Men rely on platitudes when they are incapable of answering specific arguments directly. So you were in favor of intense military pressure as long as we didn't really mean it. The timetable contemplated in Resolution 1441 was "immediate." This may have been the only context in the entire debate in which immediacy played a critical role - or was intended to play a critical role until various USNC members began to develop new definitions of "immediate" alongside their re-interpretations of such drastically complicated terms as "full" and "compliance." The idea that weapons inspectors might have found "enough WMD... to bring other allies on board" is ludicrous. You confirm that you also thought that the inspectors should have been WMD detectives, finding evidence that a reluctant regime was attempting to hide. That was not their purpose, and they had no ability to perform such a task. Their job was to verify full compliance - active and affirmative cooperation with UN mandates - or not. Among the many outcomes that delay would have allowed for were many negative ones, including some disastrous ones, along with the certainty of some of the near-term negative outcomes that I outlined. A united front was lost the moment key US allies (or supposed allies) broke ranks - publically stating, for instance, that they would not support the use of force under any circumstances. Rather than respond to the specifics, you prefer to attempt a slur, you continue to ignore the larger and longer term issues, and continue to focus on your own narrow and simplistic statement of the issues. I don't think there's much danger of the debate coming to a premature end (especially if you and I have anything to say about it). Whether it's best conducted within the framework of partisan opportunism and media frenzy is another question. Will seems to imagine that future challenges will all resemble the Iraq conflict. In some instances, of a true imminent threat, there may be no time or opportunity for discussion: An administration will be forced to act, as is their responsibility under law, morality, and tradition. In other cases, the intelligence and the related concerns may be of a much different character. Will strains to make a point about the credibility gap that enemies of Bush are trying to drive between him and the public. Clearly, Bush is being forced to address the issue, but the effect on the doctrine of pre-emption is speculative and secondary. Here, again, is what Bush said in his State of the Union speech - a key passage, but not the only one along these lines - delivered to a worldwide audience at a time of maximum attention: Why don't you find an equivalent passage or passages from any major or even minor speech or set of remarks that contradicts this clear and unequivocal statement, and places US policy in the context of urgent action to combat imminent threat of use of WMDs against the American homeland? It won't be helpful if the passage, like most if not all of the passages in that post that Madison put up and that others have been circulating, is dragged out of context, is based on a misstatement, or merely accurately refers to the speaker's knowledge of then-current intelligence on WMDs. Administration officials have openly admitted that they focused on the WMD issue - the whole WMD issue, not just the parts as you like to define them - because they felt it was one of the strongest and most easily accessible elements of the case. There's nothing inherently wrong with having done so - except that it has turned out to play into a counterstrategy by political opponents of reducing the issue to its most simplistic form, then hammering away at it. I make no claim of any kind on the issue. I present my arguments and evidence to the best of my ability. No sensible person presumes that his or her own opinions are so distorted by bias as to be invalid, just as no sensible person presumes his or her own total freedom from bias. Hagel has a right to his concerns, as to Bush's critics from the opposition and elsewhere. There is also reason to be concerned that disunity and opportunism might also impact upon the ability of the United States to sustain an effective and systematic defense of its national interests. In relative terms, this period is "downtime" in the war on terror. We seem to have the luxury to turn 16 possibly ill-chosen but altogether innocuous words from the State of the Union, one minor element of a much larger case, into top headlines day after day. There were outbreaks of such backbiting during World War II and the Civil War, too. Even the ancient democracies used to turn on themselves in such a way during wartime, even and especially after victorious military enterprises: That doesn't make it a good thing.
When we find Saddam we probably will find the WMD. Why wouldn't he keep them close to him and under his direct control for a last resort effort?
There has been much speculation among relatively well-informed sources that the Administration is holding onto WMD information that it has not yet released. Some have suspected a political calculation: Let the bitterest and most excessive opponents of the Administration, along with the opportunists drawn into their circles, climb out together onto as high a limb as possible before cutting it off. Others presume that the total picture - which may contain both pluses and minuses for the Bush Administration - is still coming together. A third possibility is that the information remains extremely sensitive - that sources are still in danger, that methods could still be compromised, and that letting "them" know what we know or suspect could be critically disadvantageous. There is also speculation abroad that SH is preparing for a counterattack from his enclave - much of it underground - in the area of the so-called Sunni Triangle. US forces, it is claimed, are preparing for such an eventuality - which might not be a bad thing at all from the military perspective, but might also risk a publicity disaster (kind of an Iraqi Tet). The possibility of use of WMDs can't be excluded, but in this context they might only make sense as some psychopathic "blaze of glory" statement, since collateral effects would hit SH's strongest supporters the hardest, and since any use of WMDs would largely put an end to one of his main political strategies in both domestic and international dimensions. It was feared by some before the war that SH would use WMDs and other methods to inflict large casualties on his own populace, but this theory, though it correctly calculated SH's willingness to sacrifice Iraqis for the sake of his own ambitions, ignores the bases of his power, especially if presumed to apply to the Sunni and Tikriti tribal areas. Some in the US may have underestimated Sunni loyalty to the order that gave them privileges and relative power in Iraq, as well as SH's own recognition of his dependence on the Sunnis. The nature of this power nexus may have contributed to SH's political conclusion that using WMDs against US forces could have a massive downside for him. In this regard, common depictions of Saddam as a "madman" or "psychopath" again look like classic instances of underestimating the enemy. He's displayed sociopathic and sadistic tendencies, he might not hesitate to inflict any number of casualties even among his own supporters if it served his purposes, and he may also act stupidly or self-destructively from time, but he hasn't given evidence of being psychologically out of control. If Saddam's own people - not Iraqis, but Sunnis and particularly members of his own Tikriti clan - were to turn on him or to fail him, then he might determine that they deserved to suffer an even greater punishment than any they or any of Saddam's enemies have previously undergone. Hitler made such a determination about the Germans near the end of World War II. Saddam still commands the loyalty of numerous veterans of his security services, he's survived tough scrapes before, and he may still have access to substantial finances and weapons stockpiles. Fear of him is still a quite reasonable response, among his own people especially. When the final confrontation with SH and his remaining allies occurs, it could take many forms, ranging from a relatively small scale captures or assassinations to an all-out conflagration. It could occur today or months from now. Whenever it happens, I really don't think anyone will be thinking much about one possibly dubious intelligence item that found its way into Bush's SOTU.
So in essence it is possible that administrations (not just this one) could put an ace up their sleeve in the form of information that may be crucial to national security just so they can have an advantage in the political game?
Of course it is possible, why not? Aphie, you are not really so young and naive to think that politics isn't the most corrupt dirtiest game in the world, are you? The reelection campaign in 2004 was begun the moment Bush won the election in 2000.
And yet, when the ultimatum was clear, and then re-stated in even sharper terms, and was defied, you would prefer that we held back yet once again. What, under such circumstances, would have made SH or any other enemy believe at some later point that this time we really, really, really meant it? Just as important, why should we have believed it? Even that wasn't enough to gain "full and immediate compliance" from him. He may have calculated, like you and Jacques Chirac, that it was still possible to call the US "bluff." More likely, he calculated that giving in would sooner or later mean the end of his hold on power and his longer-term ambitions. He preferred, and still prefers apparently, to fight rather than to give in. To say the least, he's hardly unique in this respect. Indeed, he's almost normal. "Immediate" is not just my understanding. It was the actual word used in Resolution 1441. Later, apparently on second thought (either that or as a result of a pre-planned betrayal), some members of the UNSC decided that maybe "immediate" wasn't really what they meant, or maybe that "immediate" didn't really mean "immediate," that the last chance wasn't really a last chance, and so on. (There have even been some suggestions that the divisions that resulted - the willingness particularly of the French to adopt the Queen of Hearts position that words mean whatever they want them to mean - partly reflected a difference between Anglo-American and Continental European understandings of law and language. Personally, I consider this perspective too charitable to the French, though it may explain why they were so shamless about their actions.) The break with the UN was real. The main difference between us on the subject is that you blame the US for it, and are apparently comfortable subordinating US policy and interests to an organization that can't stand by its own solemnly adopted words, and can't even agree on what the words themselves mean. This instance was hardly the first time that the UN proved itself unable to function credibly, consequentially, and effectively. It may have been the last time for a very long time that the US invests very much political capital in changing the UN into something more respectable. It's ludicrous to think that, if Saddam actually possessed nuclear weapons, any of this would have happened - least of all his submission to what he considered the violation of Iraqi sovereignty. It's almost as ludicrous to believe that, if Saddam was determined to defy the world, that the inspectors would have been able to find securely hidden WMDs. Though to me it's obvious that a few hundred, or even a few thousand, inspectors couldn't be expected to search every square mile of a country the size of Iraq, you don't need to rely on speculation: Saddam had already managed repeatedly to fool inspections teams in the past. You do not seem to have an understanding of how inspections regimes are designed and intended to work. You are not alone in this misunderstanding. The negative political ramifications of the US being publically humiliated and forced to back down by the united front of Saddam, the Axis of Weasels, the Arab street, and the peace movement would very likely have been extremely negative, in my opinion, for some of the reasons outlined previously. Even without going into them, however, the near-term set of virtually certain negative outcomes to the US succumbing to pressure for delay would have included the cost, strain, heightened vulnerability, and other military impacts of having to re-organize and re-deploy forces brought into theater, the extension of economic uncertainty relating to the actual state and outcome of the conflict, the continuation for an indefinite period of UN sanctions, and the exposure of allies within Iraq and the region to intensified, lethal pressure. Very unlikely in general terms, and especially from the perspective of Iraqi opponents of Saddam - for whom you apparently have no sympathy whatsoever. All we can do when contemplating alternatives is put together scenarios. I haven't seen anything from you resembling a cogent alternative scenario advantageous to the US, just some hazy ideas and some wishful thinking.
You keep on saying this, but, when challenged to provide supporting evidence, you punt. Okay - then I really wonder whether you put on a bib before opening your upper shithole. Is that the level on which you'd like to debate these issues? (If you follow your usual tactics, you will cut and paste part of the first sentence from this paragraph into some other post as some supposed demonstration that I argue solely by use of ad hominems and "flaming.") Your idea of analyzing the situation is to imagine totally counterfactual scenarios based on vague speculation about what might have been possible "behind the scenes," even though it contradicts everything that is known about the motives and statements of key participants, both as publically stated and as revealed through analysis and actual behind the scenes reporting. Aside from being a fantasy, this response has nothing at all to do with the issue of utilizing a united front against Saddam. Your idea is that an effective united front could have been produced behind the scenes? That's a contradiction in terms. Just using France as the main example: When the French government's unambiguous opposition to the US was publically stated, and verified by intensive French efforts to rally opposition to the US, any politically meaningful united front was finis. Imagining a set of circumstances under which it might have arised again, and could have been depended upon and therefore might have had the desired effect, would require imagining a complete transformation of all of the parties involved. I took your reference to "chicken hawks" as a slur. False accusations and repetions of big lies are also familiar fascist tactics. But no one claims that the Bush Administration isn't being forced to address these issues. There's a difference, however, between addressing the issues and merely conceding the critics' case. Again, you punt - and you repeat an unproven charge while seemingly assuming that it's fact - that Bush "was using fabricated intelligence." Your unsupported slur against Bush says more about your hostility towards him than about any of the facts and issues we're discussing. I've given examples of how such passages have been manipulated. (I see in the op-ed you c&p'd that Pat Buchanan repeated the dishonest use of the Cheney quotation in his own typically intemperate take on these matters.) I've also spoken about them in general terms. I don't accept any obligation to go through the list item by item. I've challenged you to back up your view of Bush's war justifications. I presented a major policy statement that directly contradicts your claim, and you have yet to produce a single item in support of it. The best you can do, apparently, is to repeat your empty assertions or change the subject. Reminds me of "if the glove don't fit, you must acquit." That kind of reasoning doesn't cut it in international affairs - war and peace is not a US murder trial, and enemies of the US don't get out on technicalities. You have not demonstrated, by far, the WMDs did not deserve to be a significant element in the case for war. You have merely offered suspicions extrapolated from one distorted analysis of one narrow aspect of the WMD issue. I again have no idea how you draw this inference my statements. I have to conclude that you reached this conclusion beforehand, and somehow imagine that the reasons are obvious. I offered "reason to be concerned" about possible impacts, alongside an affirmation of the right of Hagel and of critics from any party or side to state their other concerns. We dislodged the Taliban. We dislodged Saddam's regime. We've chased Al Qaeda from its sanctuaries, killed or captures numerous members of the organization including top leaders. Our forces are stretched near the limit. There appears to be no major new initiative on the horizon. There has been no new outrage on American soil. Relative to other periods - immediate aftermath of 9/11, war in Afghanistan, build-up to Iraq, major combat - what we've been going through lately suggests "downtime" to me. I'm sorry if the expression offends you. Seems harmless to me. I had in mind a number of examples from Greek and Roman history, events that took place during pre-imperial, transitional, and imperial periods in the histories particularly of Rome and Athens - simply as an observation on human nature and familiar patterns that recur in democratic forms of government. The Athenians were famously subject to extreme reversals in opinion regarding war leaders - banishing or literally executing victorious commanders over perceived infractions against Athenian tradition or interests, and at other times suddenly reversing themselves and embracing individuals whom they had just recently rejected. The factionalism, inconsistency, and wasteful self-destructiveness that became endemic to Athenian politics and war strategy are considered major reasons why, despite major economic and military advantages, Athens finally succumbed to Sparta. The example has stood literally for thousands of years as a warning to democracies, and as a major reason why many were skeptical, a couple centuries ago, that democracy could ever be made to work in the United States.
I don't see how holding back current information on WMDs could be considered harmful to national security, though I would consider holding onto this information solely for the sake of enticing critics into a trap would be underhanded and an inappropriate use of intelligence information. For the other reasons I mentioned, however, it may actually be helpful to national security or at least to the security of real soldiers, operatives, agents, witnesses, and bystanders, conceivably even crucial, to hold this information back. Or the administration and/or investigators may merely be waiting until they feel the picture is definitive enough to present. In either case, the eventual embarrassment of Bush critics would merely be a side-benefit, and something they brought on themselves. While we're speculating about the motives of individual actors on the political scene, it's likewise possible that some Bush critics are cognizant of the risk they're taking, but can't resist various pressures and temptations to make political hay while the sun is shining.