As much as I like mining commodities, it really holds no match against the technology sector. Here from top to bottom, 12 months; $NVDA NVIDIA Corp, $URA URANIUM, $SPX S&P500, $LIT Lithium, $COPX Copper.
Markets https://www.bloomberg.com/news/arti...les-on-fresh-sanction-fears?srnd=premium-asia Russian Aluminum Giant Rusal Tumbles on Fresh Sanction Fears Rusal drops as much as 22% as Ukraine escalation fuels risks Crisis rocks commodities, with nickel and aluminum soaring A 'Made in Russia' tag on a bound stack of aluminium ingots in the foundry at the Khakas aluminium smelter, operated by United Co. Rusal, in Sayanogorsk, Russia in May 2021. Photographer: Andrey Rudakov/Bloomberg Bloomberg News 22 February 2022 United Co. Rusal International PJSC tumbled as much as 22% in Hong Kong as investors monitored the dramatic escalation in the West’s stand-off with Moscow over Ukraine. That’s the biggest fall since April 2018, when Rusal was hit by an earlier round of U.S. sanctions in response to what the U.S. Treasury then called Russia’s “malign activity around the globe”. The Ukraine crisis adds to risks for the major aluminum producer amid fears that rising tensions or further conflict in Ukraine could disrupt trade flows or trigger fresh sanctions against Russian entities. The U.S. administration said it will announce new sanctions Tuesday, although there’s no certainty what those might entail. Rusal shares slumped to their lowest since September, as the ruble fell and oil advanced. Russia’s exports of aluminum account come largely from Rusal and are equivalent to about 5% of global output. Sanctions on the company in 2018 upended the global market and led to soaring prices -- as well as complaints from manufacturers struggling to find metal. While the U.S. and its allies have said Russia is preparing to attack its smaller neighbor, Moscow has repeatedly denied any such plans. Aluminum surged Tuesday to its highest intra-day level in more than 13 years, and is near a record high. The metal was up 1.2% at $3,319 a ton by 11:50 a.m Shanghai time. Nickel, with Russia also a major producer, rose to its highest since 2011. Rusal was among the largest companies the U.S. has ever put on its sanctions list. The earlier curbs were removed in January 2019 after Rusal’s billionaire founder Oleg Deripaska agreed to relinquish control. — With assistance by Martin Ritchie, and Winnie Zhu
EXCLUSIVE Pentagon to boost rare earths and lithium stockpiles -sources By Mike Stone https://www.reuters.com/world/us/ex...earths-lithium-stockpiles-sources-2022-02-18/ The Pentagon building is seen in Arlington, Virginia, U.S. October 9, 2020. REUTERS/Carlos Barria WASHINGTON, Feb 18 (Reuters) - The Pentagon plans to boost the stockpile of rare earth minerals, cobalt and lithium it manages for the U.S. government to reduce its long-term dependence on China, two people familiar with the plan said. The new stockpile agreement guidance is expected to be announced as soon as next week, one of the people said, nearly a year after U.S. President Joe Biden issued an executive order to study U.S. supply chain resiliency in February 2021. Rare earths are often converted into magnets and used in next-generation weapons research as well as the Lockheed Martin Corp (LMT.N) F-35 jet and Raytheon Technologies Corp (RTX.N) precision guided munitions. Lithium, a key component used to make electric-vehicle batteries, will be vital to the Pentagon's goal of shifting its non-tactical vehicle fleet, currently 170,000 strong, to zero emissions. An agreement between the Departments of State, Energy and Defense was signed in early February and covers the select materials as well as large batteries used in the electrical grid, the people said. The Departments of Defense, Energy and State did not immediately respond to a request for comment. The memo also directs inter-agency coordination of an unclassified stockpile for relevant non-fuel minerals necessary for a transition to using more clean-technologies. The agreement enables other U.S. agencies, like the Department of Energy, to coordinate on and draw from these stockpiles, according to the people who spoke on condition of anonymity. Reuters could not determine if the agreement stipulated if the materials for the stockpiles were required to have a specific origin. The U.S. Congress has tried to stipulate where the Pentagon can source rare earths. Rare earths are a group of 17 metals that, after processing, are used to make magnets found in electric vehicles, weaponry and electronics. Since World War Two, U.S. military scientists developed the most widely-used type of rare earth magnet but China has slowly grown to control the entire sector in the past 30 years. The U.S. has only one rare earths mine and has no capability to process rare earth minerals. Many lithium and rare earth junior miners have hoped the Pentagon would buy more domestic product. To build reserves, the Pentagon buys supply in part from China, a paradox that many on Capitol Hill hope will abate in time. The rare earths production process creates a lot of pollution, part of the reason why it grew unpopular in the United States. Ongoing research is attempting to make the process cleaner. Lithium is more abundant but there is only one active mine in the United States, Albemarle Corp's (ALB.N) Silver Peak in Nevada. There is very limited U.S. processing capacity for the mineral. Reporting by Mike Stone in Washington and additional reporting by Ernest Scheyder; Editing by Nick Zieminski.
ASX very strong today, I'm up to my neck deep in stocks, got a bit hurt yesterday, my worse day for some time but I held on with my teeth and today have recovered about 50% of yesterday's losses, trading day not over yet. Anyhow, still have cash in kitty for more buying should I choose, bought two positions today, one was adding to a fintech, the other was a battery play which I continually swing trade, NVX.AX. Anyhow the main gyst of this post was I trade in and out of lithium stocks and was very tempted to jump into one position I play, but me thinks lithium has a bit more to fall yet. Using ETF as an example, these are monthly bars, expecting atleast to hit 70. I avoid buying ETF's but they make good bellwethers.
Gazprom may be going to hell but so is Norilsk Nickel. From Wiki.... Norilsk Nickel (Russian: ГМК «Норильский никель»), or Nornickel, is a Russian nickel and palladium mining and smelting company. Its largest operations are located in the Norilsk–Talnakh area near the Yenisei River in the north of Siberia. It also has holdings in Nikel, Zapolyarny, and Monchegorsk on the Kola Peninsula, in Harjavalta in western Finland, and in South Africa. Headquartered in Moscow, Norilsk Nickel is the world's largest producer of refined nickel and the 11th largest copper producer.
%% MOST metals are in long term trends; good trends. I was surprised , in the brass empty shells cash markets[local, south USA]; went weekly from $00.60 to $1.20@ pound. Now back down to $ 00.40 @ pound [wholesale volume prices were different i'm sure]........................................................................................................
https://www.afr.com/companies/finan...xposes-weak-underbelly-of-lme-20220313-p5a47b Opinion Karen MaleyColumnist Mar 13, 2022 – 6.37pm Global financial markets remain on tenterhooks after last week’s extraordinary decision by the London Metal Exchange to freeze nickel trading, allowing major banks and Chinese officials to cobble together a rescue plan for Tsingshan Holding Group, the world’s biggest producer of nickel and stainless steel. The LME’s extraordinary move – the first time it has frozen trading in a metals contract since the collapse of an international tin cartel in 1985 – was made as Xiang Guangda, the Chinese billionaire owner of Tsingshan, was wrong-footed on a huge bet he had made on a falling nickel price. Traders and brokers on the open outcry pit at the London Metal Exchange. Bloomberg Instead of falling, the price climbed sharply higher, after Russia, the world’s third-largest nickel producer, invaded Ukraine and was hit with punishing sanctions. This price spike left Tsingshan and other players which had sold forward contracts with two options for closing out their losing positions: they could either buy back these forward contracts; or they could deliver physical metal against them. But even though Tsingshan is the world’s biggest nickel producer, it faced a problem in delivering physical metal. That’s because nickel delivered into LME warehouses must be at least 99.8 per cent pure, and Tsingshan produces lower-grade nickel. triggered a massive short squeeze in nickel on the LME, causing its price to more than double in only a few hours of trading and reach a record of more than $US100,000 a tonne. The price surge left Tsingshan exposed to trading losses of $US8 billion ($11 billion) and struggling to meet margin calls – demands for extra cash to cover it loss-making positions. Bid to avoid default. The price rise was further fuelled as brokers and bankers to Tsingshan rushed to buy back nickel contracts they had sold on its behalf. With rumours sweeping through the market about the ability of Tsingshan and its brokers to meet margin calls and avoid default, the LME intervened. It suspended nickel trading on Tuesday and cancelled all trades carried earlier in the day, before the freeze was announced. The LME has not indicated when trading will resume. The LME’s decision has given Tsingshan much-needed time to buttress its finances. The Chinese nickel giant raised bridging loans from banks including JPMorgan Chase & Co and China Construction Bank that should allow it to avoid defaulting on margin calls. It has also provided a welcome reprieve for Tsingshan’s brokers and bankers. According to a Bloomberg report, the US banking heavyweight JPMorgan Chase & Co is the largest counterparty to Tsingshan’s nickel trades. Quoting unnamed sources, the report says about 50,000 tonnes of Xian Guangda’s total nickel short position of more than 150,000 tonnes is held through an over-the-counter position with JPMorgan. As Bloomberg noted, “based on that figure, the tycoon’s company, Tsingshan Holding Group Co, would have owed JPMorgan about $US1 billion in margin on Monday. The nickel producer has been struggling to pay margin calls to its banks and brokers.” According to the Bloomberg report, “Tsingshan’s difficulties paying its margin calls have put its banks and brokers in a bind, as they have had to make hefty margin calls of their own at the LME to cover their short positions on the exchange. If Tsingshan walks away from its commitments, the banks stand to lose billions of dollars.” JPMorgan is playing a leading role in discussions between Xiang and the roughly 10 banks and brokers through which his nickel short position is held. At the same time, Beijing is mulling a potential rescue of Tsingshan, which would allow it to swap some lower-grade nickel it produces for refined metal held in China’s state reserves, which could then be delivered against its contract at the LME. Sticking point But there appears to be a sticking point in the talks. Both the LME and Chinese officials want Tsingshan to pay its brokers and exit its position, allowing the market to reopen in an orderly fashion. Tsingshan’s bridging loans, however, give it the ability to meet margin calls when the market reopens. Xiang is obviously calculating that the situation can be resolved without losses, either for Tsingshan or its banks. That’s because if the Chinese nickel giant can find a way through its present difficulties, it will ultimately benefit from higher prices. What’s more, if Xiang holds on to his short position, as he has told his banks he wants to, and nickel prices go down once the LME reopens, the amount of money he owes his banks and brokers would also drop sharply. Still, the Tsingshan episode has raised serious questions about the huge systemic risk lurking on commodity exchanges. One issue is the lack of transparency, and the lack of disclosure regarding off-exchange positions. Tsingshan, for instance, has a short position of 30,000 tonnes of nickel directly on the LME, which is held through brokers. But the bulk of its 150,000-tonne short-position has been accumulated through bilateral deals with banks. Companies prefer these “over-the-counter” positions because there are less onerous reporting requirements. The banks then offset their risk by selling futures contracts on the LME. But there are also big questions about whether clearing houses such as the LME are adequately capitalised given their potentially huge systemic risk. Typical clearing houses – which stand between both sides of a financial trade and ensure its completion even if one side goes bust – have a “waterfall” structure of losses, with the defaulting party bearing the initial losses (both through their initial margin and their default fund contribution), followed by the usually minimal financial contribution made by the clearing house itself. If the losses are larger, the default fund contribution that has been made by the surviving members of the clearing house will be tapped. But critics argue that clearing houses should be forced to put up more capital to cover potential losses, and that clearing house members should be given a bigger voice in deciding whether particular players should be rescued. Not surprisingly, several traders were outraged by the LME’s decision to cancel all the 5000 nickel trades that were executed last Tuesday morning, before it announced its trading freeze. Market participants estimated that the cancelled trades were worth nearly $US4 billion, and that $US1.3 billion of profits – and losses – on the deals had been wiped out. Investors on the exchange were furious about the cancellations, which they argued were purely to the advantage to Tsingshan, its lenders and the LME, which is owned by Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing. But the LME defended its decision, arguing that the unprecedented surge in nickel prices had created a “systemic risk” to the market, triggering a spike in margin calls, and raising the possibility of multiple defaults. Several leading financiers agreed, pointing out that a catastrophic default was not in anyone’s interest, and that everyone benefitted from having an orderly, functioning market.
.....riiiiiight.... The LME was owned by its members until 2012, when it was sold to Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing for £1.4 billion.[4]WIKI
The United States Mint will not strike 2022 Morgan or Peace dollars, with Mint officials identifying silver planchet shortages as the reason for the cancellation of the planned coins. The March 14 Mint press release follows: https://www.coinworld.com/news/us-coins/breaking-news-no-2022-morgan-or-peace-dollars
https://www.fnlondon.com/articles/t...el-traders-were-warned-20220323?mod=hp_LATEST The LME made a hash of it — but nickel traders were warned The nickel debacle has led to renewed questions among traders about whether HKEX is an ideal parent for a key City institution LME's handling of cancelled trades could have a much wider impact going forward By David Wighton Wednesday March 23, 2022 Traders on the London Metal Exchange may be furious. But they can hardly claim they weren’t warned. Laying out its 'strategic pathway' five years ago, the LME’s chief executive Matthew Chamberlain made plain that the exchange’s first principle was an “absolute commitment” to the physical market. “If there is ever a conflict between the physical market and other users on our exchange the physical market wins,” he said. So when the interests of Chinese metals producer, Tsingshan Holding, came into conflict with a bunch of hedge funds and other traders, there should have been no doubt which side the LME would be on. Whether by cancelling $3.9bn of trades retrospectively the LME met its second principle of “fairness” is another matter. The nickel trading fiasco that has unfolded over the last two weeks raises a host of questions: about the future of the LME under the ownership of Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing; about the lack of transparency in financial markets; and about the role of London as a centre of global metals trading. But one thing is not open to question: the LME has made a total hash of it. The LME allowed nickel prices to treble in less than two days, doing nothing to slow a rise that would clearly put some market participants, and the market as a whole, at risk. Traders say the threat should have been plain even though the LME didn’t know the full extent of Tsingshan’s short exposure in nickel. The reason it didn’t know? When LME suggested some time ago that there should be greater transparency in the market some of its member brokers objected. So it didn’t happen. As a result, the LME was unaware that, in addition to its exposure via the exchange, Tsingshan reportedly had four times as much exposure via over-the-counter deals with banks. This would have left it owing the banks, including JPMorgan, Standard Chartered and BNP Paribas, an estimated $15bn had the trades not been cancelled, according to The Wall Street Journal. After the trades were scrapped, Tsingshan owed about $4.5bn in margin payments which it is seeking to borrow from the banks against its huge holdings of physical nickel. The lack of transparency has distinct echoes of last year’s Archegos collapse, where the market had no idea of the hedge fund’s total exposure to highly geared stock bets. The one surprise is that this time accident-prone Credit Suisse appears not to have a starring role in the drama. Belatedly, the LME introduced caps to daily price swings, which are widely used by other exchanges, and is planning to introduce tighter position limits together with tougher supervision of traders with large short positions. The LME has also ordered nickel traders to disclose their over-the-counter positions above a certain threshold. Some traders have argued that setting volume limits or increasing margin requirements would have prevented the price squeeze getting out of control. But the LME says that by the time it acted the pressure on a number of market participants was such that cancelling the trades was the only way to prevent permanent damage to the market. It may well be right. But the cost is a devastating blow to the LME’s reputation which has prompted explosive attacks from the likes of AQR hedge fund boss Cliff Asness who accused the exchange of “stealing money” from traders. Some firms have reportedly pulled back trading from the exchange in protest and have raised the prospect of legal action. Adding insult to injury, the LME suffered a number of further problems as it restarted nickel trading. Chamberlain has insisted that its actions had nothing to do with favouritism towards Tsingshan related to the exchange’s Hong Kong-based ownership. But the episode has led to renewed questions among traders about whether HKEX is an ideal parent for a key City institution. It is almost 10 years since HKEX paid £1.4bn for the member-owned exchange, beating off rival bids from CME, InterncontinentalExchange and NYSE Euronext. Chamberlain, then a banker at UBS, was one of the advisers to HKEX on the deal. Critics say that LME has stumbled under HKEX ownership and that the latest debacle is a gift to potential rivals. CME, which has a successful copper contract, is looking at the potential to move into nickel, while LME’s mistakes could be very helpful if the Shanghai Futures Exchange, which already has a nickel contract, wanted to open up more to international traders. Mark Thompson, a former metals trader at Trafigura who has been one of the LME’s fiercest critics, told Bloomberg that the shambles has shown that HKEX is the wrong owner for the LME. If that is true, the City should perhaps breathe a sigh of relief that HKEX was forced to abandon its 2019 bid for the much more important London Stock Exchange Group.