Practice with electronically monitored bail in NZ has shown that the rate of offending is significantly lower than with other types of bail. http://www.justice.govt.nz/publicat...legislation-for-electronically-monitored-bail In Holland and Belgium also favorable experiences have been gained with electronic monitoring of heavy offenders released on parole. IMO in this case it is a very viable option.
Did that study include perps with tens of millions of dollars stashed offshore who could buy a Gulfstream and disappear 10 minutes after cutting off the bracelet?
. It's very debatable whether that would be a smart course of action. Legally nothing is set in stone, he might get a fine of 5m or he might get 20 years, who knows? Besides, if he wants to flea, a 5m bail isn't going to stop him either.
He can go to Russia and propose to Poetin to crash the American markets over and over again. Because according to the Americans he is capable of doing that. That is confirmed by the SEC. Don't hold back your imagination. A Gulfstream G650 costs about 65 million, Sarao has probably not enough money just to even buy this plane.
His best bet is to lease/charter a G280....at only $5,000 per hour. It's quite a bargain compared to the other models. It will go 3600 miles without refueling. https://www.aircharter.com/gulfstream-jet/ But first he must lease a helicopter so that he can be picked up from the roof of his parent's house before the authorities storm the place. Then the helicopter will take him to a private air strip so he can make his getaway. Only bad news for Nav: Hanoi, Vietnam is 5800 miles away....they must stop to refuel somewhere.
Good article from the NYT... The Trader as Scapegoat By RAJIV SETHIAPRIL 28, 2015 A BRITISH trader, Navinder Singh Sarao, is facing extradition to the United States. Federal prosecutors accuse him of having significantly contributed to the “flash crash” of May 6, 2010, in which major American stock markets plunged dramatically in a matter of minutes. Prosecutors also say that he manipulated prices on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange for years by “spoofing,” or placing orders that he intended to cancel before they were filled. In fact, this is a common activity in equities markets today. The prosecution of Mr. Sarao is arbitrary, and his contribution to the flash crash was negligible. Regulators should direct their attention instead to far more damaging practices — for example, high-speed strategies that exploit the fragmented nature of our trading systems to make profits purely on timing and speed. The market that Mr. Sarao stands accused of manipulating is among the world’s most liquid. Traders can buy and sell contracts that are bets on the future value of the Standard & Poor’s 500 stock-price index. How exactly did Mr. Sarao manage to single-handedly manipulate a market with tens of thousands of participants and billions in daily trading volume? According to the complaint, filed in federal court in the Northern District of Illinois, he placed multiple large orders to sell contracts at prices slightly above the best prevailing offer. The goal was to create an impression of considerable selling pressure, in the hope that this would drive prices down. Mr. Sarao could then buy at prices that he had himself played a role in depressing, only to sell moments later once he had canceled his initial orders and prices had recovered. In describing this activity, the complaint refers to “bogus orders” designed to “trick other market participants” by creating “a false appearance of increased supply” and preventing “legitimate forces of supply and demand from operating properly.” This language reflects a naïve understanding of modern finance. Our markets are full of bogus orders that create a false appearance of demand or supply and that cannot be traded against by ordinary investors. Most of these are placed not by traders like Mr. Sarao but by high-frequency traders using algorithms to implement complex strategies. Their strategies combine traditional market-making functions (such as the posting of buy and sell orders at a small spread) with speculation based on short-term price forecasts. They rely on the timely acquisition and rapid processing of incoming market data. By selectively altering this data, Mr. Sarao was attempting to trigger behavior that would net him a quick profit. Investors buying or selling securities based on their prices in relation to economic fundamentals will not generally be affected by this kind of manipulation. It is only strategies that seek to extract information from market data itself that are vulnerable to spoofing. And in today’s S.&P. futures market, high-frequency traders are responsible for about half of total trading volume and appear on one or both sides of around three-quarters of contracts traded. It is the automated response of these traders to the placement of orders, both legitimate and bogus, that precipitated the flash crash. The growth of high-frequency trading has been fueled in large measure by the fact that our equities markets are fragmented. Individual stocks can be bought and sold at more than 50 different venues. Under a rule known as Regulation NMS, all orders must be communicated and consolidated in a manner that allows each new order to trade at the best available price in the market as a whole. But this process of consolidation is not instantaneous, and high-frequency traders have invested huge sums to receive and react to information at individual exchanges a few milliseconds before it has been aggregated and made available to others. As a result, orders are not always fully processed in the sequence in which they arrive at the market. In the time it takes for a partially filled order to reach a second destination, firms can modify orders and make trades at multiple venues. And they can insert themselves between buyers and sellers with compatible orders that have yet to be matched, thus providing liquidity where none is needed. These practices reduce the incentives to analyze fundamental information about securities. They also involve the placement of orders that are not intended to result in trades — which, in the case of Mr. Sarao, is allegedly a criminal act. So why was Mr. Sarao singled out? Probably because his strategy was transparent, and his account relatively small. Larger firms that combine many strategies with evolving algorithms will not display so clear a signature. Mr. Sarao made no pretense at market making and no attempt to disguise his strategy. But the strategy itself was not new. If regulators and prosecutors are serious about enforcement of securities laws, they should focus on the largest players in the fragmented markets for stocks and not on an individual, acting alone, who managed to fool an algorithm.
But this lease company will be sewed under the 9/11 act for helping a (financial) terrorist who undermined the American economy. Maybe he can get a M28 helicopter and a Mig for free from the Russians. There are enough Russians in London to help him. And if he should pay, he can pay in cheap roubles....
But the author failed to mention that the CME has the power and the technology to stop the spoofing or at least diminish it's effects....but they won't do it as it will decrease the trading volume and cut into their profits. They stand to lose fee income.