Apparently Azerbaijan has started an attack on Armenia today. According to the ОДКБ agreement, if/when Armenia is attacked, Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kirgizia and Tajikistan are supposed to come to its aid, militarily. Do you think they will?
Really? You think all the Ruskies want and need to import right now is consumer crap? You might study up a bit on how modern technological and industrial and military needs work. And yes. Growing your account surplus because you got nothing you can spend on is a negative. That do have a pile of revenue from oil and gas- so far so good. The part about being able to spend revenue on your true economic needs. Not so much. Oh, I see. No need for any spare parts for your military and industrial complex. "We will just keep getting 30 year old shit from North Korea. All is good."
There is lots of talk about a general mobilization coming in Russia. Lots. It may not happen but the fear of it is in the air and every household. Some of those "patriots" who responded to the polls a couple months ago will/are suddenly less patriotic when they or their son could get a notice in the mail any day now calling them to report for duty to kill grannies and children in Ukraine, and a chance to get killed themselves.
TreeFrog, there is a reason they didn't do mobilization yet. Yes, let's say they can throw a wide net and get 500K people off the Russian streets (which is not that certain because there are reports that the mobilization "machinery" is just not there and neither is the enthusiasm). But: 1. You need people to train all these guys. Where are you going to get them? 2. You need equipment for these guys other than the basic AKs. Russia is already having trouble with that. How are they going to basically triple the tanks/BMPs etc? 3. It takes TIME to train these guys. At least a few months. You can't stick someone into a tank and say "go". Well, you can but they won't get far and will get wiped out in the first skirmish. 4. You need officers to lead these guys. Where are they going to suddenly get 50-60K new officers/sergeants? Without any of this, all you can do is bring the cannon fodder to the front and let them get slaughtered by Ukrainians. With minimal losses for the Ukraine.
Oh yeh. I got all that. And even the Russian commanders are speaking out on that point and saying that they do not necessarily need more men. They need more technology and trained men. Just a larger clown show is not working. But in addition, Putin does was hoping he could fight the war with poor ethnic kids from the Caucuses and Siberia and Syria etc. - while the residents of St. Petersburg and Moscow watched on youtube or state tv. You start taking their kids and that is a whole different thing. Suddenly they do not want their kids dying so that there will not be Drag Queens in Ukraine.
Where is the Russian air force? Russia’s Air Force Goes Missing At The Worst Possible Time—During Ukraine’s Counteroffensive https://www.forbes.com/sites/davida...ng-ukraines-counteroffensive/?sh=487074f13838 Ukrainian troops are on the move—rolling along wide highways and across open fields as they counterattack in eastern and southern Ukraine. They’re out in the open in broad daylight. They should be easy targets for the Russian air force’s hundreds of modern fighter-bombers. But the Russian air force is missing in action. It has made no meaningful effort to halt the twin Ukrainian counteroffensives that kicked off on Aug. 30 in the south and eight days later in the east. It’s not hard to explain the Russian warplanes’ absence. Russia’s old-fashioned air-war doctrine can’t keep up with a fast-changing battlefield. And the Ukrainian army and air force, against all odds, still are mounting a stiff defense of the air space over the front lines. Befuddled by the chaos on the ground and harried by Ukrainian missiles and guns, Russian pilots mostly are sitting out the current campaign. The Ukrainian brigades fighting their way south toward Russian-occupied Kherson and east across Kharkiv Oblast should have been sitting ducks. The southern front with its wide, treeless fields and numerous, difficult-to-cross rivers is famously favorable for attack pilots hunting enemy tanks. The eastern front for its part is heavily forested in places, which forces mechanized units to stick to roads if they hope to move fast. But well-marked roads risk channeling troops into aerial ambushes. All that is to say, the Russian air force—as well as the aerial arm of the Russian navy—had opportunities to hit the Ukrainians at their most critical moments: in the early hours of each counteroffensive, as brigades and battalions concentrated their vehicles then rolled forward in careful sequence. But they didn’t. The unhappy truth, for the Russian army, is that the Russian air force’s doctrine prevents it from closely supporting ground troops when the enemy is on the move. That’s because the Russian air force isn’t an “air force” in the sense that many Western observers understand the term. Rather, the Russianair force is airborne artillery. Pilots bomb—sight unseen—coordinates that ground commanders provide them, often based on old intelligence. The air force doesn’t track enemy ground troops in real time. It doesn’t free its pilots to hunt the enemy on their own. As long as the Ukrainians keep moving—and to be clear, they’ve been moving fast since late August—they should be able to stay inside the Russian air force’s targeting processes, and avoid attack. On those few occasions in the last 10 days that the Russians have launched sorties, pilots have faced stiff Ukrainian air-defenses. The government in Kyiv claimed its forces shot down nine Russian warplanes between Aug. 29 and Sept. 12. Independent analysts scouring social media for photos and videos have confirmed at least five losses, including two Su-25s, two Su-34s and an Su-30. It’s unclear exactly how the Ukrainians shot down the Russian jets, but The Economist cited Ukrainian sources singling out the German-made Gepard self-propelled anti-aircraft guns. Berlin is providing Kyiv 20 of the classic vehicles. The Gepard is mobile and protected, as it combines the basic chassis of a Leopard tank with a lightly-armored turret. Its twin Oerlikon cannons fire 550 rounds a minute out to a range of three miles. The three-person crew is cued by a turret-mounted radar with a nine-mile range. The Ukrainians’ Gepards, combined with their other air-defense systems—including long-range S-300s, medium-range Buks and short-range Strelas and shoulder-fired missiles—should top the Russian air force’s list of targets. If it could suppress Ukrainian air-defenses and speed up its targeting cycle, the Russian air arm could become relevant again. But 200 days into Russia’s wider war on Ukraine, the Russian air force still hasn’t made a concerted effort to find, track and attack Ukrainian air-defenses. Contrast this with the Ukrainian air force’s own SEAD campaign. Ukrainian MiG-29s and Su-27s firing American-made anti-radar missiles have knocked out some Russian air-defense systems and suppressed many more, in essence, scaring their crews into turning off their radars. Which is one reason why the Ukrainian air force–with its 100 or so surviving jets–is active where the much larger Russian air force—300 jets just at bases near Ukraine—is idle. Photos and videos from the current counteroffensives depict Ukrainian planes conducting close-air-support missions near the fast-moving front lines. It’s possible that, with the onset of winter in the next couple months, the front could freeze in place—and Russian commanders might discover that their outdated doctrine is useful again. But Ukrainian air-defenses might be even more dangerous by then. The United States and Germany both have pledged to Ukraine new and better surface-to-air missiles, which should begin arriving soon.
The arrest or death of individuals that have a wide following in Russia such as popular artists and news reporters surely has an impact on public opinion, even if polls don’t necessarily reflect that fact because of selection bias or other factors. Further, Western social media or at least those Russians who are in contact with people outside of Russia who have access to western social media know how unpopular Russia is to most countries right now. Was it not five months ago there were posts by Russians wondering “Why does everybody hate us(Russia) so much”? If any culture knows how to read-in-between-the-lines of propaganda, it would be the Russian people. No matter how things may be portrayed in their media, most should know the cause and effect of Putin’s war: Russia invades Ukraine and the West responds with heavy sanctions including travel restrictions on Russian citizens, more likely to be prominent citizens and negative media coverage begins. Personal accounts by people we know often has much more credibility than state controlled media can ever dream of. These stories get passed from family members to friends, neighbors, and coworkers. There may be a large number of Russians who want to act in some way, but are hesitant because they fear for their safety, don’t know what to do, or don’t know how many others are willing to act. The war may be shortened if solid answers to the preceding can be determined. Regardless, it seems inevitable that Russian discontent will rise as the war drags on, possibly reaching a breaking point involving the things discussed as likely possibilities in earlier posts. Again, someone with authority or capability in Russia may feel compelled to act. If not Putin, then someone else. Perhaps a little encouragement is all that’s needed.
. Russian energy exec falls from boat in latest mystery death https://nypost.com/2022/09/12/russian-energy-exec-falls-to-his-death-from-boat/
I recall an article a few months ago that suggested Putin was reluctant to put major capital military assets such as large naval ships and aircraft into the fray because fear of loss. The Moskva was recently sunk and another Russian capital ship was damaged in Ukrainian missile attacks. Or was it someone smoking? Putin’s apparent sentiment is understandable given long replacement times during the best of circumstances, without sanctions and other constraints during wartime. It seems like a “Damned if you do, damed if you don’t situation”. Attempting to conduct a war with two branches of the military mostly missing is challenging and expensive for the other branch. However, losses of such capital assets could lead to years of vulnerability. Sounds like an untenable situation for Russia to me. If war is not working then something else should be tried? What that something is, I’ll keep under wraps for now, but it begins with a “P”!
That’s it! Handrails! Lots of handrails need to be installed. Handrails on boats! Handrails on hospital windows! Handrails on helicopters!