Bring Back the Baathists - NY TImes By ERIC POSNER Published: April 28, 2004 CHICAGO The decision by the Coalition Provisional Authority to ease its policy barring former Baath Party members from Iraqi government jobs has generated widespread criticism in Iraqi political circles. Ahmed Chalabi, America's onetime favorite member of the Iraqi Governing Council, said that giving jobs to former Baathists was like "allowing Nazis into the German government immediately after World War II." But that's precisely the point â the history of the last 50 years shows that countries trying to make transitions to democracy must inevitably bring back at least some members of the ousted regime. After World War II, the allies resolved not only to punish Nazi war criminals but also to purge Nazism from German public life. Yet even before the Nuremberg trials had concluded, the Americans realized that they could not rebuild Germany without the help of at least some former Nazis who had dominated the bureaucracy, industry and the military. Although the worst Nazis were punished, most others were eventually given amnesty and went to work on reconstruction. Simultaneously in Japan, transitional justice was even more perfunctory. From the beginning, the Americans decided that Emperor Hirohito would have to be retained so that the United States could exert control over the populace through him. His absence from the Tokyo trials of war leaders weakened that tribunal's impact, and soon enough many members of the wartime regime were allowed to help get the country back on its feet. In both cases, the decisions to ease the purges were partly, but not entirely, realpolitik. Yes, America needed Germany and Japan as allies against the Soviet Union. But it also realized that neither place could become a functioning liberal democracy without the cooperation and expertise of the vast majority of those tainted by the previous governments. An endless occupation was not an attractive prospect â just as it is not in Iraq now. The compromise in both Germany and Japan was a series of high-profile trials of the worst war criminals, followed by amnesty for most everyone else, many of whom were not only complicit in the old regime but responsible for some of its ugliest decisions. This set the pattern for the next several decades â in Spain, Greece, Portugal, Argentina, Chile, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland, the former East Germany, the Philippines, South Africa and elsewhere. Although in some cases moderate transitional justice measures were carried out â including truth commissions, reparations, purges of leaders and collaborators, and trials of some lower-level officials like border guards â most holdovers from the old regime were permitted to take part in the new. Admittedly, there are some big differences between the recent experiences in Europe and Latin America and the current situation in Iraq. First, in most of those other countries the former leaders left office peacefully in return for implicit or explicit grants of immunity. Many also retained some support among the public and in the military. And they were not kicked out by a foreign army. Because of the different situation in Iraq, former Baathists have less bargaining power. Still, as we have seen in the Sunni Triangle, they retain ample power to do mischief, and pacification will not be possible without some compromise. The other major difference is that many Iraqis can claim to have been active opponents of Saddam Hussein rather than sullenly complicit, as was more the case in Eastern Europe during the cold war, or enthusiastically complicit, which was the case in Germany and Japan after World War II. Telling these brave Iraqi dissidents that they must now allow their former oppressors to join them in government is hard â and it seemed politically impossible a year ago. In light of the current insurgency, however, such a move seems unavoidable, and no doubt many Iraqis who suffered under the Baathists would now agree that maintaining order and getting sovereignty is the highest priority. The coalition officials who initially resolved to de-Baathify Iraq made the same mistakes as their World War II predecessors: they saw the former Baath members only as villains and troublemakers. They did not consider that the Baathists' skills and experience â and their political power â made them indispensable. Now the Coalition Provisional Authority seems to have realized its mistake. Although its leader, L. Paul Bremer III, plays down the latest step â saying that he is not abandoning the de-Baathification policy but simply making it more orderly â it seems clear that his intent is to get thousands of former low-level Baathists, especially teachers, back to work quickly. Further relaxation of the de-Baathification program is inevitable. The impulse to hand over the reins of power entirely to Saddam Hussein's victims, as compensation for the injustices they suffered, is understandable. But history shows that political compromise is the wiser course. And with every passing day that the old regime's underlings remain unsatisfied, America's troubles will only increase. Eric Posner is a professor of law at the University of Chicago.
And again, if you want to support the murderous Baath Party, of course, it's your choice. Not me. Never.
lolol do you mean this same Chalabi? Iraq's pie was sliced and delivered before the war, All these gyrations are just the typical bureaucratical bs now November 3, 2002 The Observer The leader of the London-based Iraqi National Congress, Ahmed Chalabi, has met executives of three US oil multinationals to negotiate the carve-up of Iraq's massive oil reserves post-Saddam. Disclosure of the meetings in October in Washington - confirmed by an INC spokesman - comes as Lord Browne, the head of BP, has warned that British oil companies have been squeezed out of post-war Iraq even before the first shot has been fired in any US-led land invasion. http://observer.guardian.co.uk/iraq/story/0,12239,825105,00.html just follow the money.........
US forces to pull out of Falluja George Wright and agencies Thursday April 29, 2004 US forces today announced an end to their siege of Falluja, saying they will pull out immediately to allow a newly-created, Iraqi security force to secure the city. The new force, known as the Falluja Protective Army, will consist of up to 1,100 Iraqi soldiers led by a former general from the military of Saddam Hussein and will begin moving into the city tomorrow. ... http://www.guardian.co.uk/Iraq/Story/0,2763,1206015,00.html
Another apparent reversal of policy; exactly like allowing the murderous Baathists to participate in the new government. Let's bring our guys home!!! We have NO FIRM POLICY in Iraq!!
If the Bush Administration doesn't pursue the right approach, I say let's get out of there NOW!!! I'm not saying that your question doesn't bring up a good point, I just put the U.S. and our guys first. No more Vietnams, no more leaving our young guys to just be sitting ducks. Whatever happens if we get out could be tragic. What's going on now is tragic. Tough questions. If the Iraqis don't have the will to mold and defend their chance for a democracy now, will they ever? As I've stated, do this war right or go home.
I'll be brief: The use of OVERWHELMING FORCE, no appeasement whatsoever, consistent and clear policy. History proves this works. In war, people (i.e. men, women, children) die. Sad, but true.