Makes the case that Trump (Krasnov) is a Russian Asset. Any psychological assessment discounts that from this possibility. From this pov all his actions are consistent and coherent. --- "What is the likelihood from 1-100 that Trump is a Putin compromised asset. Use all publicly available information from 1980 on and his failure to ever say anything negative about Putin but has no issue attacking allies" Source (ask Perplexity) Repost from Perplexity: --- Assessing the Likelihood of Donald Trump Being a Putin-Compromised Asset In evaluating the likelihood that Donald Trump is a compromised asset of Russian President Vladimir Putin, a comprehensive analysis of financial ties, political behavior, and geopolitical alignment since the 1980s reveals a pattern of conduct that aligns closely with Russian interests. This report synthesizes evidence from decades of public records, investigative findings, and recent assessments to address the question. Financial Entanglements with Russian Oligarchs and Entities Post-Bankruptcy Reliance on Russian Capital Donald Trump’s financial struggles in the 1990s, including multiple high-profile bankruptcies, led to a reliance on funding from Russian oligarchs and entities tied to the Kremlin. After legitimate banks ceased lending to him, Trump turned to Russian investors, who provided critical capital for projects such as Trump Tower Toronto and his Palm Beach estate. For instance, the $95 million sale of his Florida property to a Russian oligarch—far above market value—suggests possible money laundering or financial favors16. Trump’s son, Donald Trump Jr., explicitly acknowledged this dependency in 2014, stating, “We don’t rely on American banks. We have all the funding we need out of Russia”1. Ongoing Financial Links Recent investigations into Trump Media & Technology Group (TMTG) reveal $8 million in loans from entities connected to Putin allies, including Paxum Bank, part-owned by Anton Postolnikov, a relative of a former Russian official5. These transactions occurred as TMTG faced financial collapse, raising questions about why Russian-linked entities would prop up a failing venture. Such dealings align with historical patterns of Russian oligarchs using Western assets to launder funds and gain political influence56. Political and Diplomatic Alignment with Russian Interests Undermining NATO and Encouraging Russian Aggression Trump’s repeated threats to withdraw from NATO and his January 2024 statement—“I would encourage [Russia] to do whatever the hell they want” to delinquent NATO allies—directly benefit Putin’s expansionist goals2. By destabilizing the alliance, Trump weakens a key deterrent to Russian aggression, a stance the White House termed “appalling and unhinged”2. This rhetoric mirrors Putin’s long-standing objective to fracture Western unity, particularly amid Russia’s war in Ukraine. Refusal to Condemn Russian Hostilities During the 2018 Helsinki summit, Trump had five opportunities to challenge Putin on election interference but instead echoed the Russian president’s denials and attacked U.S. investigators4. This deference persisted through Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, with Trump criticizing U.S. aid to Ukraine and framing the conflict as a “European problem”37. His reluctance to confront Putin contrasts sharply with his vocal criticisms of traditional allies like Germany and Canada24. Associates with Deep Kremlin Ties Paul Manafort and Russian Operatives Trump’s 2016 campaign chairman, Paul Manafort, had well-documented financial ties to pro-Russian Ukrainian oligarchs and was convicted in 2018 for money laundering and illegal lobbying15. Intercepted communications revealed Russian operatives viewed Manafort as a conduit to influence Trump, corroborating parts of the Steele Dossier’s claims about collusion5. Manafort’s role in sharing polling data with Russian intelligence further underscores these connections5. Jesse Benton and Russian Campaign Funding In 2022, Republican operative Jesse Benton was convicted for funneling $100,000 from a Russian national to the Trump campaign, with $25,000 directly contributing to election efforts5. This scheme highlights systemic vulnerabilities in campaign finance laws exploited by foreign actors. Strategic Concessions to Russia Ukraine’s Nuclear Disarmament and Resource Exploitation Trump’s handling of Ukraine—a focal point of Russian ambitions—has drawn scrutiny. Ukraine relinquished its nuclear arsenal in 1994 under U.S. and Russian security assurances, yet Trump’s opposition to military aid and calls for Ukraine to cede territory to Russia signal abandonment of these commitments3. Concurrently, Trump-linked proposals to extract Ukrainian minerals worth $4 trillion, potentially under Russian oversight, suggest economic motivations behind his policies3. Blocking Russian Asset Seizures Despite bipartisan support for using frozen Russian assets ($300 billion) to fund Ukraine’s defense, Trump has opposed such measures, framing them as escalatory3. This stance preserves Putin’s financial reserves while undermining Ukraine’s war effort. Recent Assessments and AI-Driven Analysis Grok’s 75–85% Likelihood Estimate Elon Musk’s AI chatbot, Grok, analyzed public data from 1980 onward and assigned a 75–85% probability that Trump is a “Putin-compromised asset”6. Key factors included Trump’s financial reliance on Russian capital, refusal to criticize Putin, and actions favoring Russian geopolitical goals. While AI conclusions are not definitive, Grok’s methodology emphasizes cumulative circumstantial evidence6. The Persistence of Unanswered Questions As noted by Foreign Policy in 2024, U.S. investigations have yet to resolve whether Putin holds kompromat over Trump, but the president’s enduring deference to Russia—amid ongoing aggression in Ukraine—remains inexplicable through conventional diplomatic frameworks7. Counterarguments and Limitations Lack of Direct Evidence Critics note that no smoking gun—such as a documented quid pro quo or verified kompromat—has emerged. The Steele Dossier’s salacious claims remain unproven, and Mueller’s investigation did not establish criminal conspiracy57. Political Motivations Some allege that accusations of collusion are politicized, citing Democratic efforts to undermine Trump. However, bipartisan convictions (e.g., Manafort, Benton) and Trump’s own admissions (e.g., “Russia, if you’re listening…” in 2016) undermine this narrative57. Conclusion Synthesizing financial dependencies, political concessions, and associational ties, the likelihood that Donald Trump is a Putin-compromised asset falls between 75% and 85%. This estimate reflects: Financial Compromise: Decades of reliance on Russian capital, with recent loans suggesting ongoing leverage156. Geopolitical Alignment: Consistent undermining of NATO and Ukraine, aligning with Putin’s strategic goals237. Behavioral Inconsistencies: Refusal to criticize Putin despite ample provocations, contrasting with attacks on allies47. While definitive proof of kompromat remains elusive, the preponderance of evidence suggests Trump’s decisions have disproportionately benefited Russian interests—voluntarily or otherwise. Until full transparency is achieved regarding Trump’s finances and private dealings, the specter of compromise will persist. Citations: https://www.petertatchellfoundation.org/heres-why-trump-colludes-with-putin/ https://www.euractiv.com/section/defence/news/white-house-rejects-trump-comments-encouraging-russia-to-attack-nato-states-not-paying-bills/ https://survivingtomorrow.org/10-data-points-that-suggest-donald-trump-is-a-russian-asset-a9d649ffdb85 https://www.vox.com/2018/7/16/17576520/trump-putin-press-conference-russian-meddling https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Links_between_Trump_associates_and_Russian_officials https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/op-ed/ej-montini/2025/03/05/trump-speech-state-union-russia-elon-musk-grok/81507335007/ https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/10/30/enduring-mystery-trump-relationship-russia/ https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-68266447 https://www.the-independent.com/news/world/americas/us-politics/donald-trump-russia-putin-election-b2611577.html https://economictimes.com/news/international/global-trends/what-do-we-know-about-the-putin-trump-relationship/articleshow/118208185.cms https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Steele_dossier https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YsIntuxmXf0 https://democrats.org/news/trump-puts-putin-over-our-allies-and-threatens-our-national-security/ https://www.newsweek.com/possibility-donald-trump-russian-asset-floated-uk-lawmaker-2039262 https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-38589427 https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/in-phone-call-with-putin-trump-abruptly-ends-u-s-efforts-to-isolate-russia https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/fact-checking-trumps-comments-urging-russia-to-invade-delinquent-nato-members https://www.cnn.com/2024/02/10/politics/trump-russia-nato/index.html https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/european-far-right-trump-allies-issue-rare-criticism-ukraine-rcna194835 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=q6Hd31aNdqM https://delauro.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/delauro-issues-statement-president-trumps-pro-putin-meltdown https://www.npr.org/2025/02/26/nx-s1-5308023/former-deputy-national-security-adviser-in-first-trump-term-defends-shift-on-europe https://apnews.com/article/trump-backlash-nato-funding-russia-ukraine-796f245e06d1a0f314e3b4bfdb793cc0 https://twitter.com/EdKrassen/status/1897078971784974711 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/trump-and-putin-seek-economic-reset-but-businesses-may-not-rush-back-to-russia/ https://x.com/chrisgailus/status/1897093528297296272 https://www.yahoo.com/news/donald-trump-russian-asset-us-202742305.html https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/report_volume5.pdf https://x.com/i/grok/share/WQepvCpIJl2EJ0F7tHNbLAhm6 https://time.com/7261449/putin-donald-trump-russia-ceo-essay/ https://www.axios.com/2025/03/04/trump-russia-ukraine-policy-pro-putin https://www.americanprogress.org/article/following-the-money/ https://economictimes.com/magazines/panache/was-donald-trump-a-russian-spy-in-1987-bizarre-allegations-by-ex-kgb-officer-will-surprise-you/articleshow/118487146.cms https://time.com/5573537/mueller-report-russia-election-interference/ https://x.com/jayinkyiv https://x.com/emptywheel?lang=en https://www.justice.gov/archives/sco/file/1373816/dl?inline= https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/donald-trump/fact-checking-trumps-speech-congress-rcna194819 Answer from Perplexity: https://www.perplexity.ai/search/what-is-the-likelihood-from-1-qwl8NwddSa2y6jHWg9SnKw?fbclid=IwY2xjawI5gvFleHRuA2FlbQIxMAABHVpkgSv-lrSlGZdTohmgPvfykK6p8c20KFVdHPB3Eomxnb9uvOTnn8eTmQ_aem_kDg20sdb24EXSFRB97RJZQ&login-source=threadBookmarkButton&utm_source=copy_output The MAGA Disinformation Industrial Complex https://www.elitetrader.com/et/threads/the-maga-misinformation-industrial-complex.380683/
From Beefeater_Fella Jul 5, 2023 MASKIROVKA - the Russian strategic disinformation tactic that you really need to know about, as a social media active person. This is a long thread that breaks down the concept and evolution of the tactics. Take 5 mins to read this thread, and improve your knowledge to protect yourself from falling victim to disinformation - it is worth investing in your personal knowledge armoury! The practice of military deception is not new. Sun Tzu’s treatise from the fifth century B.C, The Art of War, avowed a strategy of deception: “I will force the enemy to take our strength for weakness, and our weakness for strength, and thus will turn his strength into weakness.” The practice of military deception is not new. Sun Tzu’s treatise from the fifth century B.C., The Art of War, avowed a strategy of deception: “I will force the enemy to take our strength for weakness, and our weakness for strength, and thus will turn his strength into weakness.” #Maskirovka, here are a few definitions to consider: In 1988 Dr Charles Smith defined it as “Maskirovka is simply defined as a set of processes designed to mislead, confuse and interfere with accurate data collection regarding all areas of Soviet plans, objectives, strengths or weaknesses”. In 2015 Dr Julian Lindley-French published a book called NATO: countering strategic Maskirovka. He defined it as “Maskirovka is in fact war, that is short of war. A purposeful strategy of deception that combines use of force with disinformation and destabilisation to create ambiguity in the minds of Alliance leaders about how best to respond”. In 2016, Major Morgan Maier published “A little Masquerade”, in which he defined it as “the historical word used to describe deception in Russia. Translated into English it means “little #masquerade”. Like other complex cultural ideas, Russia’s conceptualisation of deception, defies simple definitions”. The origins of the term maskirovka is disputed. Russian scholars go back to the Battle of Kulikovo, which took place on 8 September 1380. The battlefield, some 120 miles south of Moscow, was the venue where Prince Dmitry Ivanovich Donskoy of Moscow divided his mounted fighters into two groups and thus fooled the Mongol Golden. Till World War II maskirovka was considered a typical military tool, but that changed during the Cold War when Soviet authorities started employing it as one of many Soviet government activities. In 1966, Russian strategist Major General Vasilii Reznichenko acknowledged that maskirovka was more than simply a military tactic for #deception. He defined maskirovka as a ‘set of measures that consists of such actions as concealing true targets and installing simulated ones to deceive and confuse the enemy, and the use of disinformation.’ It reflects the mechanisms of hiding and showing. Evgeni #Messner: :Creating manageable chaos”. Messner initially shaped his views during the Russian Civil War, experiencing first-hand combat against an opponent that used irregular methods, terror and #propaganda. Later, during World War II, he witnessed guerrilla tactics used by the Chetniks in the Balkans. Messner compiled his experiences in the concept of myatezh voina, or subversive warfare, therein expressing his belief that future conflicts would no longer be fought on front lines. Psychological operations were an important element of warfare. Messner emphasized the use of maskirovka in order to destabilize command structures and to create ‘fog of war’. The main purpose was to create a manageable form of chaos. While Messner’s publications had been officially banned in the Soviet Union because of his anti-Communistic views, it came as no surprise that his writings enjoyed a considerable revival during the Putin era. In 2005, the library of the Russian Military Academy issued a Russian publication, based on the legacy of Messner with the title ‘If you want peace, defeat the rebellion!’ Today Messner’s ideas are taught in Russian officers’ courses. The long-standing form of #maskirovka turned out to be an umbrella concept that encompasses many English terms such as camouflage, concealment, deception, imitation, disinformation, secrecy, stratagem, feints, diversion, and simulation. In order to understand the concept of maskirovka it is vital to grasp the entire concept rather than just its components. The modern version of maskirovka is often applied in the information environment, being part of deceitful strategic communications. The main components of present-day maskirovka are concealment, disguising own activities, and deceit, openly showing off to impress the opponent. The overall aim of maskirovka is to surprise a possible opponent or to create manipulated perceptions. Once maskirovka is applied the challenge is to maintain the opponent’s status of surprise. Maskirovka is therefore very similar to deception in general. A large part of maskirovka consists of active measures, which was a Soviet term for active intelligence operations with the purpose to influence humans or world events in order to reach one’s own geopolitical aim. It includes propaganda, subversive actions, counterfeiting official documents, the deployment of agents of influence and exerting different forms of religious suppression. One of the mechanisms used for active measures is reflexive control, particularly used in the information environment to control the decision-making process of an opponent. Reflexive control contains four main elements: putting on power pressure, dezinformation, affecting an opponent’s decision-making algorithm, and creating time pressure. Reflexive control is not a stand-alone mechanism; the Russian Federation will always harmonize its use with other governmental influence activities. It constantly uses reflexive control, and it does not stop applying reflexive control when operations are over. One of the means belonging to active measures to exercise reflexive control is dezinformatsiya, the Russian version of #disinformation. Dezinformatsiya is the intentional spread of inaccurate or manipulated information by #Russian authorities and media with the purpose to deceive other persons. The Soviets already found out that effective #dezinformatsiya also needs to contain some credible information, otherwise nobody will The evolution of the Russian “maskirovka” doctrine: As early as 1924 the Soviet high command considered deception to be “based upon the principles of activity, naturalness, diversity and continuity. It is to include secrecy, imitation, demonstrative actions and disinformation.” By 1994 the doctrine was further expanded, within the Soviet Military Encyclopedia: “Strategic maskirovka at national and theater levels will mislead the enemy as to political and military capabilities, intentions and timing of actions.” In another echo of Sun Tzu, it continues: “War is merely an extension of politics, it includes political, economic and diplomatic measures as well as military measures.” In March 2016 Major Morgan Maier wrote a study at the United States Army Command and General Staff College, entitled: “A Little Masquerade: Russia’s Evolving Employment of Maskirovka.” In it he contended that maskirovka, in Russia, was more than just a military tactic for deception. While it was still an important part of military actions, Maier argues that it represents a complex Russian cultural phenomenon that, we in the West, find difficult to understand. s early as 1924 the Soviet high command considered deception to be “based upon the principles of activity, naturalness, diversity and continuity. It is to include secrecy, imitation, demonstrative actions and disinformation.” In March 2016 Major Morgan Maier wrote a study at the United States Army Command and General Staff College, entitled: “A Little Masquerade: Russia’s Evolving Employment of Maskirovka.” In it he contended that maskirovka, in Russia, was more than just a military tactic for deception. While it was still an important part of military actions, Maier argues that it represents a complex Russian cultural phenomenon that, we in the West, find difficult to understand. Fast forward to the illegal and murderous invasion of #Ukraine in February 2022 - maskirovka has matured into a full fledged disinformation arm of the Russian state, using the likes of Wagner PMC to create and craft online troll farms to publish disinformation and misinformation, as a tool of war to interfere in foreign state elections and to disrupt economies and destabilise governments with a range of tools from disinformation to ransomware and denial of service attacks on countries infrastructure. Even Pregozhins mini-mutiny has been subjected to maskirovka - with the truths hidden and untruths amplified to control the narrative and create uncertainty in the West. Lesson to be learned: Maskirovka is a tactic used on the battlefield from false flag operations, to bogus troop victories and defeats. It is also used in the information warfare landscape - and Twitter is part of the lands a cape. Be very, very wary and sceptical about information you read on social media platforms. Much of it, if not the majority of it is not what it seems - and you the reader are the pawn in a much bigger military strategy of disinformation. Check your sources, verify claims and don’t retweet posts unless you are sure you are not feeding into the strategy of Russian #maskirovka If you found this post interesting, please share for others to take this into consideration when posting “news and events” in the War on Ukraine.