Russia & Ukraine

Discussion in 'Politics' started by UsualName, Jan 18, 2022.

  1. gwb-trading

    gwb-trading

    #8261     Oct 9, 2022
  2. gwb-trading

    gwb-trading

    #8262     Oct 9, 2022
  3. Yup. He is on his way to Kherson.

    And he will need snowtires on that wheelchair before long. I have to believe that it is not easy getting in and out of the trenches there unless your wheelchair has snowtires in the winter.


    Idiots.
     
    #8263     Oct 9, 2022
    gwb-trading likes this.
  4. gwb-trading

    gwb-trading

    A thread...

     
    #8264     Oct 9, 2022
  5. gwb-trading

    gwb-trading

    #8265     Oct 9, 2022
  6. themickey

    themickey

    So long as Putin is around, there should be zero negotiations.
     
    #8266     Oct 9, 2022
  7. UsualName

    UsualName

    China owns Russia lock, stock and barrel now. The Russians are using the yuan as their reserve currency while the Chinese will just dump that paper on Russia for oil. What’s the problem? The Yuan is 3% of global reserves because China sells its half decent shit for dollars.

    Russia is locked out of the global market and can’t even buy whatever shit China is willing to sell on the open market for dollars. Vlad will have to show up with his hat in hand once a month asking for wormy 2nd class food stuffs and cut rate tech.
     
    #8267     Oct 9, 2022
  8. Nova Kakhovka is about to become my next lesson in Ukrainian geography.

    It is where the hydro-electric dam is, and the dam backs up the river to form a reservoir that diverts fresh water to Crimea, which Crimea desperately needs. And, the roadway on the dam is the last of two remaining ways for Russia to cross the river to supply its troops.

    Yup. I am seeing Nova Kakhovka in the crosshairs now. Not sure how the Russians can get anything across that road on the dam though with so many rats fleeing across it from Kherson.



    Putin's 'henchmen' flee in panic from Kherson province as Ukraine's army closes in


    Nova Kakhovka is a key target for Ukraine's commanders, whose capture would have serious consequences for the Kremlin.

    The town is the site of a hydroelectric dam and a vital bridge that crosses the Dnipro River.

    The bridge is one of only two that Russia's army is able to use to supply its 25,000 or so troops on the western bank of the river.

    The other, the Antonivskyi bridge in Kherson city, has been rendered all but unusable by Himars strikes.

    The capture of Nova Kakhovka would in effect cut off supplies to Russian troops on the western bank and lead to inevitable defeat.
    :rolleyes:
    Moreover, the reservoir behind the dam at the hydroelectric station is a source of fresh water for Crimea.

    https://www.express.co.uk/news/worl...flee-nova-kakhovka-kherson-ukraine-war-latest
     
    #8268     Oct 9, 2022
  9. themickey

    themickey

    Axe falls on Russian military commanders, as Kremlin seeks blame for war failures
    By Mary Ilyushina and Natalia Abbakumova October 10, 2022
    https://www.smh.com.au/world/europe...s-blame-for-war-failures-20221009-p5bobi.html

    Russian Ground Forces General Alexander Dvornikov, who over a 44-year military career was best-known for scorched-earth tactics in campaigns he led in Syria and Chechnya, was named overall operational commander of the war in Ukraine in April. He lasted about seven weeks before being dismissed as part of a wider shake-up in response to heavy losses and strategic failures.

    Around the same time, Colonel General Andrey Serdyukov, another four-decade serviceman, the commander in chief of the elite airborne troops, was stripped of his post after nearly all divisions of the airborne forces suffered major losses.

    [​IMG]
    Col. Gen. Alexander Dvornikov, pictured with Russian President Vladimir Putin in 2016, was in charge of Russia’s war in Ukraine for seven weeks before being dumped.Credit:AP

    And just last week Col. Gen. Alexander Zhuravlev, the head of the Western Military District responsible for Kharkiv, where Russian forces lost huge swaths of territory in early September, was removed after four years on the job, according to Russian business daily RBC.

    Far from bestowing glory on Russia’s military brass, the war in Ukraine is proving toxic for top commanders, with at least eight generals fired, reassigned or otherwise sidelined since the start of the invasion on February 24. Western governments have said that at least 10 others were killed in battle, a remarkably high number that military analysts say is evidence of grievous strategic errors.

    The upheaval in the upper ranks of uniformed officers highlights Russia’s fundamental mistakes in war planning, and the dysfunctional chain of command that resulted first in Moscow’s failure to achieve its primary military objective – the quick capture of Kyiv, and toppling of the Ukrainian government – and more recently in the retreats on the eastern and southern fronts.

    But the dismissals also reflect a scramble by political elites to place blame for the costly and faltering war as open criticism grows louder, particularly among pro-war hawks and propagandists.

    [​IMG]
    Russian Colonel-General Andrei SerdyukovCredit:AP

    Like their badly prepared forces on the front, the commanders in the Russian Armed Forces are turning out to be easy targets, even as senior political leaders, including Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu, the Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov, and President Vladimir Putin himself had largely avoided direct criticism.

    Recent criticism of Shoigu, however, has signalled that his job, too, may finally be in jeopardy.

    Unlike in Ukraine, where the top generals, including the commander in chief, Valery Zaluzhny, and Oleksandr Syrsky, who led the recent Kharkiv offensive, are now revered figures, it has often been difficult to know who in Russia is actually running the war. Personnel changes are often carried out with little public announcement and trickle into the Russia media with little or no explanation.

    On Friday, RBC reported that the commander of Russia’s eastern military district, Col. Gen. Alexander Chaiko, had been replaced by Lt. Gen. Rustam Muradov. No explanation was given for the switch.

    [​IMG]
    Criticism has mounted of Sergei Shoigu (left) while Dmitry Bulgakov (right) was recently dumped.Credit:AP

    In a rare public announcement of staffing changes, the Russian defence ministry said late last month that it removed the general responsible for “the logistics support of the Armed Forces,” Dmitry Bulgakov, and appointed in his place Col. Gen. Mikhail Mizintsev.

    Mizintsev was an obscure figure before the Ukraine war but has earned the gruesome moniker “Butcher of Mariupol” after Ukrainian officials and activists accused him of orchestrating a brutal siege of the southern Ukrainian port city that has killed thousands of civilians and razed residential buildings.

    And on Friday, Russia’s Black Sea Fleet admitted after weeks of speculation that it had replaced its commander, Adm. Igor Osipov, with Vice Adm. Viktor Sokolov who vowed to “increase the combat readiness of the fleet”.

    In late April, Ukraine sank the fleet’s flagship, the cruiser Moskva, with an audacious but successful strike using two Neptune anti-ship missiles. On Navy Day, in July, the headquarters of the Black Sea Fleet was attacked by a makeshift combat drone that dropped an explosive device on its roof, a symbolic attack that symbolized Ukraine’s ability to strike deep into Russian positions.

    The recent public announcements of dismissals may reflect a growing imperative to satisfy demands for blame and accountability. Such calls, and criticism of the war effort in general, have been amplified since Putin’s declaration of a partial military mobilisation last month, which led more than 200,000 fighting-age men to flee the country, and set off angry complaints over men wrongly being called to service and conscripts receiving poor treatment, including minimal food and rusting weapons.

    After a long string of failures and few significant victories, the knives now seem to be out for Russian generals, amid criticism from prominent Russian military correspondents, state television propagandists and even members of the normally obedient parliament.

    Two Russian lawmakers – chairman of the defence committee Andrey Kartapolov and anti-corruption committee Vasily Piskarev – are holding closed-door meetings in the lower house of the parliament, the State Duma, to review the “situation with the supply of the Russian army”.

    Kartapolov and Piskarev also sent a written request to the prosecutor general, asking him to investigate “how the financing was wasted in the rear” – alleging that commanders have been looting the military budget.

    The head of Chechnya, Ramzan Kadyrov, who sent his own fighters to Ukraine, slammed the commander of the Central Military District, Alexander Lapin, as a “talentless” leader and a product of “nepotism” in the leadership of the general staff, for deploying fighters from one of the self-declared pro-Russian separatist areas without proper support or preparation.

    “The colonel-general deployed mobilised fighters from the Luhansk People’s Republic and other units on all frontiers of the Lyman direction, but did not provide them with communication, did not ensure coordination and a proper supply of ammunition,” Kadyrov wrote in a scathing post last Saturday.

    Critics, including Kadyrov, have accused top officers of lying about what is happening on the front.

    “It’s necessary to stop lying,” Kartapolov, the defence committee chairman, said, lashing out on Soloviev Live, an online channel run by top state television propagandist Vladimir Soloviev. “Almost all the border villages of the Belgorod Region have been destroyed, but we are learning this from anyone: governors, Telegram channels, military correspondents. But not the Defence Ministry,” Kartapolov said.

    In a different show this week, Soloviev said that “lies on every level must be punished most severely”.

    “I don’t pretend to know the art of warfare, but what is the genius idea behind the general staff plans now?” Soloviev asked rhetorically. “Do you think time is on our side? [Ukrainians] have concentrated weapons and mercenaries ... and what have you done in that time?”

    According to Conflict Intelligence Team (CIT), an independent group that has been monitoring Russian military activities in Ukraine since 2014, Col. Gen. Gennady Zhidko took over from Dvornikov in May as the overall commander of the Russian war.

    Dvornikov’s dismissal may have been linked to the destruction of the 58th Combined Arms Army, normally stationed in the southern Vladikavkaz, which was lauded as one of the most combat-ready Russian armies and key to the invasion of Georgia in 2008, the BBC Russian service reported.

    But Zhidko, who also held the title of deputy defence minister, in what appears to be a damning trend for generals in Ukraine, was in charge for about a month before more problems emerged, and he was demoted to the head of the Eastern Military District.

    It is not clear which general currently runs the overarching Russian war operation.

    The Washington Post
     
    #8269     Oct 9, 2022
  10. themickey

    themickey

    Putin’s bridge of dreams explodes in flames
    By Maite Fernández Simon and Paul Sonne October 8, 2022
    https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/10/08/kerch-bridge-crimea-symbolism-putin/

    It was a media extravaganza, Putin-style. At the lead of a small truck convoy, Russian President Vladimir Putin drove an orange dump truck flying Russian flags across a portion of the Crimean Bridge in 2018, proudly inaugurating a 12-mile colossus of steel and concrete connecting the Crimean Peninsula he illegally annexed from Ukraine to mainland Russia. At the end of the ride, he was met with cheers and applause.

    Even during the reign of the czars, “people dreamed of building this bridge,” Putin boasted. “Finally, thanks to your hard work and talents, this project, this miracle, has come true.”

    Early Saturday, a giant explosion sent a fireball rolling across Putin’s crown jewel thanks, it could be said, to Putin’s own hard work in launching an invasion of Ukraine in February. Portions of the bridge, among the longest in Europe, could be seen sinking in the water.

    Whileparts of the bridge reportedly reopened to traffic a few hours after the explosion, Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov said the government didn’t have a timeline for making the bridge fully functional again. Initial information provided by a top Russian law enforcement agency suggested three people had been killed, including a truck driver.

    Ukraine, while not taking credit publicly for the blast, had openly promised to attack the bridge as recently as June, calling it a “number one” target because of its strategic importance. The bridge is the main route for trains and trucks carrying troops and weapons from mainland Russia to Crimea, from where they are funneled into the grinding war against Ukraine.

    It was a strategic disaster and, in part because of Putin’s personal identification with the bridge, a symbolic disaster as well, in a war where symbols matter to the morale of a restive Russian population, on the one hand, and to Ukraine’s Western supporters, for whom highly visible gains for Ukraine are important not only to keep the arms flowing but to persuade citizens that their sacrifices, like high energy prices, are bearing fruit.

    Few recent gains were as visible as Saturday’s flames and collapsed roadways spreading across Putin’s bridge.

    The Kerch bridge became a symbol of Putin’s mythical personal prowess, his ability to deliver on big infrastructure projects, his ambition to restore Russia to its long-lost greatness. “Even the most ambitious plans can be realized when they are implemented by him,” Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said in 2018 of the bridge project.

    Its completion also solidified Russia’s illegal annexation of the Crimean peninsula, occupied by the country’s forces since 2014.

    After Russia annexed Crimea from Ukraine, Moscow faced a logistical problem. The peninsula was connected by an isthmus only to Ukrainian-controlled territory, meaning cargo and people could arrive only by boat or plane. The idea of a bridge over the Kerch Strait, which would connect Russia to Crimea, became a way to solve that dilemma.

    But while Czar Nicholas II and the Soviets had considered building a bridge over the strait in the past, and the Nazis began constructing one before they were ejected from the area during World War II, the idea was regularly questioned for its cost and the challenges of construction, due to weather and terrain.

    Among other things, the ground under the strait is composed of silt that made anchoring a bridge difficult. A railway bridge the Soviets built over the strait at the end of World War II was swept away by drift ice a few months after the first train crossed.

    Russian President Vladimir Putin inspects the road section of the road-and-rail Crimean Bridge over the Kerch Strait on March 14, 2018.. (Yuri Kochetkov/AFP/Getty Images)
    Putin decided to proceed with the project anyway, and the bridge’s construction soon became emblematic of Moscow’s commitment to the newly annexed Crimea — a patriotic undertaking reminiscent of Soviet-era dams and canals that became the subject of worker-state propaganda.

    To build the bridge, Putin tapped his childhood friend and judo partner, Arkady Rotenberg, who had become a billionaire in the 22 years since Putin took power by receiving large-scale state construction contracts and had been the target of international sanctions. Construction of the 12-mile rail and passenger bridge lasted three years and cost some $4 billion.

    “It was a pet project for Putin,” said Simon Schlegel, senior Ukraine analyst for the International Crisis Group. The bridge “made the connection between the Russian mainland and this peninsula that they just claimed to be theirs. It really sort of said that in steel and concrete.”

    The annexation of Crimea and the building of the bridge represented “Russia regaining and returning its historical territory” after it had been gifted by Nikita Khrushchev to Ukraine during Soviet times, said Maria Snegovaya, a Postdoctoral Fellow at Georgetown University’s Walsh School of Foreign Service.

    Coming amid a string of recent Russian battlefield failures and a reshuffle of top commanders, the explosion is also “essentially just another confirmation” that the trouble he faces now “is unlike anything Putin’s regime has faced over pretty much all of its duration,” Snegovaya said.

    Those failures and the latest one, the bridge explosion, prompted renewed public criticism of the conduct of Putin’s war in Russia’s media.

    “The stupidest thing to do now is to start reassuring the country that nothing terrible has happened” wrote Komsomolskaya Pravda’s war correspondent, Alexander Kots. The Ukrainians “hit a symbol,” he wrote. “The Crimean bridge is a symbol that the peninsula is securely sealed to Mother Russia and nothing can tear it away from it.”

    But it was also a logical target strategically because the bridge, while symbolic, has a military purpose, supplying Russian forces.

    Russia, he said, should take a lesson from Ukraine. “Let’s fight more fiercely, for real, without excuses about the impossibility of blowing up the bridge on which the arms are coming from the West. Nothing is impossible, the Ukrainians show us.”

    Missy Ryan, Natalia Abbakumova and Kostiantyn Khudov contributed to this report.
     
    #8270     Oct 9, 2022