Proposed NFA Capital Requirement

The higher capital requirement will mean firms going out of business and thus less competition. Of course FXCM supports this move as they will easily meet the new capital requirements. FXCM will probably pursue an active policy absorbing the customer base of the firms going out of business.

 

Exactly. I can't believe anyone actually trades with those tiny IBs that are in jeopardy but to each their own. BTW, my post goes to illustrate just how vocal they are ... as in most of posts in this thread.

 

The Case of CFG

I have spent a lot of time discussing the issue of forex fraud and how this has been one of the motivating factors driving the regulators' desire to raise capital requirements. But the issue of broker dealer insolvency is in many respects more pressing. The failure rate for firms with capital below $5 million is shockingly high. And why is that? Because too many people think running a forex broker dealer is as easy as running a bagel shop. But this next three part series on the demise of Forefront Investments (aka CFG) is evidence of how difficult it is to run a forex brokerage and why as a result of CFG’s collapse the NFA has an even stronger case to raise capital requirements.

I first became interested in the CFG case when an attorney posted this thread at Forex Factory:
(http://www.forexfactory.com/showthread.php?t=40618) asking former customers of CFG to contact him if they were still owed money. Still owed money? That piqued my curiosity. And so I began digging through the wreckage of CFG. Here is what I discovered:

CFG got its license in November of 2003. But its owner, Don Snellgrove, founded the company in 1998. (http://countyads.org/Business.asp?record=10993)

Originally the firm was in the forex training business. Essentially, for a fee, CFG would assign traders a mentor whose job it would be to teach “the forex” to rookie traders. While some customers complained about the ineffectiveness of the training (http://www.ripoffreport.com/reports/0/087/ripoff0087932.htm) there are no indications that CFG was involved in any fraudulent activities. Indeed, Snellgrove had a reputation for being a very religious man and is quoted on his own website as saying, “We sincerely want people to succeed! Galatians 5:1 in the Bible, states that one should not be under bondage. 99% of the people who talk with me are under the bondage of debt. The Forex market is the largest legal cash flow industry in the world and a potential vehicle to achieve success by just about anyone and thus move out of bondage.” (http://www.cfgtrading.com/newsletter/edition01/cfgnews_008.htm)

Unfortunately, Snellgrove’s decision to turn his training business into a full fledged forex broker dealer would not only leave his customers still under the bondage of debt, but transform them into the Gimp from Pulp Fiction after the firm went under and their accounts were frozen.

But before going there it is important to review Snellgrove’s career to date. He was a good and moral man, he had a clean regulatory record, his company was fairly transparent as he had an open door policy with all his customers at his rather large office in Virginia, and he had been in the business since the late nineties. But there was one missing ingredient in this forex broker dealer cake: Snellgrove was poorly capitalized. And that’s why the firm went under. More to come…

Tomorrow- Part II “The Collapse of CFG”

 

The Collapse of CFG

In January of 2007 CFTC reports showed that CFG Trader had $1,790,000 in Adjusted Net Capital. That means they were $800,000 over their required amount. So for the average trader checking in on CFG everything looked good right? Suppose you also checked the NFA website and saw they had a clean regulatory record. Looks good right? You spoke with a smooth talking sales rep and saw they had been in business since the nineties. Looks good right? Boy would you have been wrong. For it was at this time that CFG began to unravel.

According to the NFA in its 2007 audit NFA noted that, “the balances on Forefront’s Form 1-FR dated January 31, 2007, which had been previously filed with NFA, were inconsistent with the general ledger the firm provided to NFA as part of the audit.” Furthermore, “Forefront had failed to include all customer liabilities when preparing its financial statements. As a result, it appears that Forefront was under the required minimum ANC by at least $850,000.”

The next blow came on March 15th
http://www.nfa.futures.org/BasicNet/Case.aspx?entityid=0334858&case=07MRA00003&contrib=NFA
…still not having received the updated financial statements, NFA spoke with Snellgrove, Conn, Lani and representatives of the firm’s accounting firm. NFA asked whether Forefront currently had the required minimum ANC. Snellgrove referred the question to Lani who responded that the firm did “not have accurate numbers to work with.” Additionally, Lani indicated that it would be “a fair statement to say that the firm does not know its financial status.”

With CFG’s financials in chaos the NFA notified the CFTC who then went to court to get an injunction to halt the transfer of any money out of the firm. The CFTC injunctive action states the following:
http://www.cftc.gov/opa/enf07/opa5310-07.htm

According to the CFTC complaint, as of January 31, 2007, and perhaps earlier, Forefront’s net capitalization was below the adjusted net capital required by the Act and a Commission regulation. As of March 19, 2007, the complaint charges, Forefront’s adjusted net capitalization remained below the required adjusted net capital with Forefront’s total liabilities equaling $8,000,000 while its assets were only $6,760,000. Furthermore, the complaint charges Forefront with failing to maintain books and records that it is required to maintain pursuant to a Commission regulation.

While the CFTC was dragging CFG through the courts the NFA decided to give CFG one final kick in the ribs while they lay curled up in the fetal position by hitting them with a formal complaint regarding their marketing practices on April 4, 2007:
http://www.nfa.futures.org/BasicNet/Case.aspx?entityid=0334858&case=07BCC00011&contrib=NFA

At this point the court approved a receiver to preside over the dissolution of CFG and arrange for a customer buyout. I Trade FX put in the highest bid and then proceeded to take over CFG’s customer accounts.
http://www.cftc.gov/opa/enf07/opa5311-07.htm

The swift and stunning collapse of CFG ended happily enough with customers getting their money back. But it could have been much worse. What would have happened if a creditor had interceded to lay claim to customer funds as happened with the customers of RefcoFX? In such a drawn out situation a potential buyer would have been scared off and by the time the estate was settled (minus the huge legal fees of course) customers would have been lucky to get back a fraction of their investment.

This is just one of the lessons to be learned from the Collapse of CFG. I will review the others tomorrow in “Part III – Lessons from the Collapse of CFG.”

 

Lessons from the Collapse of CFG

Why does the NFA want to raise capital requirements? Precisely because of firms like CFG. Of course, many of the fraudsters will be driven out of the business which is certainly a good thing and one of the reasons for the NFA to take action. But there will always be con-men in the financial markets. I believe the real reason the NFA is pushing so hard to raise capital requirements is its concern that there are many more potential CFG’s out there.

The fact is you need more than $1,000,000 to run this kind of business today. Ten years ago when there was no regulation you could a run a forex broker dealer on the cheap. Not now. After all a good compliance officer alone can run you upwards of $200,000 a year never mind all the accountants and book keepers and legal staff needed to run a fully functional compliance/accounting department. But guys like Don Snellgrove couldn’t afford that kind of staff. And neither can many of these poorly capitalized firms. When you are a small forex broker dealer start up you have one goal: GET CUSTOMERS. To do that you need a fully functional platform and an aggressive sales force. That costs money. Compliance can come second after that, if at all…

With this in mind I have outlined a checklist for the average trader looking to find a broker:

1) Make sure they are registered with the NFA (or appropriate regulatory body such as the FSA in the United Kingdom). Avoid unlicensed firms at all costs.

2) Check the firm’s regulatory background on the NFA’s website. (http://www.nfa.futures.org/BasicNet/) Be sure to also examine the background of the principals of the firm. This is extremely important because if you see that a principal has a record of working for a bunch of firms with dodgy backgrounds then you need to seriously reconsider that firm.

3) Check the firm’s financials. (http://www.cftc.gov/tm/tmfcm.htm) Make sure the firm you are dealing with is well capitalized. This should be one of the most important criteria used in deciding on a forex broker. As I have demonstrated meeting the minimum capital requirement should not be an ending point when considering a firm since at one time or another even the most crooked outfits are reporting they are in compliance with the cap laws. Furthermore, beware investing with firms below $5 million net capital right now until the situation with the NFA proposal is sorted out. No, the rule has not passed yet but it most likely will and should that time come there is no question that some of the firms on the dead pool list are going under. Why put yourself through the stress of wondering whether or not your firm will be able to make the cut?

4) Test a firm’s customer service in advance. Are they open on the weekends? Do they respond quickly to emails? Do they have actual customer service 24 hours a day or just a surly dealer outside business hours who doesn’t like talking to people? Customer service with a forex firm is a lot more important than customer service with your bank as it can often times have a direct impact on your p/l.

5) Avoid “get rich quick” scams. Easily said but even though everyone knows it people still fall for them, especially in forex. Whether those scams involve some broker promising software guaranteed to make you a millionaire or some money manager saying his fund always has a positive return don’t fall for the hype. Remember, if what they said were true they would be millionaires sitting on a beach in Bermuda not sweating it out trying to get you to buy in on their scheme.

6) Experience means nothing in forex. Keep in mind this industry is only 10 years old. This isn’t the equity market where you have brokerage firms that have been around for decades. Everyone is new to forex including the brokers selling themselves to you. Don Snellgrove had more experience in this industry than almost anyone but his firm was not the better for it. Stability is what matters. And larger firms tend to be more stable because they have the capital to ride out the storms in this industry. Furthermore, many of them are backed by well established corporate partners or investors while smaller firms are mainly on their own with limited resources at their disposal.

So there you have it. Those are the lessons from the Collapse of CFG. Take them to heart and trade wisely.

 

Hey Forex, Velocity were off your most recent dead firm walking list. Does this mean they have recieved a pardon and will be allowed to live?

 

Not that I don't agree with you, but my point was that it's in FXCM's own interest to support the consolidation in the industry. No benevolence here.

 

Velocity has not been granted a pardon. They are listed under the name Hamilton Williams

 

There is this myth going around that NDD firms have no risk because they are "not market makers." It's time to put this myth to rest once and for all.

First, all firms, whether they have dealing desks or not, are required to set aside 10% of all customer assets if they offer 100 to 1 leverage. So a firm with $50 million in customer assets is required by law to already set aside $5 million just to meet that simple requirement. When added to the probable NFA rule change that firms set aside an additional $5 million in capital that means firms will need $10 million in capital Currency Trader Magazine reported.

But getting back to the NDD 'no risk' myth. Here are just some of the risks NDD firms have to cope with.

1)Business Risk. All businesses have the simple risk of not having enough revenue to cover their expenses. Forex firms are no different. But since forex firms are holding customer funds the temptation of creditors to lay claim to those funds should a forex firm go out of business is too tempting. That is one reason the NFA wants forex firms to have more capital on hand than the average business in America. If a restaurant goes under the customers of the restaurant don’t feel the pinch since they just go to another restaurant. But customers of forex firms could lose their money on deposit if the firm they do business with goes under. Thus the risk is far greater to the general public.

2)Credit Risk. The reason behind Regulator's customer asset requirement rule (firms must set aside 10% of all customer assets) is because of the risk of customers defaulting on their credit obligation. This happens in futures all the time when accounts go negative. While forex firms like to brag about their platforms preventing customers from going negative the fact is it does happen. If the market drops 100 points in one tick it can easily happen. And if the firm can’t collect on that customer they have to eat that loss. That is a big risk. And with customers trading at 400 to 1 leverage in some cases the NFA is well justified in demanding firms have more capital on hand to offset that risk.

3)Market Making Risk. As much as NDD firms like to say they have no market risk because they pass along their trades to banks the fact is they still do have market risk. While that risk is not as large as non-NDD firms the fact is if the banks who execute each trade suddenly decide NOT TO execute a trade it is the NDD firm that has to take over pricing. Banks are not obligated by law to make prices the way exchanges are. If the market gets wild and the NDD firm’s bank decides not to make any prices who do you think is stuck with that responsibility? The NDD firm is. Either that or they don’t offer prices at all and basically cease operations. I would say that is quite a risk and certainly justifies a higher capital requirement as a result.

4)Market Discrepancy Risk. Trade discrepancies happen. There will always be cases where a bank says it executed a trade at one price while the counterparty says that trade was executed at another price. Since banks are loathe to admit guilt the onus of responsibility almost always falls on the counter party. And with high leverage those discrepancies can be very costly. Again, this justifies a higher capital requirement to help offset that risk.

So as you can see NDD firms have plenty of risk as well. They are not immune to the laws of economics. And as such are just as much in need of higher capital requirements as every other forex dealer.

 

I agree. The fx retailer's primary job is marketing, which forces it to keep the marketing fresh to lure new customers. A few years ago it was the cache of a dealing desk, to influence small time wannabes to believe they actually were involved in international foreign exchange. Then it was smaller spreads. Now it's deep pockets so you -- the customer -- won't have to worry about bankruptcy or finding out your retailer blew your dough on hookers and roulette. It's simply a matter of marketing.

Any guess what the next come on will be?