Your dictionary's definition doesn't appear to reflect connotations. The term as used in modern English almost always refers to non-constitutional monarchies or to dictatorships, and is virtually never used to refer to democracies. What principally upset people about Kerry's statement was the implicit equivalence between the Baath Party regime and the US Administration. If you were to take Kerry's remark literally, you'd have to think he was calling not for replacing Bush, but for replacing the US system of government. Kerry was attempting, of course, to make a joke - a very stale one, which has been a staple of Democrat attacks on Bush for months or more. Whether he got it from a chat with Barbra Streisand or off a protest sign, the comment was a clumsy, extremely ill-timed pander to the antiwar constituency, many of whose members seem actually to believe that Bush and Saddam are on a par, if not that Bush is worse. Kerry doesn't really believe that, but he does want to get the votes and support of people who do.
Thanks for clearing that up. Heartily agree - I'm sure there are many ETers who perceive Bush's administration to be a 'regime' in the same way I associate the word as it is used to refer to SH and other dictators. I think they're idiots, and they think the same of me. Round and round it goes. BTW, are you able to do something about the inflated view numbers for this thread? Babak apparently isn't satisfied with my offers of Spam, Vienna Sausage, Provolone, and Cheddar-in-A-Can...
Those who voted that N. Korea is not a threat and should thus be left alone, please explain your rationale.
North Korea - Military Confrontation or Not? NOT ! Why ? Too late, and they are too tight with China.
http://onehandclapping.blogspot.com/2002_12_29_onehandclapping_archive.html by Donald Sensing. Permalink: 12/30/2002 08:56:56 PM In all the hue and cry over North Korea's increasing bluster and threats, I have detected in my web readings near-panicky assertions that the North has overwhelming superiority over the South and the American forces stationed in the South. Some commentators have claimed that the 2d US Infantry Division there is nothing more than a speed bump and that if the US has significant forces engaged against Iraq, the South is as good as lost. To which I say, "No." In fact, I have already said that North Korea is a paper tiger - in conventional arms, let me be specific. When it attains a nuke or two, the paper teeth will have some bite, unfortunately. But in conventional arms, the South and the US are quantitatively superior to the North. I served in the 2d US Infantry Division (2ID) in Korea from 1977-1978, in 1st Battalion, 38th Field Artillery. The battalion was then equipped with 18 105mm towed howitzers, M102A1. Today it is equipped with 27 Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) vehicles, an exceptionally powerful rocket artillery system. 2ID then resembled a World War II division more than it did its present configuration. We did not then consider ourselves a "speed bump." The technological advances since 1978 have increased the division's combat power exponentially. I do not claim that 2ID can defeat an invading North all by itself. I certainly do claim that those who write the division off, saying that it would be destroyed, are just wrong. In the 50-odd years since the Korean War, the US Army has been well funded most years, has fought in several wars large and small, and has been the direct beneficiary, and sometimes the engine, of the revolution in computerization. The Army's history since 1953 has been dynamic. Capabilities in conventional munitions have been so improved that tactical atomic weapons are not necessary to achieve effects against enemy soldiers or installations. In fact, a single MLRS launcher is more destructive than a 155mm atomic projectile, and at longer range. There have been enormous improvements in training and the systems and equipment used for training. Intensive combat simulations ("war games" being a hopelessly inadequate term) are now used that integrate vehicles, simulators, communications, computers, aerospace assets and ground/naval units in ways never before possible, linked worldwide. In contrast, the North Korean army has done none of this. In particular, they have not been required to stretch their doctrine because they have not fought a war since 1953. They have read and studied, of course, but they have had no chance to test whether their theoretical doctrine is any good. Their millions of soldiers are far from uniformly effective. (Of the five million men under arms the North is said to have, about three-fourths are reserves with little regular training.) None of their services have the combined arms operations skills that US and Southern forces have. They rarely conduct large-scale maneuvers, and when they do, the maneuvers are scripted. Free-play exercises are not done. Their air force does not fly near the hours that US and ROK air forces do, and with nothing like the training intensity. They do not have stealth aircraft. Their most numerous fighter plane, the MIG-19, dates from not long after the Korean War. That NK troops could cross the Military Demarcation Line can't be denied; doing so has been the main focus of their military for, lo, five decades. (When I served on the DMZ, US and ROK engineers were blowing up tunnels that the North had dug under the DMZ; at least one could handle trucks. There are certainly tunnels we have not discovered.) But it is highly likely that they have no real imagination for doing anything much more than making the initial assault, except for taking Seoul. (Seoul is only 30 miles from the DMZ.) In short, their whole operational model has been their previous invasion of 1950, when they drove all the way to Pusan. But in 1950 they did not face a well-prepared defense in depth, manned with well-trained troops. Nor had Northern troops and their families suffered from decades of communist oppression and literal starvation. Neither had the inherent corruption of the communist system yet destroyed the integrity of their officer high command. If the North invades again, from the beginning Allied forces will enjoy -- communications dominance, position advantage, clear firepower superiority, better weapons and equipment, better trained units, staffs and procedures, better combined arms integration, air superiority, then air supremacy, better tactical and strategic intelligence, better round-the-clock combat capability. What the North does have is troops - lots and lots of troops. But "hording" as a combat tactic will result in the Allies enjoying something close to Omdurman-type victory [note: 1898 - the Dervish Army, approximately 52,000 strong, suffered losses of 20,000 dead, 22,000 wounded, and some 5,000 taken prisoner--an unbelievable 90% casualty rate! By contrast, the Anglo-Egyptian Army, some 23,000 strong, suffered losses of 48 dead, and 382 wounded - an equally unbelievable 2% casualty rate]. 2ID is armored and mechanized. The US M1A1 Abrams tank outshoots and outruns anything the North has. The North has perhaps 3,500 main battle tanks, but how many of them run is another matter. And how many crews are trained is yet another. The vast preponderance of Northern troops are foot soldiers who would perish in untold numbers to American artillery and Air Force weapons. By no means would such an invasion be easily resisted. As I said in my previous post, casualties would be high on both sides, but much higher for the North. Probably more South Korean civilians would die than ROK troops. NK special ops forces would be of serious concern and would spearhead an invasion, operating well south of the DMZ. They would commit sabotage, assassination and special attacks. The North almost certainly has fairly modern UAVs that would be used as a "poor man's cruise missile." Some analysts think that the North would launch nonpersistent chemical agents at Seoul, intending to kill as many Southern government workers as possible; that many ordinary Seoulians would die also is of no consequence. Steven Den Beste has said that civilian refugees fleeing the battle would constitute major mobility problems for Allied forces, and he's probably right. While the North's army slugged its way south, American air power would be devastating North Korea's lines of communication, ports, installations and infrastructure. The North's air force would pretty quickly be dispatched. Military and government buildings in Pyongyang would be leveled. I think US commanders would show much less restraint against North Korea than they did against Iraq in 1991. In short, the North can invade the South, but it cannot win. The ensuing war would be disastrous for the South in terms of human loss, also for the North unless the war ended with the South's suzerainty over the North. But even so, the North Korean people would suffer very greatly until then. The problem, though, is not that the North could win such a war. It is that its isolated, self-justifying oligarchy might think it can win. And with its impending development of atomic weapons, it may think that all the more. by Donald Sensing. Permalink: 12/30/2002 04:59:44 PM
Yes, Donald Sensing consistently offers incisive and thoughtful analysis of military issues, and pretty smart political observations, too. Among other things, just in case the North Korean leadership wasn't sure that an attack on the South would result in their annihilation, that an entrenched American mechanized division isn't a pushover, and that Americans do not lack resolve, our little expedition to Iraq may have helped disabuse them of the notions. In an op-ed that appeared in the LA TIMES a couple of weeks ago, but is no longer available on-line except for $$$, Asia expert Sam Crane stressed that a key immediate concern is not an attack from or on North Korea, but the sudden, catastrophic collapse of the regime. Current Japanese, Chinese, and South Korean policy is to keep Kim Jong Il afloat, even strengthen him, in the hope that a more or less peaceful and affordable transition can be made at a later date. One might always hope for a coup by some North Korean general, but Stalinist regimes have historically been very good, and very ruthless about eliminating threats from the military. Still, Kim Jong Il is apparently a major freakazoid twerp, and the situation in North Korea seems to be inexpressibly abysmal. You'd think that someone with a little bit of sense would sooner or later come along and smother him with a pillow - presuming there's not some more pleasant way to put the country out of his misery.
Military, at a very last resort. And....I mean, very last resort. If Saddam did have nukes, and rockets to fire them, would we really have invaded the way we did?
Probably not, but I don't think the Israelis would have let him get that far to begin with. I think it is still very much up in the air as to the exact amount of nukes Kim has and the means of delivering them. I hear estimates ranging from enough fissionable material for 2-4 warheads in a couple of years to enough for two at the present time. Maybe dGAB can do us the favor of looking up what Jane's says about it... Say our intel gets definitive confirmation that the North has but one nuke-tipped missile capable of reaching Hawaii or the West Coast. Would Dubya figure it's worth risking the loss of Honolulu or LA in order to get rid of Kim?
What if he targeted a very highly populated area like Tokyo? Last resort, absolutely 100% last resort. This is very different. Personally, I still think Kim is China's bitch, so it really is up to China what happens with him. We would do nothing without China's approval. Bush is a cowboy, but he isn't stupid. His father was the head of the CIA for goodness sake, he knows all the real players. Saddam was easy, he was a dead man walking anyway, as I have no doubt we got the go ahead from behind the scenes from the heads of OPEC before we went in. We have no idea what kind of deals were cut behind the scenes before this war began. As much as Saddam is a loser here, France, Germany, and Turkey are the biggest losers. Nothing like getting everybody else to tip their hand before you play your cards, is there?