As will the history books. I'm just one who enjoys the facts, figures and trivia found a little deeper than the headlines when it comes to history.
I'm not one to argue my point through a hundred posts from every angle. If one doesn't understand my point and the reality of the problem, then so be it. I'll make this last and final spat of logic from another analytical source about the reality on the ground about the drone program in Pakistan and let it go at that. While drones have been effective at taking out some enemy leaders, it has not effective at achieving what should be our objectives and I fault Obama for ignoring this point. Is drone warfare effective? Despite a ramping up of drone attacks since Obama took office, militant attacks continue to emanate from Pakistan with regularity. The militant leaders who are being killed are those most likely to broker a peace with the Afghan regime; new leaders are younger and likely to be both more radicalized and unwilling to compromise. Statistics further bolster claims of dronesâ ineffectiveness. On average, only one in seven strikes kills a militant leader; less than 2 percent killed by US drone strikes in Pakistan were leaders of al-Qaeda or groups allied with them. Violence in Pakistan has also risen dramatically since the programâs inception (from 150 terrorist incidents in 2004 to 1916 in 2009). Counterterrorism expert David Kilcullen sums up the dilemma of drone strikes in Pakistan: âThe drone strikes are highly unpopular. They are deeply aggravating to the population. And theyâve given rise to a feeling of anger that coalesces the population around the extremists and leads to spikes of extremism well outside the parts of the country where we are mounting those attacks.â Kilcullenâs testimony is borne out by a 2009 Gallup poll, which found that only 9 percent of Pakistanis support drone strikes. Two-thirds of those polled in tribal areas also said that suicide attacks against US military targets are justified. Popular anger deriving from civilian deaths as well as a rise in terrorist incidents has effectively made the idea of drone strikes directly antithetical to the counterinsurgency doctrine of winning the hearts and minds of a population: âPopular anger against drone missions deprives U.S. forces of the good will they need to woo neutrals to their side, which diminishes the returns of successful kills. It is the kind of vicious spiral that undermined U.S. efforts in Vietnam.â Concluding Thoughts Drone strikes have become an incredibly popular tool in the United Statesâ arsenal in the field of counterterrorism, and the incentives remain in place for both the military and political establishment to continue expanding dronesâ role in counterterrorism. While these strikes have killed upwards of 1,300 militants in Pakistan alone, it remains unclear whether they are legal, moral, or even effective. Though the likelihood that CIA operatives will be prosecuted for conducting drone strikes is farfetched at best, the consequences of drone warfare on the effectiveness of Americaâs counterterrorism strategy are real. A loss of credibility and legitimacy in the eyes of populations whose trust we are trying to win far outweighs the benefits derived from killing predominantly low and mid-level militants. Drone strikes are a tactic and not a strategyârelying upon them alone as the primary means of counterterrorism will not suffice until it is coupled with articulated, focused ends. http://policyoutlook.blogspot.com/2011/08/drone-warfare-unlawful-and-ineffective.html