Time for a shareholder revolt

Discussion in 'Wall St. News' started by glennmm, Oct 27, 2009.

  1. glennmm


    There are encouraging signs that shareholders are becoming more assertive in defending their interests.

    The Financial Times reported on Monday that some of Britain’s largest institutional shareholders - including Standard Life, Legal & General and M&G - are working on a plan to bypass investment banks by creating a club to underwrite new issues of equity by small and medium-sized British companies, a move that could save hugely on fees.

    What, you may wonder, took them so long?

    Second only to taxpayers, investors have been the great patsies of the financial crisis, paying massive costs to a financial services industry which has, to put it mildly, not served them well.

    Activist shareholders and investors could be a key force in fixing what is wrong with the financial system. Unleashing their power to act in their own best interests should be a main thrust of new regulation.

    The British investor group, reportedly being assisted by mergers and acquisition advisors Lazards, would effectively cut out the middle men by agreeing to take up any unwanted new shares in an offering. This is an idea which if successful could save companies and their owners huge amounts in fees and at the same time deal a blow to investment banking profitability.

    Fees charged by banks for equity underwriting in Britain have more or less doubled in the aftermath of the crisis to 3.5-4.0 percent of the amount being raised, with the lions share going to banks rather than to the institutional investors who sub-underwrite.

    While banks may argue, and in part be correct, that this is because the past two years have demonstrated the risks of capital market underwriting, it is also patently because there are now fewer banks competing for this business.

    To be sure, a club approach is better suited for small and medium sized underwritings and would face huge difficulties for a major share issue involving global investors. But if a test run proves successful it would place pressure on fees for transactions of all sizes.

    Even before the crisis hit, fees for investment banking services seemed not to follow with the same fidelity the laws of economics which hold such sway in microchips, steel or even tax preparation.

    And it’s not just investors, who consume investment banking products, who have been ill-served. Shareholders in companies, particularly in banks, have provided the capital but have not had their fair share of the fruits.


    That has led to bad decisions, decisions often designed to maximize the benefit to employees at the expense of the shareholders who run disproportionate risk.

    Paul Myners, a British Treasury official with special responsibility for financial services, gave an absolutely scathing address last week to the Worshipful Company of International Bankers, assembled for dinner in the Mansion House in the City of London.

    Myners, who is reported to be considering holding a competition inquiry into banking fees, took aim at the bonus and compensation culture in the industry.

    “It could be argued that some shareholders in banks have been left holding not the ordinary shares they originally purchased, but a new form of subordinated, participating, non-cumulative equity that ranks behind rewards for the senior management, and executives of the firm in which they invested have a prior claim. This cannot be right,” Myners said.

    “In case anyone needs reminding, the profits of banks belong to their owners; not their managers and traders.”

    I imagine that the bankers were a little less worshipful on their way out then they were on the way in.

    I would also argue that what Myners said about banking also holds true - to a lesser extent - in other publicly traded companies, where management is able to extract compensation out of proportion to their likely contribution.

    Shareholders, and we are really talking about institutional shareholders, have allowed management to get away with it for years because they thought what they were supposed to be doing was outperforming the market by picking winners.

    Much of what passed for skilled investment over the last 20 years has been little more than riding the waves of a debt-fueled economy which seemed capable of providing six to ten percent returns on an unleveraged basis.

    Adding value too often meant little more than adding leverage to increase returns. When the current rally ends, as it surely will, investors should take a long look at their long term returns. What they will usually see is that they are poor.

    A better strategy for the next 10 years may be to spend as much effort protecting your economic interest in what you own as you do in choosing what to own.