. February 6, 2006 SouthAmerica: The United States government believes that âThe boogieman is coming to get you again â Iran is the latest boogieman â¦ The Iranians want to build nuclear weapons â and so what? Since Iran is a sovereign country they have the right to do anything they want inside their country to protect their population, including building nuclear weapons - In my opinion, the same story applies to North Korea. Here we are talking about a country's sovereignty. I don't know if the American people understand the concept of "Sovereignty" today, otherwise why the United States make such a big deal about other countries developing nuclear weapons? This is not a debate about defending North Korea's or Iran's position. This is a debate about how a country that has sovereignty also has the right to build nuclear weapons. The decision to build nuclear weapons is between the government and the people of that country. If the people of a country decides that they want to build nuclear weapons; then it is not the business of any other country to try to stop that endeavor. Or a country has sovereignty or it does not. Every country has the right to build nuclear weapons including not only North Korea but also Iran, Brazil, Argentina, etc. By the way; the United States, and the Russia, both countries have the right to develop and build its new series of smaller nuclear weapons. I don't see any other country trying to stop the United States or Russia from going ahead with their nuclear weapons plans. Here is why the Iranians don't trust the United States, and they believe that they need nuclear weapons to defend their country against a possible pre-emptive attack by the United States. Remember, Iran is the second part of the "Axis of Evil." If you watch the Fox News Network, the impression that you get is that the Iranian government is getting ready to attack the US with nuclear weapons. You know, like a repetition of the Saddam Hussein regime change fiasco. These phantom weapons can be launched and reach the US in 45 minutes, or something like that. (What a bunch of BS.) You might ask: why not North Korea first? Because of two reasons: 1) Iran has lots of "OIL" and North Korea doesn't. 2) North Korea has a large army, and the US could not beat them during the first Korean War, and the US most likely can't beat them again. The North Koreans have a 5 million people army, and the US can't beat even a bunch of insurgents in Iraq estimated at less than 15,000 people. I want to remind you once again, Iran has lots of "OIL." Here is another example of how well American intervention on other countryâs business worked in the past â it is just a reminder. Here we go againâ¦â¦â¦â¦ ********** Part 1 of 2 The American Prospect "Regime change since 1953" Article published 11/01/03 Regime Change: The Legacy - Since 1953, U.S. presidents have been toppling other governments. Now, the consequences. By Stephen Kinzer Issue Date: 11.1.03 A very happy group of men convened at the White House on Sept. 4, 1953, to hear a cloak-and-dagger story that would resonate through all of subsequent American history. Two weeks before, the Central Intelligence Agency had overthrown Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh of Iran. It was the first time the CIA had deposed a foreign leader, and on this day the agent who ran the operation, Kermit Roosevelt, was to explain how he did it. Roosevelt's account of bribes, staged riots and artillery duels was almost too hair-raising to believe. It transfixed everyone in the room, including President Dwight Eisenhower, who later wrote that it "seemed more like a dime novel than historical facts." If there was a single moment when the United States can be said to have entered the modern era of covert action and regime change, this was it. "One of my audience seemed almost alarmingly enthusiastic," Roosevelt later recalled. "John Foster Dulles was leaning back in his chair. Despite his posture, he was anything but sleepy. His eyes were gleaming; he seemed to be purring like a giant cat. Clearly he was not only enjoying what he was hearing, but my instinct told me that he was planning as well." Roosevelt's instinct was true. Soon after his triumphant White House briefing, his CIA superiors approached him with a new offer. President Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles wished to be rid of troublesome Guatemalan leader Jacobo Arbenz. Seeing as Roosevelt had already shown his skill at toppling elected governments, would he like to try again? He demurred, but the project went ahead anyway. It was another brilliant success, as Arbenz was forced from power and replaced by a pliant colonel. In the space of less than a year, the CIA had deposed two popular leaders whose nationalism and refusal to accommodate foreign capital had made them anathema in Washington. These two "regime change" operations set the United States on a course to which it still holds. Over the 50 years that have followed, driven by a combination of idealism and arrogance, successive American administrations have assumed the right to topple governments around the world. Only now, in the wake of the shocks that the world system has suffered in the last few years, is the full aftereffect of those operations being felt. The coups of the 1950s in Iran and Guatemala, like the recent Iraq invasion, were planned with a stubborn insistence that everything would turn out all right in the end. This relentlessly naive optimism, this unbounded faith in the ability of the United States to work its will in the world, has become a guiding principle of American foreign policy. It has led some in Washington to conclude that the United States represents such a unique combination of lofty principles and great power that it can triumph even over history itself. During the Cold War, the United States could depose foreign governments only through covert action. Armed invasions were out of the question because they had the potential to set off global cataclysm. Today, however, invasion is once again considered a realistic option. With no Red Army to fear, regime change is now a job for the CIA if possible, the military if necessary. There are obvious differences between the recent Iraq War and the coups that brought down the leaders of Iran and Guatemala half a century ago. One was a full-scale military campaign, while the others were covert operations. The target in Iraq was a monstrous tyrant, while those in Iran and Guatemala were democratically elected leaders. But the Iraq War resembles those first two CIA coups in important ways. Economic factors have often played a crucial role in American decisions to plot regime change. The target country almost always has a valuable resource that it is refusing to share on terms that the West considers fair. Prime Minister Mossadegh nationalized Britain's fabulously lucrative Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, and American leaders feared that if the nationalization were allowed to stand, it would set a dangerous precedent that could undermine corporate power around the world. President Arbenz's offense was his campaign to force the United Fruit Company to sell off its vast unused lands so they could be distributed to Guatemalan peasants. Similarly, Saddam Hussein was sitting atop a huge reserve of oil and was decidedly hostile to U.S. companies eager to extract, refine and sell it. In all three of these countries, regime-change operations were designed in part to show that the United States does not tolerate foreign leaders who restrict the ability of Western corporations to make money. The drive to control the world's most valuable resources is not the only factor that pushes the United States into action abroad. Eagerness to strike against global enemies is also a strong motivation. During the Cold War, the enemy was communism. An alarming series of communist advances in the late 1940s and early 1950s terrified many Americans. Secretary of State Dulles and his brother, Allen, who ran the CIA during the Eisenhower administration, took office eager to demonstrate their determination to fight this enemy. British leaders tried to overthrow Mossadegh in 1952, but he learned of their plot and foiled it by expelling all British diplomats from Iran, among them secret agents assigned to stage the coup. Desperate to remove their tormenter, the British asked Washington for help. President Harry Truman refused, worrying quite rightly that such a violent interruption of Iranian political life would have unpredictable and perhaps disastrous consequences. That left the British angry and frustrated. But when news came of Eisenhower's election in November 1952, they were thrilled. Kermit Roosevelt stirred their hopes by visiting London soon after the election and telling his friends in the Secret Intelligence Service that the new administration's approach to Iran might be "quite different" from Truman's. .