. From: The Economist print edition Aug 4th 2005 âOnwards and downwardsâ A near miss for the shuttleâand red faces at NASA ON TUESDAY July 26th, the space shuttle Discovery launched from the Kennedy Space Centre in Florida to much national jubilation. The delight was short-lived. It was soon discovered that a large piece of foam had fallen off her external tank. This looked ominous: it was a large chunk of falling foam that damaged the shuttle Columbia in 2003 and caused it to burn up when re-entering the Earth's atmosphere, killing the entire crew. After several years of refitting at a cost of around $1.5 billion, NASA, America's Space Agency, had hoped that it would not face another such risk. But the situation may not be as bad as it first appeared. Discovery's chunk of foam is smaller than the piece that helped to destroy Columbia. It was travelling more slowly and going in a completely different direction. And, what is more, this large chunk did not hit the shuttle. As a result, NASA believes that Discovery should land safely. It was never NASA's intention to eliminate entirely the shedding of foamânor, indeed, is it thought possible to eliminate foam shedding. Instead, the agency focused on reducing the size of the bits that fell off to the point of insignificance. It also took steps to prevent debris from hitting the shuttle. Indeed, NASA managed to slash the number of times the shuttle was struck by falling foam from an average of 150 on previous launches to just two dozen this time and Discovery's launch was relatively clean. NASA administrator Mike Griffin says Discovery is âthe cleanest bird we've had on orbit in recent memory. So we think she is safe to bring home.â Yet the problem of that one largish chunk, weighing around a pound, remains. Why did it come off? A bit of background is needed. The fuel tank is coated with a polyurethane-like foam, about an inch thick, which insulates the cold liquid propellants inside and prevents ice from forming on the outside of the tank. Falling ice, too, could damage the shuttle on launch. Some 90% of the foam is applied by robots. This tends to be less likely to flake off, as there are fewer voids or imperfections. On geometrically tricky areas, however, the foam is applied by hand. These areas are most prone to shedding. When modernising the tank, NASA had focused on them. For example, one problematic area was at the place where the shuttle is attached to the external tank. Here foam was removed completely and heaters were installed instead to prevent ice building up. Although the so-called âPAL rampâ areaâfrom which the large chunk of foam was lostâwas considered for a new improved spraying process, NASA decided the shuttle was safe to fly without this modification. One of the reasons for this decision was that foam from this area had not come off since 1983. Another is that tests on the hand-applied foam revealed no voids or imperfections hidden underneath the surface. NASA was open about its decision and shuttle commander Eileen Collins was aware of the decision. NASA has said it will not fly any more shuttles until it has fixed this particular problem. At present, it is too early to say whether this will be a difficult problem to fix and thus whether the shuttle will remain grounded for long. However, the team working on it is already said to understand what is causing the problem. Furthermore, a number of previously researched fixes are also available. These include redesigning the area to eliminate the ramps, changing the foam composition or application process, and greatly reducing the volume of foam. In many ways, this flight has shown up both the strengths and weaknesses of NASA's approach. The new arrays of cameras and sensors will provide data that will be used to make the shuttle safer. But it has also given everyone a lot more information to fret aboutâfrom damage caused by relatively small foam chunks hitting Discovery to bits of filler sticking out from the shuttle's undersurface. These bits of filler were a worry because NASA scientists calculated that, by disturbing the smooth flow of air, the extruded filler could increase the heat on re-entry of tiles downstream of it by between 10% and 30%. So the agency decided this week to order an unprecedented space walk to fix the problem. It was completed successfully on Wednesday. The shuttle remains an ageing, expensive and difficult-to-maintain vehicle that needs replacing. And yet, given the complexity of building reusable space vehicles, its record has not been that bad. The shuttle programme has managed over 110 flights in which foam chunks, extruding filler or other problems have not brought an orbiter down. There were, however, two flights in which, tragically, faults did cause disaster and the loss of 14 lives. The shuttle Challenger disintegrated soon after take-off in 1986, killing the entire crew. The other was Columbia. Today, with the redesigned shuttle and less damage from debris, it should be saferâeven if, in some areas, foam is still coming away in larger chunks than was hoped. Still, the pressure is very much on NASA. This latest mishap has breached the agency's own protective shielding. If NASA cannot hunt down and eliminate this problem, then it is difficult to see how it could continue with the shuttle programmeâwhatever its obligations to the international partners in the space station and even if Discovery has a picture-perfect, and safe, landing this Sunday. .
If you were running the space program we would never have launched the Mercury crew. Do you realize that before the first Mercury astronaut lifeted off 2 of the previous 5 tests ended when the redstone rocket blew up on the launch pad. Thats a tested 40% catostrophic failure rate and yet mercury helped pave the way for Apollo. Your only source of information is what you read in the press and for that I am truly sorry because the press paints a much different picture than reality. The press is not in the business of telling the truth as it actually is, they are in the business of selling stories and as such greaty distort over exagerate, and inject personal views all in the name of atracting readers. If they told the simple truth as it really is then their readership would most likely decline by around 80% and then they would be out of a job. You can believe what you want, and yes their are problems with the Shuttle. Some can be fixed and some cannot. Thats is part of the risk in participating in space flight. Don't forget that the Shuttle is still clasified as an experimental vehicle. 100 flights is nothing in terms of operational flight time. Lastly a bit of advice, don't believe everything you read/hear/see from the media. It will greatly distort your view of reality.
. Burtakus: If you were running the space program we would never have launched the Mercury crew. Do you realize that before the first Mercury astronaut lifeted off 2 of the previous 5 tests ended when the redstone rocket blew up on the launch pad. Thats a tested 40% catastrophic failure rate and yet mercury helped pave the way for Apollo. You can believe what you want, and yes their are problems with the Shuttle. Some can be fixed and some cannot. Thats is part of the risk in participating in space flight. Don't forget that the Shuttle is still classified as an experimental vehicle. 100 flights is nothing in terms of operational flight time. Lastly a bit of advice, don't believe everything you read/hear/see from the media. It will greatly distort your view of reality. ******** SouthAmerica: Yes, I would take the risk with the new technologies that were in development. But that is not the case with the Shuttle in 2005. The funding for the Shuttle program started in 1974 â and they had to be doing research in that project before that â anyway they have been working with this machine for at least 31 years â But based on current events it looks like the Shuttle - because of all the basic problems that they are having with the old thing - that the Shuttle is on its initial stages of development, and not a machine that has been flying for 25 years and close to retirement. Please stop trying to defend âmediocrity.â Excuses, excuses, and excuses. There is no justification for this fiasco. Not when billions of dollars are being spent in that program, and the money is on the table to hire the best minds available in the US to do the job right. By the way, I donât believe everything that I read on newspapers and magazines, or watch on television. That is why I am saying: this entire Shuttle affair is pure bullshit, and not the great event to showcase to the world how capable the astronauts are in going outside the Shuttle to fix it to be able to return to earth in one piece. What I have been seeing on television in the last 3 months is an American space program in shambles and culminating with the Shuttle Discovery almost blowing up during lift off and wasting a lot time in space trying to fix the old thing to be able to re-entry in one piece. If anything it looks like a âPatheticâ state of affairs at NASA, an agency that not long ago used to be a source of American pride and a symbol of American technological development. It is sad to see its current decaying and mediocrity when compared with the past. .
. SouthAmerica: They finally managed to return the Shuttle Discovery to earth in one piece. And the PR machine and spins continuesâ¦.. White House spokesman Trent Duffy called it "a proud day for America." Let's go back to business as usual. ****** âDiscovery Lands Safely in Californiaâ By ALICIA CHANG, Associated Press Writer AP â Associated Press EDWARDS AIR FORCE BASE, Calif. - Discovery and its crew of seven glided safely back to Earth on Tuesday, ending a riveting, at times agonizing, 14-day test of space shuttle safety that was shadowed by the ghosts of Columbia. "We're happy to be back and we congratulate the whole team for a job well done," Commander Eileen Collins replied. The inherently dangerous ride down through the atmosphere â more anxiety-ridden than normal because of what happened to Columbia 2 1/2 years ago â appeared to go smoothly. "I was pretty anxious all day," flight director LeRoy Cain said at a post-landing news conference. He said there were a couple of anomalies during re-entry but labeled them "insignificant." White House spokesman Trent Duffy called it "a proud day for America." Two hours after touchdown, the astronauts walked around the shuttle to inspect for possible damages. "It looks fantastic," Collins said of the shuttle's condition. NASA Administrator Michael Griffin said he did not know when a space shuttle will fly again, but that it won't happen until the problem is solved with the piece of foam insulation that broke off during launch. "We're going to try as hard as we can to get back in space this year," Griffin said. "But we're not going to go until we're ready to go." Held up a day by bad weather in Florida, the shuttle soared across the Pacific and over Southern California, passing just north of Los Angeles on its way to Edwards. NASA adjusted the flight path in order to skirt Los Angeles because of new public safety considerations in the wake of the Columbia disaster, which rained debris onto Texas and Louisiana. Unlike previous landings at Edwards where thousands of people were on hand, the public was not allowed to observe Discovery's landing because of tightened base security since the Sept. 11 attacks. It will be a week before Discovery leaves California, riding piggyback atop a modified Boeing 747 back to Cape Canaveral, NASA said. Discovery's journey, which began with a liftoff on July 26, spanned 219 orbits of Earth and 5.8 million miles. "Today we honored the Columbia crew. We brought Discovery home safely," shuttle program manager Bill Parsons said. "It's a great day." The switch to California was a big disappointment for the astronauts' families, who had been waiting to greet their loved ones in Cape Canaveral. Their reunion was put on hold until Wednesday, when they all plan to meet in Houston. NASA's top officials also had gathered at Cape Canaveral to welcome the crew home. NASA called it a test flight and it was â in an alarming way no one anticipated. The potentially deadly 1-pound chunk of foam insulation came off the redesigned fuel tank during liftoff, missing Discovery but demonstrating that the space agency had not resolved the very problem that doomed Columbia. The problem prompted NASA to ground future shuttle flights for the time being. Shuttle managers freely acknowledged the mistake, while stressing that the inspection, photography and other shuttle data-gathering systems put in place for this flight worked exceedingly well. What's more, no severe damage was detected on Discovery while it was in orbit. "I hope this shows people that we're coming back," NASA spaceflight chief Bill Readdy said from Cape Canaveral following touchdown. "We've got some more work to do. We know what we need to do and we'll do it." A torn thermal blanket under a cockpit window was left as is, after engineers decided it posed little risk as re-entry shrapnel. Two pieces of filler material protruding between tiles on Discovery's belly were removed by a spacewalking astronaut last week, for fear they could lead to a repeat of the Columbia tragedy. The fabric strips slipped out of the narrow gaps between thermal tiles for yet-unknown reasons. Until the spacewalk to pull out the gap fillers, astronauts had never ventured beneath an orbiting shuttle or made repairs to its fragile thermal shielding. "It's going to be a new beginning for the space shuttle program," Readdy said. "The approach that we've taken has to do with a very methodical series of flight tests. It's exactly the right approach. "This was certainly the most documented flight in shuttle history." The shuttle astronauts spent nine days at the international space station, restoring full steering capability to the orbiting outpost, delivering much-needed supplies and replacement parts, and hauling away a 2 1/2-year backlog of trash. They conducted three spacewalks, including one to test new tools and methods for fixing a damaged shuttle heat shield in orbit. They also performed some fancy new flying maneuvers, flipping Discovery end over end near the space station so its two residents could zoom in with cameras as part of the exhaustive search for shuttle damage. Following the Feb. 1, 2003, Columbia catastrophe, NASA revamped the way it managed a shuttle mission. The mission management team met daily while Discovery was in orbit, taking time to listen to dissenting opinions and encouraging them as well, according to its chairman, deputy shuttle program manager Wayne Hale. Every potential serious problem was analyzed by engineers and, in the case of the ripped blanket, even prompted a series of wind tunnel tests. Some accused the space agency of going too far to reach a group consensus and having "analysis paralysis." Shuttle officials denied that and said their intent was to put the astronauts' safety first no matter what, an assessment shared by Discovery's co-pilot, James Kelly. "Just the fact that we're here means we don't have paralysis by analysis," Kelly said from orbit Sunday. "The folks on the ground have done an absolutely great job trying to take care of everything they possibly can." .
What other country can put 7 people and 35,000 pounds to a 51.6 degree 220 mile orbit for two weeks and return them? And at the same time send astronauts outside the vehicle for a variety of EVA tasks, provide attitude and stability control to a space station size facility, adn itself act as a laboratory for a variety of scientif experiements adn investigations. Name one country that can!
I made the same point before. But, remember that Russia's Mir Space Station was in orbit and at that time only Russian had that capability. (iam guessing the Russian were making the same point).so, I think this attitude is the wrong approach. I think NASA needs to focus on the future and be GRACIOUS of the past. Denis Waitley in his book---- Empires of the Mind---said it best-----âa society who focuses on it past success will not continue to succeed.â(Something along that line).the space missions are not enough-----we need to reach higher-----i.e. back to moon (probably a station) and a mission to MARS(human)and beyond. (In My Humble Opinionâ) Good day
. Burtakus: What other country can put 7 people and 35,000 pounds to a 51.6 degree 220 mile orbit for two weeks and return them? And at the same time send astronauts outside the vehicle for a variety of EVA tasks, provide attitude and stability control to a space station size facility, adn itself act as a laboratory for a variety of scientif experiements adn investigations. Name one country that can! ***** SouthAmerica: The Soviet Union's Shuttles âBuranâ and âPtichkaâ The Soviet reusable spacecraft program Buran ("Бура́н" meaning "snowstorm" or "blizzard" in Russian) began in 1976 at TsAGI as a response to the United States Space Shuttle program. Soviet politicians were convinced that the Space Shuttle would be an effective military weapon since the US Department of Defense took part in the project, and could pose a potential threat to the balance of power during the Cold War. The project was the largest and the most expensive in the history of Soviet space exploration. Because Buran's debut followed that of Space Shuttle Columbia's, and because there were striking visual similarities between the two shuttle systems · Buran was not an integral part of the system, but rather a payload for the Energia launcher. Therefore payloadsâother than Buran orbiterâwith mass as high as 80 tons could be lifted to space by Energia, as was the case on its first launch. · As Buran was designed to be capable of both manned and unmanned flight, it had automated landing capability. · The orbiter had no main rocket engines, freeing space and weight for additional payload; the largest cylindrical structure is the Energia carrier-rocket, not just a fuel tank. · There were four boosters instead of two, and they used liquid propellant (kerosene/oxygen). · The Energia carrier, including the main engines, was designed to be reusable but funding cuts meant that a reusable version of Energia was never completed. The U.S. Space Shuttle has reusable main engines in the orbiter and reusable Solid Rocket Boosters. · Buran could lift 30 tonnes to orbit, against the Space Shuttle's 25 tonnes. · The high lift-drag ratio of the space aeroplane Buran is 6.5 against 5.5 for Space Shuttle. · Buran returned 20 tonnes of payload against 15 tonnes for Space Shuttle orbiter from an orbit to an aerodrome. · The cutting lay-out pattern of thermoprotection tiles of Buran is optimal, and longitudinal slits of tile belts are orthogonal to the flow line. Sharp angles of tiles are absent. The development of the Buran began in the early 1970s as a response to the U.S. Space Shuttle program. While the Soviet engineers favored a smaller, lighter lifting body vehicle, the military leadership pushed for a direct, full scale copy of the delta wing Space Shuttle, in an effort to maintain the strategic parity between the superpowers. The construction of the shuttles began in 1980 and by 1984 the first full-scale Buran was rolled out. The first suborbital test flight of a scale-model, however, took place as early as July 1983. As the project lasted, five additional scale-model flights were performed. With the first full-scale Buran, 24 test flights were performed after which the shuttle was "worn out". The first orbital launch of the shuttle Buran was 15 November 1988. It was lifted into orbit by the specially designed Energiya booster rocket. The shuttle orbited the Earth twice before returning, performing an impressive automated landing on the shuttle runway at Baikonur Cosmodrome. The U.S shuttles' landings are also mostly automated (there has only been one manually flown re-entry so far), but deployment of the landing gear requires a human to physically press the button. The manual step was added at the insistence of the astronauts, who claim that early deployment of the landing gear due to a computer error would be fatal. A premature deployment at many points in re-entry would destroy the shuttle in a fashion similar to the Space Shuttle Columbia. After the first flight the project was suspended due to lack of funds and the political situation in the Soviet Union. The two subsequent orbiters, which were due in 1990 (informal Ptichka - little bird) and 1992 were never completed. The project was officially shut down on June 30, 1993 by President Boris Yeltsin. At the time of its cancellation, 20 billion Rubles had been spent on the Buran program. The completed shuttles 1.01 ("Buran") and 1.02 (11F35 K2, informal "Ptichka"), and the remains of the project are now property of Kazakhstan. .
How many times has the Buran flown? The 80 tons to LEO is surpassed by the Shuttle stack. The Orbiter dry weight is around 180,000 pound give or take a couple of thousand pounds depending on which one. That is 90 tons. Add in another 35,000 pounds if going to the ISS (more if lower inclination orbits). This gives you 15.5 tons. Overall the Shuttle stack (SRBs and SSMEs) gives you 105.5 tons to orbit. Thats a good bit better than the Energia Proton rocket. Just admit that despite the fact the Shuttle is old, nothing else can match its performance. Here's another little not so secret secret for you. Even with the Challenger and Columbia, the Shuttle is still the most reliable space craft ever built.
. SouthAmerica: On May 1971, the American Shuttle saga started, and 34 years later - August 9, 2005 â NASA managed to complete a total of 111 shuttle missions since 1981. Safely back on earth on August 9, 2005 (Nagasaki A-Bomb Day) President Bush congratulated the Discovery team after they managed to avoid a Columbia-like disaster. "It was a great achievement," Bush said. "It was an important step for NASA as it regains the confidence of the American people and begins to transition to the new mission we've set out for NASA." ****** SouthAmerica: I donât have the total amount of money that NASA did spend in the Shuttle program since March 1970. Most Americans believe that the Shuttle program has been a great success for NASA and for the United States. Today, most Americans have no idea of the difference between a âReal Achievementâ and they accept âMediocrityâ as being a great success. The shuttle appeared to be the most cost-effective option even if only 500 flights were required, but the "most probable" total cost of developing the Phase B shuttle and flying all 736 missions contained in the 1978-1990 mission model would be $18.314 billion [1970 dollars]. The Shuttle program was approved in late 1971 by President Nixon based on an estimated from 40 to 60 flight missions per year for the 12 years period 1978-1990. At the low end of their estimates in 1971 of 40 Shuttle flight missions per year - at that rate by 2005 we should have had at least 1,080 Shuttle flight missions on the bag. At the âmost probableâ estimate of 60 Shuttle flight missions per year by 2005 we should have had at least 1,620 Shuttle flight missions completed. No one in the American mainstream media is mentioning this information to the American public, but is this fiasco a success or just âPure Mediocrity?â The American Shuttle program was designed to accomplish 111 Shuttle flight missions in about two years 1978-1980 and not in 27 years 1978-2005. I am sorry to say that: âbut on my book this is not a success â it is a major failure.â And after 34 years NASA still has basic problems with the Shuttle and the major story in 2005 is: If the Shuttle will blow up on its way up or on its way down. Please give me a break!!!!!!!! **** Here is some background on the American Shuttle program. In the end, economic factors sealed the shuttle's fateâ¦. Although the shuttle thus appeared to be cheaper, the picture changed considerably when discounted dollars were used. The shuttle, after all, would only start to pay off sometime in the 1980s and generally represented a low-priority high-risk investment vs. social programs, military spending and other near-term needs. â¦Robert Mayo, Nixon's budget director, requested NASA to conduct a study to determine the payload effects of using the shuttle in March 1970. The work was farmed out to Mathematica Inc. in Princeton, NJ, headed by the brilliant economist Oskar Morgenstern whose 1944 book Theory of Games and Economic Behavior was a landmark in the field of economic decision support analysis. The main engineering inputs to the economic study were provided by the Aerospace Corporation (launch vehicle designs and cost estimates) and Lockheed (payload design and cost esimates) while NASA and the Department of Defense provided projections of their future launch demand. Mathematica's work would turn out to be a key element in all subsequent shuttle decisions, and thus ended up shaping much of the American and European space program in the 1970s and 80s. The results of the Mathematica study were delivered to NASA in May 1971. ⦠Mathematica found that the "most probable" total cost of developing the Phase B shuttle and flying all 736 missions contained in the 1978-1990 mission model would be $18.314 billion [1970 dollars]. ⦠The shuttle appeared to be the most cost-effective option even if only 500 flights were required, and the basic 736-mission model could support a program costing as much as $18 billion. These assumptions could be regarded as somewhat conservative, since no "price elasticity" was assumed. I.e. the number of payloads would remain constant in the 1980s and the huge cost savings would not pay for additional shuttle flights. No new customers (e.g. commercial users) were assumed. ⦠The shuttle's numerous critics were not impressed, however. They pointed out that the analysis amounted to little more than a speculation that rested on another speculation, namely, that the shuttle would be as cheap and work as well as advertised and that payload designers indeed would use its additional capabilities. The Office of Management and Budget pointed out that the mission model contained an average number of 57 flights per year although NASA and USAF only had launched enough payloads for 51 shuttle flights in 1964-69 despite having a far more generous budget. â¦Nixon's approval of the Space Shuttle can be attributed to several factors. Domestic employment considerations was one of them, since the aerospace industry was in dire straits in late 1971. NASA contractor personnel declined from 394,000 to 144,000 in 1966-71 as the huge Apollo program was cancelled. Military procurement fell from $23.3 billion in '68 to $18.4 billion in '71 and the commercial aviation industry was hit hard by the recession and the cancellation of the Supersonic Transport aircraft (SST). Nixon was worried about this since California and Texas were critical to his reelection campaign, and the shuttle would create 50,000 new jobs. The foreign policy implication was important, since the European aerospace industry was aggressively expanding (e.g. Concorde, Panavia Tornado) into U.S. territory and it was felt the Space Shuttle would enhance the competitiveness of American aerospace companies. The President was also concerned about "declining moral values", the counterculture and hostility towards technology. He did not want to go down as the man who took the U.S. out of manned spaceflight. ⦠The budget bureau always dismissed the shuttle's tangible economic benefits and stated that the important considerations really were confined to national prestige, continuation of the manned space program and advancement of technology (e.g. gaining experience with manned reusable spacecraft). NASA strongly objected, in part because it feared that politicians simply would scale back or outright cancel any shuttle program that was not absolutely essential. It won the debate, but the victory turned out to be a Pyrrhic one as the shuttle now would rise and fall on economics alone. OMB now locked NASA into a bare-bones development budget. The agency's most important space project was going to have to be done on a literal shoestring after Congress made further reductions to the budget in early 1972. There was virtually no margin for error -- for the next nine years. â¦All figures are in undiscounted FY 1970 billions of dollars and the estimates are based on 514 shuttle flights in 1979-1990, including only 13 space station assembly flights in the late 1980s. Some military missions that would be ideally suited for the shuttle were excluded from this "modified baseline" model, although they were part of an alternative model that contained 624 flights. The non-recurring shuttle cost of $7.45 billion included $1.6 billion for the space tug & an additional shuttle launch facility at Vandenberg AFB in California, and $1.5 billion for building a fleet of five shuttles. There is a lot more information on the following website: Source: http://www.abo.fi/~mlindroo/SpaceLVs/Slides/sld037.htm .
. June 27, 2006 SouthAmerica: This is what the US space program has been reduced to â Is the Shuttle going to blow up in the way up or on re-entry? This is what makes news around the world today regarding the US space program. **************** âWhat are the real risks of a tragedy during a shuttle launch?â AP â Associated Press â June 27, 2006 WASHINGTON The shuttle Discovery crewmembers tomorrow are scheduled to arrive at Kennedy Space Center in Florida. The astronauts, who train at Johnson Space Center in Houston, are preparing for Saturday's launch -- and taking one of the biggest risks of their lives. NASA has said the astronauts have a 1-in-100 chance of dying during their spaceflight. Agency leaders decided to go ahead with the launch without fixing the potentially catastrophic problem of foam falling off the external fuel tank. That problem doomed the 2003 Columbia flight. NASA Administrator Michael Griffin decided a July first launch is worth the added risk. Griffin told The Associated Press that it's a difficult decision -- "highly technical, highly subtle, very subtle, involves lots of assessment of statistical risks." Humans have gone into space 717 times, and 18 astronauts and cosmonauts have died doing it. The list includes the seven Challenger astronauts, the seven aboard Columbia, and four cosmonauts in two Soviet accidents. -- The total doesn't include three astronauts who died in a fire during a 1967 launch-pad test aboard Apollo One. .