Rare insight into Kreml's internal politics: https://www.is.fi/ulkomaat/art-2000010648292.html (Google translate, IS = Ilta-Sanomat BTW) Sources for IS: A fierce power struggle is underway in the Kremlin In the Kremlin, there is a lot of bubbling under the surface. There is a power struggle especially between two men. Kaarlo Somerto, Ulla Appels 25.8. 19:30 Read the summary According to IS sources, Putin's reign is coming to an end and the power struggle is going on behind the scenes. There are two camps in the Kremlin: Nikolai Patrushev's and Sergei Tshemezov's. According to IS sources, autumn may bring significant changes to the Russian leadership. Putin's reign is coming to an end, and the power struggle behind the scenes is already heating up. In the Kremlin, two warring camps influence each other, and autumn can bring changes, according to expert sources for IS. Outwardly, everything looks normal: Vladimir Putin speaks, performs and meets people. Last Tuesday, the Russian president paid a symbolic visit to the Republic of North Ossetia, located in the North Caucasus. However, there is something bubbling under the surface. There are signs that you have to know how to read. One is this: Putin has been largely invisible. In reality, the strings are in the hands of Putin's right-hand man Nikolai Patrushev . He is now the brains of the Russian leadership, assesses the situation in Russia, very knowledgeable security sources for IS. Due to their status, the sources can only appear anonymous. Putin appointed Patrushev, who previously held the position of Secretary of the Security Council, as his advisor in May. Putin leads, but Patrushev leads Putin, sources estimate. Patrushev and Putin met already in the 1970s in the KGB, the Soviet intelligence service. Putin recommended Patrushev as his successor as head of Russia's security service, the FSB, after he himself became Russia's prime minister in 1999. The strengthening of Patrushev's position has meant that there are now two distinct camps in the Kremlin, with a well-concealed but existent internecine war going on. There is the Patrushev camp and there is the Tshemezov camp . Oligarch Sergei Tshemezov is also Putin's long-term friends from the 1980s and has been the director of the technology company Rostec. Tshemezov's tentacles reach high through Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin , sources say. Although Mishustin is still in office, according to various sources, his duties are practically handled by Deputy Prime Minister Denis Manturov , who is also Minister of Trade and Industry and responsible for Russia's defense industry and procurement of the armed forces. According to sources, Manturov is Tshemezov's right-hand man. Patrushev is a war hawk, but you can't call Tshemezov a dove either. According to estimates, he is indeed less warlike, but not necessarily directly in the cause of peace. For Arkady Moshes , Program Director of the Foreign Policy Institute, the things told by IS sources sound familiar. - The existence of different camps is normal. Whatever monarchy or court you look at, you find cliques in the court, he says. Arkady Moshes is the director of the Russia, EU's Eastern Neighborhood and Eurasia program at the Institute for Foreign Policy. However, Moshes does not see Patrushev's transfer from the position of Secretary of the Security Council to Putin's advisor as a real victory for Patrushev. - He is Putin's advisor in matters related to shipbuilding, Moshes describes the content of Patrushev's new duties. - Of course he still has access to Putin's ear, but how much, I can't say, says Moshes. However, in addition to Nikolai Patrushev, Moshes mentions his son, Dmitri Patrushev . 46-year-old Dmitri took over as Russia's deputy prime minister in May, after previously serving as minister of agriculture. In various assessments, Poika-Patrushev has been named as one of the possible candidates for Putin's successor. - He has clearly received a promotion, Moshes evaluates Dmitri Patrushev's move to deputy prime minister. - To improve the deal for Nikolai Patrushev, his son's career will progress, Moshes says. According to Moshes, Sergei Tshemezov's position is also not completely secured. In Russia, several technological projects for which Tshemezov has been responsible as head of Rostec have not progressed as hoped. If necessary, this gives an excuse to weaken Tshemezov's position in the Kremlin's internal power game, Moshes estimates. Completely Moshes does not want to ignore Prime Minister Mihail Mishustin either. Even if this is not at the center of the Kremlin's power game, he is still formally Russia's second-in-command after the president. - He has proven his efficiency as a technocrat and his usefulness to Putin, Moshes describes. If one wanted to make bigger changes in the Russian system, Mishust would have to be moved out of the way first, Moshes estimated. Although the situation is not visible from the outside, there is also a big lack of trust between the army leadership and the Russian administration, IS security sources say. There are several reasons for this - the most important, of course, is that the so-called military special operation, as the Russian elite calls its war of aggression in Ukraine, has not been as successful as hoped. The fact that money has flowed into the wrong pockets also affects the matter. The leadership does not trust the generals, and the generals do not trust the leadership, explain IS sources. A particularly big lack of trust is between the security service FSB and the army leadership. The FSB's role is indicated by the fact that the Kremlin calls its response to Ukraine's actions in Kursk an "anti-terrorist operation". The name is no accident. This automatically puts the management of the operation in the hands of the FSB and its head Aleksandr Bortnikov , since the fight against terrorism in Russia belongs to the FSB. However, the situation is internally difficult. According to sources, Defense Minister Andrei Belousov and FSB director Bortnikov no longer want to fit in the same room: the resentment is strong on both sides. Belousov succeeded Sergei Shoigu as Minister of Defense in May, when Shoigu replaced Nikolai Patrushev as Secretary of the Security Council. Arkady Moshes says that he expects Putin to do something to weaken the position of the security service as well. In a way, this has already happened when Bortnikov was transferred to the person responsible for the situation in Kursk, Moshes estimates. - Bortnikov was given a task that he cannot do. There is a war going on in Kursk. Putting the FSB man in charge of it makes no sense. He may fail. It is important from Putin's point of view that no single power bloc grows too powerful. Mutual competition keeps the challenge to the autocrat himself at bay. "Divide and rule" is a working principle for Putin also in relation to the Kremlin's internal power dynamics. Moshes believes that despite the disputes between the different blocs, Putin is still able to maintain some kind of stability within the Kremlin, at least in terms of his own position. Putin leaving the scene in one way or another would naturally change the situation. - Autocratic systems cannot renew themselves. If one man has too much power, you can't put another person in his place and expect things to stay the same. Moshes says. Also involved in the Kursk operation was Putin's former bodyguard Aleksei Djumin , who was elevated to the role of Putin's advisor to the position of secretary of the government in the internal transfers of the Russian administration. He is Putin's confidant and possibly supervises the actions of both the FSB and the military leadership. If Bortnikov fails with the Kursk operation, Moshes considers it possible that Djum will take over responsibility for Kursk next. Djumin's name has also been around from time to time in speculations about Putin's possible successor. Kursk is a bigger deal than was initially imagined, IS sources estimate. Ukraine's goals are probably above all political: influencing the general mood and decision-makers in Russia and perhaps also gaining some kind of negotiating leverage. There are a lot of rumors surrounding Kursk, including wild conspiracy theories, according to which Russian generals deliberately leaked information to Ukraine about where Ukraine could get through. This would have been done either because of Russia's internal power games or because the purpose is ultimately to motivate Ukrainian soldiers to land on Russian soil and get a partial military victory from this. However, there is no, and certainly cannot be, any kind of confirmation for these wild rumours. So what does this deal and the internal battle of the elite mean in practice? The fact that things stand still and big decisions are missing when they cannot be agreed upon. One example of this is the movement launch in Russia, IS sources remind. Even if Putin's position fluctuates, the sources do not believe in quick peace. Nothing visible has been done for peace, and peace will not take effect immediately, even if an armistice is reached. Peace processes are almost always long and difficult. The Russian elite, on the other hand, is waking up, because both economic and future prospects look wild. According to the estimates of the sources, there are indications that the autumn may bring significant changes to the Russian leadership. Patrushev's or Tshemezov's camp will end up on top of the neck, both of them want to stick to their own positions. - Of course, the political situation can change quickly, in dictatorships in a day or a week. Still, it is far from the fact that the people would take to the streets, the sources estimate. Moshes agrees with IS sources' assessment of indecision in Russia's decision-making system. According to him, the background of it is also influenced by the stubborn way of working of the Putin regime. - Putin puts off making decisions until very late - maybe too late, Moshes describes.
Interesting summary. Most analysts have stated if Putin is pushed out then it will likely be due to a internal power struggle in his top circle of advisors rather than an external effort. The problem is that many of these advisors are more hawkish then Putin and will continue the Ukraine war and start other.
I think that some people might say that some of this is wishful thinking. But maybe, maybe not. When the war is not going well, Putin does feel the heat from the insiders. That whole episode with Prigozhin was an unexpected poignant example of that. He actually got pretty ballsy and pretty far down the road with his little resistance drama. To the point where Putin had to assassinate him. Right now, foreign troops are inside Russia. Never a good position to be in if you are the leader. You have to fix that or you will get fixed.
Don't think it's so much about wishful thinking; serious analysts know Russia without Putin is no automatic improvement w.r.t. to UA's position. Putin today is isolated, paranoid, and surrounded by sycophants he's playing against each other, and he's at the age of decline. Outright stated - the longer Putin sits on the throne, the better for Ukraine - and that's one fear I have about the Kursk offensive in that it may score a reverse goal in that regard.
common, even for ukrainian bot your IQ is below lowest where is stolen grain in this story which putin cronies produce on seized farms?
So tell us how is Putin's counter-offense in Kursk going? The Ukrainians have seized more Russian land in a couple of weeks than land the Russians have seized in Ukraine over the past year.
You should look back to February of 2022 to fully understand who the aggressor is in this war. Not content to merely being the aggressor Russia also committed endless war crimes.