Observations on the NYSE specialist.

Discussion in 'Order Execution' started by oliver777, Feb 14, 2006.

  1. I'm new to the equity world and just trying to get my facts straight so I can interpret the various views expressed on this thread in proper context. Sorry in advance if I'm missing something obvious. Is Bright trading SLK's largest clearing customer, and is SLK one of the biggest specialist firms on the NYSE?
     
    #51     Feb 18, 2006
  2. Let's be real , the specs are doing to you what you are trying to do to them.

    You know exactly what I mean.

    If your price is on an ecn , wtf would you sent it to NYSE?

    You like the price they are showing because it's lagged and below fair value.

    But 10,000 others went to hit it at the same time.

    So 9,999 cry foul.


    lol.
     
    #52     Feb 18, 2006
  3. cstu

    cstu

    All exchanges have their advantages and disadvantages. It is imperative to be familiar with market structure to best understand how and where different kinds of orders need to be sent to get a best execution.

    Do I think it's fair that on NASDAQ I have numerous times entered orders that get traded through on the opening with no report because my "specialist" does not want to show the order?

    Was it fair when the market was roaring and stocks were opg at giant premiums that I could not get one price on a sell order? and had to get on a "selling line" in a stock that is opening higher?

    Clearly, SPY is one of the worst examples to use when comparing exchanges for a liquidity seeker. The Nasdaq has no responsibility to help the liquidity adder.

    I would love to have a conversation about this stuff, I am interested in market structure but to blame some sort of criminal element is a little stupid.

    I might add, I can create a bunch of scenarios where these guys acted appropriately (the specialist) and a lot of scenarios and ways in which they could rob us blind.
     
    #53     Feb 18, 2006
  4. I think that SPY is the best example to use when comparing exchanges for a liquidity seeker. I think it is the best, because the superior prices and immediate executions, available on Nasdaq, prove that NYSE is inferior. Why do you take the opposite view?

    I guess I'm a little stupid, for blaming a criminal element. I guess the SEC and the United States Attorney and the federal grand jury and New York State Attorney General Elliot Spitzer are also a little stupid. Pray tell, why is it a little stupid for us to complain about the culture of criminality at NYSE?
     
    #54     Feb 18, 2006
  5. No, stock777, it seems that you don't understand how competitive auction markets operate. Participants in an auction compete against each other when they are eager to trade. Eager buyers compete to offer the highest possible bids, in order to attract marketable sell orders to interact with their bids. Eager sellers compete to offer the lowest possible offers, in order to attract marketable buy orders to interact with their offers.

    A participant who gives fraudulent quotes, against which some or most participants will never actually be given the opportunity to execute, can undermine the integrity of the entire process. Such a participant can deceive others into sending their marketable orders to a market center where they will not receive the favorable prices falsely advertised. If you truly understand how markets work, you would understand that the blame should go entirely on the person flashing the bogus quotes, not on the other participants who attempt to interact with those bogus quotes.

    I never routed orders to NYSE in an effort to do to NYSE what NYSE did to me, or in an effort to transact at a price better than fair value. I routed to NYSE because they were offering the best price. It was only rational for me to do so. I was victimized because NYSE was falsely advertising the best price, when in fact they provided the worst price.

    It is a fundamental requirement that in order for markets to serve the common good, they must have some level of enforcement to protect participants from fraudulent price quotes. Your argument attempts to shift the blame away from the perpetrators of the fraud and onto the victims of the fraud. Your argument has absolutely no merit whatsoever.
     
    #55     Feb 18, 2006
  6. My view is that many NYSE customers have a sohisticated liquidity providing strategy which allows them to benefit from NYSE, at the expense of other NYSE customers who take liquidity. This provides them an incentive to defend NYSE and to deny the existence of its blatant criminality.

    A customer who provides or offers liquidity is a customer who submits an order which is far enough away from the market so that it will not immediately execute. The order instead sits and waits for the market price to come to the order. Such an order is said to provide liquidity, because it helps to stabilize the market against the destabilizing tendencies of opposing orders which seek to execute as quickly as possible at the currently available price.

    A customer who seeks or takes liquidity is a customer who submits a marketable order. A marketable order can be a market order, or a limit order at a price matching or beating the best available price on the other side. Such an order is priced aggressively enough so that it is eligible for execution, as urgently and as quickly as possible against opposite orders already available on the market.

    The NYSE order-matching process systematically victimizes those who seek liquidity. It also systematically victimizes some customers who provide liquidity, but only those who are unsophisticated. The NYSE systematically shares some of the resulting loot with customers who have a sophisticated strategy for providing liquidity. It is therefore in the financial best interest of such sophisticated, liquidity-providing NYSE customers, to defend whatever NYSE does, to deny the obvious NYSE criminality, and to shift the blame onto innocent victims and others.

    One sophisticated NYSE liquidity providing customer, for example, suggested that his traders get better executions than do I at IB, because orders from his traders can interact with a pool of liquidity, provided by Goldman Sachs, for NYSE-traded issues. This subtly blames IB for failing to provide access to Goldman Sachs liquidity. The truth is that I, as an IB customer, can also access that same pool of Goldman Sachs liquidity. This is because Goldman Sachs is a registered Nasdaq market-maker. The best price available from all those Nasdaq market-makers, on any NYSE-traded issue, is quoted on the IB platform as a quote from SUPERSOES (although the official name has been changed from Supersoes to Nasdaq InterMarket). Any IB customer can interact with such a quote with a single keystroke and receive immediate automatic execution at or better than the offered price. So my broker, IB, really is not to blame at all, in this particular respect, for the unfavorable outcome of my liquidity-taking orders routed to NYSE.
     
    #56     Feb 18, 2006
  7. Hamlet

    Hamlet

    Wouldn't it be great to have a totally efficient market where no trader can profit but by chance.
     
    #57     Feb 18, 2006
  8. ilganzo

    ilganzo

    Unbelievable. Look cstu, if you think informing fellow traders of NYSE criminal activities is a little stupid, check out this report. This is not my experience or the experience of some jerk posting on ET under a stupid alias. This is the SEC:
    http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/34-49499.htm
     
    #58     Feb 18, 2006
  9. Hamlet

    Hamlet

    Quit whining on message boards and go learn how to make some money. Perhaps some day you can graduate from a small-time IB trader.
     
    #59     Feb 18, 2006
  10. ilganzo

    ilganzo

    Hey Hamlet, great reply. Just curious, how much do you make?
     
    #60     Feb 18, 2006