-American and anti-West propaganda. Both for this reason and because the policy itself was insustainable morally and otherwise, the need to come up with an alternative became ever more pressing. To loosen or remove the containment policy of which sanctions were a major part without removing Hussein's regime meant presenting it with a significant, highly exploitable victory and restored freedom of action. In short, the sanctions policy and its harmfulness, as well as the human and other costs of the last time the world had to deal with Iraqi aggression, offered clear humanitarian and political arguments in favor of finally putting an end to the Ba'ath regime.

The people who unquestioningly accept stories like this one from sites like "commondreams.org" tend to be the same ones who unquestioningly accept casualty figures from the "Body Count" site, or who have long been happy to attribute numbers of deaths per year to "globalization" (or, earlier, "capitalism") that exceed TOTAL global human mortality per year. These same people prove almost invariably to be incapable of seriously considering the implications of alternative policies or approaches.

How many hundreds of times do you need to go over the same arguments? Even if you accept the dubious numbers in the UN story and other claims, and the attribution of responsibility to the sanctions regime rather than to Hussein's reactions to it, these deaths would remain a result of the same containment policy that the peace movement was generally in favor of extending indefinitely into the future - while awaiting the results of inspections (or even of augmented inspections).

Individuals from the anti-war side who could propose and defend any coherent and practical alternative policy were hard to find. I don't believe we ever encountered one on ET, for instance, despite numerous requests. So, I ask, yet again, if not war, then what? The two basic alternatives were simple: continued containment or withdrawal, but don't forget how critical the details and geopolitical context would remain when contemplating a future that included Saddam or his sons still in power.

I believe that that last time I confronted you on this point, you did finally offer a response: All you could come up with was some laughable proposal to give each Iraqi $100,000.

I repeat: Against the lack of coherent, defendable, workable, and implementable alternatives, whatever deaths or suffering you care to attribute to past Iraq-related policies remain central arguments in favor of the war.

And one more time, just in case you missed it: Trader556, if you honestly believe that sanctions were killing 6000 infants/month, then, until you find a rational alternative policy you're willing to stand behind, you'll simply have to credit the war with saving them (or holding the potential to save them), and you'll have to stack those numbers against the war casualty numbers you also like to throw around.

If you follow your past patterns, instead of showing you've understood the argument, integrating the conclusions in your future comments, or even responding at all, you're much more likely just to disappear from the discussion. Then, after some period of silence, you'll return with some new thread, most likely offering either some warmed-over version of something you've already posted several times before, or some parroting of whatever latest anti-Administration propaganda offensive.

 

Quote from KymarFye:


As for this latest:

The sanctions policy certainly made frequent appearances in anti-American and anti-West propaganda. Both for this reason and because the policy itself was insustainable morally and otherwise, the need to come up with an alternative became ever more pressing. To loosen or remove the containment policy of which sanctions were a major part without removing Hussein's regime meant presenting it with a significant, highly exploitable victory and restored freedom of action. In short, the sanctions policy and its harmfulness, as well as the human and other costs of the last time the world had to deal with Iraqi aggression, offered clear humanitarian and political arguments in favor of finally putting an end to the Ba'ath regime.

Unsustainable, perhaps.

In hindsight, the sanctions policy did not work as intended. However, the arguments for clear humanitarian efforts were never part of Bush's thrust before the war.

It is also not know that the continuation of inspections desired by those not part of the U.S. plan would or would not have worked. There was progress. If you recall, the reason Bush demanded military action came down to his assertion that the U.S. was in immediate danger of attack from Iraq, or others who were being supported and supplied/funded by Hussein.

To this point, the crux of his argument, national security, we lack any evidence to this point that the threat was real and present.

The people who unquestioningly accept stories like this one from sites like "commondreams.org" tend to be the same ones who unquestioningly accept casualty figures from the "Body Count" site, or who have long been happy to attribute numbers of deaths per year to "globalization" (or, earlier, "capitalism") that exceed TOTAL global human mortality per year. These same people prove almost invariably to be incapable of seriously considering the implications of alternative policies or approaches.

I agree that people should not accept bias, either from the right or the left. People who support the war effort unquestioningly accepted the "evidence" presented by the administration as sufficient to support preemptive military action. That "evidence" is now in doubt by many, as it has yet to be found. There is no smoking, or even load gun found to this point, that was pointed at the USA, nor the motivation to do so by Hussein.



How many hundreds of times do you need to go over the same arguments? Even if you accept the dubious numbers in the UN story and other claims, and the attribution of responsibility to the sanctions regime rather than to Hussein's reactions to it, these deaths would remain a result of the same containment policy that the peace movement was generally in favor of extending indefinitely into the future - while awaiting the results of inspections (or even of augmented inspections).

We go over arguments again and again when there is a lack of definitive proof, proof so incontrovertible that anyone who questioned it would appear mad.

You speculate about future deaths that would have happened, but that remains on a speculative level. What we do know is what actually happened. People remain with their speculative ideas about WMD and Hussein's motives to use them, but as yet we have no definitive proof.

Besides, the war was about our national security, not the human rights of the Iraqi people....at least that was the bill of goods sold to the American people. The emphasis changed to human rights and liberation of Iraq only after the war had begun.

"Individuals from the anti-war side who could propose and defend any coherent and practical alternative policy were hard to find. I don't believe we ever encountered one on ET, for instance, despite numerous requests. So, I ask, yet again, if not war, then what? The two basic alternatives were simple: continued containment or withdrawal, but don't forget how critical the details and geopolitical context would remain when contemplating a future that included Saddam or his sons still in power.

Hard to find, doesn't mean they weren't offering the best plan for resolution. There were suggestions. The suggestions were for inspections to continue until a final report could be given by the weapons inspectors. Bush did not accept this plan, because he indicated there was a reason not to wait, i.e. a clear and present danger to the lives of Americans and others in the free world. Again, those who opposed the immediacy of war often did not rule out the idea of armed conflict, they were simply suggesting a better job of gathering evidence before a verdict was given. Bush came to a verdict on his own, with little support or agreement from the rest of the world, and the crux of his verdict was some reported "evidence" of WMD, and an intent by Hussein to use those weapons against the US, either directly or through funding of terrorists groups.

"I repeat: Against the lack of coherent, defendable, workable, and implementable alternatives, whatever deaths or suffering you care to attribute to past Iraq-related policies remain central arguments in favor of the war."

At what point did the focus of the war shift away from the potential deaths of Americans to the lives of the Iraqi people? Only after the war had begun. After Bush had convinced the American people that the threat to their lives were real. The American people didn't care about the lives of the Iraqi people, let's be honest. If Bush had tried to start a war on this basis he would not have had public support.

Since there are many other countries where human rights are suppressed, and the citizens are killed by dictators, there had to be a stronger reason for preemptive military action, for if we were consistent with such a human rights policy, we would be at war with half the world right now.

"And one more time, just in case you missed it: Trader556, if you honestly believe that sanctions were killing 6000 infants/month, then, until you find a rational alternative policy you're willing to stand behind, you'll simply have to credit the war with saving them (or holding the potential to save them), and you'll have to stack those numbers against the war casualty numbers you also like to throw around."

Another of end justifies the means proponents. I disagree that US foreign policy, as presented to the American people should ever be justified after the fact. The cause of a preemptive war should be clear and present in the beginning, not rationalized after the fact because we cannot meet the proof of our initial claims. This would be akin to illegal search and seizure, but justification of the illegal search because some ancillary good occurred.

"If you follow your past patterns, instead of showing you've understood the argument, integrating the conclusions in your future comments, or even responding at all, you're much more likely just to disappear from the discussion. Then, after some period of silence, you'll return with some new thread, most likely offering either some warmed-over version of something you've already posted several times before, or some parroting of whatever latest anti-Administration propaganda offensive."

I understand past patterns very well. The past patterns of presidential administrations, who acted with a sense of divine right to do what they wanted to do is quite clear. The president and his administration should never be above the law, or above the feeling that they can justify what they do after the fact.

The central issue in my mind remains. Was there a clear and present danger to national security sufficient to justify a preemptive war. To this point, I have yet to see the clear and present danger beyond a theory and the word of the administration that it actually existed.

That may be enough for you, it isn't enough for me.

 

Optional, you and I have been over this territory before, quite recently. You appear to have completely bought the revisionist line that the Administration's justification of war rested, as you put it, on an "immediate" threat posed by Iraqi WMDs.

Bush's most important public statement on the causes of the war was arguably his State of the Union address this January. It was a speech viewed not just be large segments of the American public, but by people all over the world. Here is what Bush actually said on Iraq. The relevant section began with this central statement:

This statement summarizes the case for opposing Hussein. "Immediate" threats from WMDs are not the critical point - at all. It was the Administration's position - and not only this Administration's position - that Saddam, unchecked, represented an intolerable threat to the region and the US.

The rest of Bush's statement summarized the post-Gulf War history of the US confrontation with Saddam:

None of these statements has been contradicted. "Pursuit" of WMDs it not the same as possession of deliverable weapons of mass destruction. This is not a trivial point. Retaining the information, the scientists, dual-use equipment and so on - the bases of a program - while violating the agreements he made more than provides what in a police matter would be called "probable cause."

Not one of these points rests on an "immediate" threat posed by deliverable WMDs. In most instances, the points rest on potential threats, residual capabilities, or reasonable suspicions.

continued:

 

Bush then moved directly to the question of "imminence."

This statement concludes the section of the speech where Bush addresses the threat from Iraq, and specifically goes into the WMD issue. It does include the infamous "African uranium" story - attributed to British intelligence, not stated as an incontestable fact. Throughout, the language is guarded in this way: It presents the facts as established or asserted by various sources, and shows that Saddam did not comply with efforts intended to establish the truth. It likewise stressed that the inspectors could not be expected to act as detectives: That is not what the UN inspections regime was designed for. It presumed active cooperation. That Saddam was not providing active cooperation - "full and immediate compliance" - was not seriously contested by anyone outside of the Iraqi Information Ministry.

Again, it is also worth stressing that the full WMD story has not yet come out.

In transition to the humanitarian justification for removing the Iraqi regime, Bush did briefly stray from the more guarded statements above:

Given the uncertainty over the actual state of Husseins' arsenal, Bush should have said something like "who we have every reason to believe is still assembling" or "who appears to be assembling" or "has assembled" or "maintains the capacity for" or "continues to guard his development program." I suppose it depends on what your definition of the word "is" is. Are you ready to impeach him over that?

This section of the speech continued as follows, sketching out the humanitarian argument in greater detail:

His summary returns to the threat to the US. Again, there is no stress on "imminence," as he has already dealt with that subject and argued against the demand for it. Instead, the stress is on a "serious and mounting threat," not an "immediate" or "imminent" one:

Here, again, the language strays from its most guarded formulations - though, even here, it relates to "intelligence" to be presented, not to absolute assertions of fact. It also remains true that Saddam had in the past attempted to "hide those weapons" from inspectors. Additionally, in context, the phrase "fully disarm" includes dismantlement of the programs and capabilities, and implies full, active cooperation with inspectors.

Bush's last statement on the war included a message to the troops and made a broad re-statement of the Administration's larger strategy in the context of desires for peace: "A future lived at the mercy of terrible threats is no peace at all."

Again, the war is justified on the basis of a future situation that must be avoided, not on the basis of VX warheads flying at us from over the horizon.

Polls seems to suggest that, though war critics either don't get or prefer to ignore this message, the broad public understood it.

For those of us who supported the war, the way in which the UN process caused some people to view the inspectors as detectives and to simplify the cause of war as the existence of WMDs themselves was unfortunate. Considering the reams of material put out on the subject of Iraq by diverse officials, spokespeople, and allies, there it would be surprising if there weren't many comments that were inaccurate and exaggerated - even willfully exaggerated. All the same, the overall thrust was demonstrably not what Administration critics are now trying to claim.

No one, not even Saddam himself, probably knew exactly what would transpire regarding Iraq's WMDs in relation to the war. To say the least, the role they played came out at the low end of the uncertain spectrum that at its highest end would have been the massive, early use of WMDs against both coalition troops and the Iraqi people. I can't say I'm disappointed that this latter fear was not borne out, even if it might have changed the shape of post-war propaganda wars. The narrowly defined issue remains a secondary one.

State of the Union transcript:

http://www.cnn.com/2003/ALLPOLITICS/01/28/sotu.transcript.1/

 

"I would argue that Saddam's prior actions and continuing conduct established that he "clearly" was dangerous. His regime's defiance and its actual and latent capacities were "present." In any event, from the statement of a general policy of "pre-emption" to the many statements about the war on Terror and Iraq in particular, the Bush Administration openly advanced an interpretation of proper justifications for acting against Hussein's regime that was explicitly at variance with the narrow interpretation you prefer."

You can argue, but you provide little to no proof that he was a direct threat to American soil, that he sponsored terrorism that directly attacked the USA, that he had weapons of mass destruction at the time of our attack against him, that he had the ability to use those weapons in a manner to attack the USA that constituted a real and present danger (North Korea being an example of real and present danger).

Was he a dangerous man? Sure. So is everyone who wields power, especially power that is wielded absolutely, or done so in a democracy where the facts are distorted or incomplete to a point where the people are not properly involved or capable of intelligent decision making.

The state of the Union address was a general theme, and was not a justification of war, nor in the minds of most Americans was it a declaration of war.

The real shift happened in this country when Colin Powell went before the UN and presented his case based on "evidence."

Bush was adamant that we had to act now, or else. Now some are seriously, and rightly questioning the "or else" danger that required expedient preemptive military action.

Given our inability thus far to produce the WMD, Hussein, or OBL for that matter, all we are left with is a story told by a president and his administration with loose facts, told to an audience that was still in fear and shock due to 911, by a president who was personally hellbent for attacking Iraq, no matter what the political costs or costs to the feelings or attitudes of the majority of the world.

You can view this anyway you want, but the more I read from you, the more I see extremism from you, not objective and rational doubt that is required of those who participate in the political process.

You can justify your extremism as a response to the Wild/MSFE's of the world, but I am not a Euro who hates America.

I am an American, who at this point has doubts, and believe we need a thorough investigation of the issue, and transparency in our Government. What Bush did was unprecedented in its preemptive nature on this scale--and without the support of all of NATO's members, consequently we need to know now what really transpired so that the next time a similar situation presents itself (and there will be a next time). I believe it is the responsible of the President to answer these questions, answer them directly, with fact, not political spin, nor justification.

Given the abuses of power of the past by the presidency in this country, I fail to understand your apparent lack of objective skepticism in this area.

 

Now it's real and present rather than clear and present, but, again, this is transferring the terms from some other debate into the question of war and peace. If your personal standards for supporting a war require "real and present" "direct" dangers to "American soil" then that's completely your right, but it hasn't been American policy for generations, if ever. (Even in the early years of the Republic, when the explicit policy was "coastal defense," we participated in wars overseas, as against the Barbary Pirates.) Many believe it should be American policy - such as those who opposed the Gulf War, the interventions in Kosovo and Bosnia, and virtually every other war in which the United States has participated going back at least to 1812 - the last time other than 9/11, Japanese attacks on US territories during World War II, certain attacks on embassies (considered American soil by international convention), and sundry acts of espionage or attempted sabotage that "American soil" was actually violated. Rightly or wrongly, American doctrine has long considered many other threats to constitute the endangerment of American "vital interests."

You choose to ignore the clear statements of policy that Bush himself made in his SOTU and that he and many others made many other times. You then claim that "the real shift happened in this country when Colin Powell went before the UN and presented his case based on 'evidence.'" On what other than your own personal perceptions do you base this conclusion?

You make a further claim, without evidence, that "Bush was adamant that we had to act now, or else." I provided you with one typical, and very widely observed and noted, statement by Bush of his policy. Once the case for war was established and accepted, timing was a secondary issue - though a very real and vital, not to mention expensive, issue for the armed forces that had been laboriously assembled and brought to a state of readiness. From the perspective of many who supported the war, the only relevant timing issue was "the sooner the better." Furthermore, in the minds of many, and not just "extremists" by any means, the job of finishing off Saddam was already years late. Many believe Saddam should have been finished off before the Gulf War was concluded. Others believe the justification for removing the regime had already been adequately established upon Saddam's first violation of the Gulf War ceasefire agreements - both relating to WMDs and relating to repression of the Kurds and Shia. As things worked out, it wasn't until 1998 and an act of Congress that regime change became the explicit policy of the entire US government, as prompted by a prior round of inspection-resisting and resolution- and agreement-breaking.

Bush clearly and repeatedly stated his arguments for acting sooner rather than later. They were explicitly NOT based on some supposed "imminent threat": To the extent the policy was "pre-emptive," it was to pre-empt any such truly imminent threat from ever arising. But it would be easy to get caught up in semantics here: I maintain that the Bush policy was neither very complicated nor very difficult to understand - except perhaps for those who, unable to accept it for what it was, insist on complicating it or turning it into something else. It was clearly stated over and over. And it was not what you continually re-cast it as.

The statement completely ignores the entire history of US-Iraqi relations, as well as the long catalogue of policy statements by this Administration and others, as sketched immediately above as well as in preceding posts.

Whoever disagrees with your premises- including the large majorities of Americans according to opinion polls - is an extremist? (Don't accuse me of resting on public opinion as the justification for my position on the war- that is not my point at all. I am merely questioning your use of the term "extremist.") I have expended substantial time and effort refuting your arguments, providing direct evidence as well as evidence based on widely known and reported historical events. To this point, you have mainly offered personal opinions asserted as fact. I won't label you, but I see no reason to adopt your opinions and arguments simply because it appears to please you to state and re-state them.

Though I disagree with some of your implicit assumptions, I have no problem at all with a thorough investigation. I am not in favor, however, of unrestricted witch hunts based on revisionist histories, straw man arguments, political agendas, and unaccountable personal perceptions. I was against them during the Clinton Administration, and I am against them now. There should be a full investigation of the use and potential abuse of intelligence. A price should be paid for every exaggeration, misstatement, or lie offered up by any war proponent with official responsibility. There is no legal, political, or moral requirement, however, to pre-judge the issue or to participate in the politically motivated attempt to turn the narrow issue of WMD intelligence and assertions into a larger indictment of the war - and there are very important reasons, in my view, not to do so.

 

The Boys Who Cried Wolfowitz
By BILL KELLER


We're now up to Day 87 of the largely fruitless hunt for Iraq's unconventional weapons. Allegations keep piling up that the Bush administration tried to scam the world into war by exaggerating evidence of the Iraqi threat. One critic has pronounced it "arguably the worst scandal in American political history." So you might reasonably ask a supporter of the war, How do you feel about that war now?

Thanks for asking.

One easy answer is that between the excavation of mass graves, which confirms that we have rid the world of a horror, and President Bush's new willingness to engage the thankless tangle of Middle East diplomacy, which raises the hope that Iraq was more than a hit-and-run exercise, the war seems to have changed some important things for the better. This is true, but not quite enough.

Another easy answer is that it's not over yet. Just as we have yet to prove that we can transform a military conquest into a real Mission Accomplished, we have yet to complete our search of a country that, as Californians must be very tired of hearing, is the size of California. This is also true, but likewise inadequate.

I supported the war, with misgivings about the haste, the America-knows-best attitude and our ability to win the peace. The deciding factor for me was not the monstrosity of the regime (routing tyrants is a noble cause, but where do you stop?), nor the opportunity to detoxify the Middle East (another noble cause, but dubious justification for a war when hardly anyone else in the world supports you). No, I supported it mainly because of the convergence of a real threat and a real opportunity.

The threat was a dictator with a proven, insatiable desire for dreadful weapons that would eventually have made him, or perhaps one of his sadistic sons, a god in the region. The fact that he gave aid and at least occasional sanctuary to practitioners of terror added to his menace. And at the end his brazen defiance made us seem weak and vulnerable, an impression we can ill afford. The opportunity was a moment of awareness and political will created by Sept. 11, combined with the legal sanction reaffirmed by U.N. Resolution 1441. The important thing to me was never that Saddam Hussein's threat was "imminent" — although Sept. 11 taught us that is not such an easy thing to know — but that the opportunity to do something about him was finite. In a year or two, we would be distracted and Iraq would be back in the nuke-building business.

Even if you throw out all the tainted evidence, there was still what prosecutors call probable cause to believe that Saddam was harboring frightful weapons, and was bent on acquiring the most frightful weapons of all. The Clinton administration believed so. Two generations of U.N. inspectors believed so. It was not a Bush administration fabrication that Iraq had, and failed to account for, massive quantities of anthrax and VX nerve gas and other biological and chemical weapons. Saddam was under an international obligation to say where the poisons went, but did not.

What the Bush administration did was gild the lily — disseminating information that ranged from selective to preposterous. The president himself gave credence to the claim that Iraq was trying to buy uranium in Africa, a story that (as Seymour Hersh's investigations leave little doubt) was based on transparently fraudulent information. Colin Powell in his February performance at the U.N. insisted that those famous aluminum tubes Iraq bought were intended for bomb-making, although the technical experts at the Department of Energy had made an awfully strong case that the tubes were for conventional rocket launchers. And as James Risen disclosed in The Times this week, two top Qaeda planners in custody told American interrogators — one of them well before the war was set in motion — that Osama bin Laden had rejected the idea of working with Saddam. That inconclusive but potent evidence was kept quiet in the administration's zeal to establish a meaningful Iraqi connection to the fanatical war on America.

The motives for the dissembling varied. The hawks hyped the case (profusely) to prove we were justified in going to war, with or without allies. Mr. Powell hyped it (modestly) in the hope that the war, which he knew the president had already decided to wage, would not be a divisive, unilateral exercise. The president either believed what he wanted to believe or was given a stacked deck of information, and it's a close call which of those possibilities is scarier.

Those who say flimflam intelligence drove us to war, though, have got things backward. It seems much more likely that the decision to make war drove the intelligence.

The origins of this may be well intentioned. Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, the most dogged proponent of war against Iraq, is also a longtime skeptic of American institutional intelligence-gathering. He has argued over the years, from within the government and from outside, that the C.I.A. and its sister agencies often fail to place adequate emphasis on what they don't know, and that they "mirror-image" — make assumptions about what foreign regimes will do based on what we would do.

One tempting solution has been to deputize smart thinkers from outside the intelligence fraternity — a Team B — to second-guess the analysis of the A Team professionals. Mr. Wolfowitz was part of a famous 1976 Team B that attacked the C.I.A. for underestimating the Soviet threat. These days the top leadership of the Defense Department is Team B. Mr. Wolfowitz and his associates have assembled their own trusted analysts to help them challenge the established intelligence consensus.

Who would argue that the spooks' work should not stand up to rigorous cross-examination? But in practice, B-Teaming is often less a form of intellectual discipline than of ideological martial arts.

Here's how it might have worked in the Bush administration:

The A Team (actually, given the number of spy agencies that pool intelligence on major problems, it's more like the A-through-M team) prepares its analysis of, let's say, the Iraqi nuclear program. The report is cautious, equivocal and — particularly since U.N. inspectors left Iraq in 1998 — based on close calls about defector reports, commercial transactions and other flimsy evidence.

The B Team comes in with fresh eyes, and fresh assumptions. One assumption, another Wolfowitz mantra, is that more weight should be given to the character of the regime — in Saddam's case, his transcendent evil and megalomania. While the C.I.A. may say that we have insufficient evidence to conclude that Saddam has reconstituted his nuclear program, Team B starts from the premise that it is just the kind of thing Saddam would do, and it is dangerous to assume he didn't.

Then Team B dips into the raw intelligence and fishes out information that supports its case, tidbits that the A Team may have rejected as unreliable. The Pentagon takes this ammo to an interagency review, where it is used to beat the A Team (the C.I.A. and the Defense Intelligence Agency) into submission. Maybe the agencies put up a fight, but (1) much of their own evidence is too soft to defend with great conviction, and (2) by this time the president has announced his version of the facts, and the political tide is all running in one direction.


When Team B seems to have the blessing of the boss, it goes from being a source of useful dissent to being an implement of intimidation. As formidable a figure as Mr. Powell, who resisted pressure to include the most arrant nonsense in his U.N. briefing, still ended up arguing a case he told confidants he did not entirely believe, specifically on the questions of Iraq's nuclear program and connections with Al Qaeda.

By the time a Team B version of events has been debunked, it has already served its purpose. That 1976 Team B, by assuming the most dire of Soviet intentions and overlooking the slow collapse of the Soviet economy, came up with estimates of Soviet military strength that we later learned to be ridiculously inflated. But the cold warriors who ran it succeeded in setting back détente and helped to elect Ronald Reagan. The 2003 Team B seems to have convinced most Americans that Saddam had nuclear arms and was in bed with Osama bin Laden.

But the consequences of crying wolf — and the belief is widespread among the dispirited spies of the A Team that the administration did exactly that — are grave. Honest, careful intelligence is our single most important weapon in the global effort against terrorism. It is also critical to winning the support of allies against nuclear proliferation, most urgently in North Korea and Iran. Already rather compelling evidence of Iran's development of nuclear weaponry is being dismissed as just more smoke from the Bush propaganda machine.

So far, the passion to investigate the integrity of American intelligence-gathering belongs mostly to the doves, whose motives are subject to suspicion and who, in any case, do not set the agenda. The pro-war Democrats are dying to change the subject to the economy. The Republicans are in no mood to second-guess a victory. Just when we really need some of that Team B spirit, the hawks have chickened out.

The truth is that the information-gathering machine designed to guide our leaders in matters of war and peace shows signs of being corrupted. To my mind, this is a worrisome problem, but not because it invalidates the war we won. It is a problem because it weakens us for the wars we still face.

 

Excerpt from Raspberry column:

"People used to argue that it was Saddam Hussein's WMDs that made Iraq so dangerous to its neighbors and to America that a preemptive strike was the right thing to do.

They still think the WMDs will eventually be found.

They seem not to have thought of the question that seems so obvious -- and so obviously important -- to me: Why would Hussein, facing annihilation, take the bother to hide his chemical and biological weapons so carefully that we still haven't found them, while leaving his millions of American dollars right where we could find them?

The WMDs, these supporters now say, are irrelevant. The new revelations regarding Hussein's brutality to his own dissidents are justification enough for what America has done."

 

It's "original context" being the Constitution of the United States. Written, I am pretty sure, before Tom Clancy had even gotten halfway finished with high school.

Here's the thing. If times require a change in the constitution, then change it. We can do that. If not, don't. But as things stand, we were not facing the "Clear and Present Danger" set forth by law as grounds to go to war. As much as a sham as the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution was, at least there was the CLAIM that an American war ship was fired on by hostile forces. What was the actual provocation for the war with Iraq? Saddam was a bad guy? Had that just become apparent?

KF, you are a brilliant guy. Anyone can see that. However is your mind so closed that you can't you see any validity to the other side of this issue? Is there not a tiny bit of doubt in your mind we may have made an error? I know I do not and at this point cannot know for sure. Do you and I have all the real facts?
(Do Cheney, Rumsfeld, Bush, and Ashcroft have them for that matter?)

Peace,
RS