Principled (not Rhetorical) Reasons Why ID Doesnât Identify the Designer (Part 1) Mike Gene recently posted on Telic Thoughts http://telicthoughts.com/they-love-to-smear-us/ responding to professor James F. McGrath, who accuses intelligent design (ID) proponents of being dishonest when they claim that ID does not identify the designer. This professor wrote: âThat isn't an instance of humility, but of strategy, and we all know why the strategy is being used: to wedge ID into science classrooms by disconnecting it from religion.â Similarly, I recently read a law review article co-authored by Barbara Forrest where she asserts with Stephen Gey and Matthew Brauer that "an intelligent designer is simply a subtle reference to God." (More on problems with this article in Part 2.) Professor McGrath is perhaps unfamiliar with writings and position of ID proponents on this point. Thomas Woodward clearly explains the principled reasons why the biological evidence for ID may not allow us to identify the designer: There is no âMade by Yahwehâ engraved on the side of the bacterial rotary motorâthe flagellum. In order to find out what or who its designer is, one must go outside the narrow discipline of biology. Cross-disciplinary dialogue must begin with the fields of philosophy, sociology, history, anthropology, and theology. Design itself, however, is a direct scientific inference; it does not depend on a single religious premise for its conclusions. (Thomas Woodward, Darwin Strikes Back: Defending the Science of Intelligent Design, pg. 15 (Baker Books, 2006).) In other words, the flagellar machine itself indicates that it did not arise by a random and unguided process like Darwinian evolution, but rather arose by a non-random and intelligently directed process such as intelligent design. However, while biological structures may be scientifically explained via intelligent design, the structures themselves have no way of directly telling us whether the designer is Yahweh, Buddha, Yoda, or some other type of intelligent agency. Thus, in contrast to the professorâs incorrect accusation that this is part of a âstrategy ⦠to wedge ID into science classrooms,â IDâs non-identification of the designer stems from a scientific desire to take a scientific approach and respect the limits of science and not inject religious discussions about theological questions into scientific inquiry. In other words, using present knowledge, identifying the designer canât be done by science. It is a strictly theological question, and thus for the theory of ID to try to identify the designer would be to inappropriately conflate science with religion. Indeed, even the staunchly anti-ID website, TalkOrigins, admits that "an anthropomorphized designer need not be a deity. The atheistic religion of Raelianism, for example, proposes that humans were created by extraterrestrials." It's a rare instance to hear TalkOrigins sound like ID proponents, but they are correct. (It's likely that the author's motive is to protect atheism in light of nature's design rather than to formulate ID as a science that doesnât investigate religious issues.) David DeWolf, John West and I also address this issue in our recent Montana Law Review article: It is important to stress that the refusal of ID proponents to draw scientific conclusions about the nature or identity of the designer is principled rather than merely rhetorical. ID is primarily a historical science, meaning it uses principles of uniformitarianism to study present-day causes and then applies them to the historical record in order to infer the best explanation for the origin of the natural phenomena being studied. ID starts with observations from âuniform sensory experienceâ showing the effects of intelligence in the natural world. As Pandas explains, scientists have uniform sensory experience with intelligent causes (i.e. humans), thus making intelligence an appropriate explanatory cause within historical scientific fields. However, the âsupernaturalâ cannot be observed, and thus historical scientists applying uniformitarian reasoning cannot appeal to the supernatural. If the intelligence responsible for life was supernatural, science could only infer the prior action of intelligence, but could not determine whether the intelligence was supernatural. (David K. DeWolf, John G. West, and Casey Luskin, âIntelligent Design Will Survive Kitzmiller v. Dover,â 68 Montana Law Review 7, 30 (Spring, 2007) (emboldened emphasis added)(internal citations removed).) Charles Thaxton took precisely this approach in the Kitzmiller trial, where he explained: I wasnât comfortable with the typical vocabulary that for the most part creationists were using because it didnât express what I was trying to do. They were wanting to bring God into the discussion, and I was wanting to stay within the empirical domain and do what you can do legitimately there. This is further explained in an excerpt from our Montana Law Review article: ID Does Not Require Supernatural Causation: "ID as a scientific theory does not attempt to address religious questions about the identity or metaphysical nature of the designer. This has been the consistent view of ID proponents for the last two decades, and Judge Jones was presented with extensive documentation of this fact in amicus briefs filed by the Discovery Institute and FTE, which the text of his opinion seemed to have ignored. Judge Jones also ignoredâor misinterpretedâkey passages from the Pandas textbook that addressed this issue. For example, the published version of Pandas used in Dover schools explained that ID merely seeks to infer 'intelligent causes' and is compatible with a wide variety of religious viewpoints, including pantheism and agnosticism: The idea that life had an intelligent source is hardly unique to Christian fundamentalism. Advocates of design have included not only Christians and other religious theists, but pantheists, Greek and Enlightenment philosophers and now include many modern scientists who describe themselves as religiously agnostic. Moreover, the concept of design implies absolutely nothing about beliefs normally associated with Christian fundamentalism, such as a young earth, a global flood, or even the existence of the Christian God. All it implies is that life had an intelligent source." One would think this passage would be highly relevant to the determination of the religious nature of ID, but Judge Jones did not even quote it in his ruling. Rather, he cited another passage from Pandas out of context in order to insist that ID requires supernatural causation: An explicit concession that the intelligent designer works outside the laws of nature and science and a direct reference to religion is Pandasâ rhetorical statement, âwhat kind of intelligent agent was it [the designer]â and answer: âOn its own, science cannot answer this question; it must leave it to religion and philosophy.â But an examination of the full passage cited by Judge Jones makes clear that he misused it. The passage does not state that an intelligent designer must be supernatural, but rather that science is unable to address this question: If science is based upon experience, then science tells us the message encoded in DNA must have originated from an intelligent cause. What kind of intelligent agent was it? On its own, science cannot answer this question; it must leave it to religion and philosophy. But that should not prevent science from acknowledging evidences for an intelligent cause origin wherever they may exist. This is no different, really, than if we discovered life did result from natural causes. We still would not know, from science, if the natural cause was all that was involved, or if the ultimate explanation was beyond nature, and using the natural cause. Indeed at one point, Pandas even seems to adopt methodological naturalism, stating that âintelligence . . . can be recognized by uniform sensory experience, and the supernatural . . . cannot.â (David K. DeWolf, John G. West, and Casey Luskin, âIntelligent Design Will Survive Kitzmiller v. Dover,â 68 Montana Law Review 7, 28-30 (Spring, 2007) (internal citations removed).) Part 2 will further discuss whether ID proponents are open about their views on the identity of the designer. Posted by Casey Luskin on October 31, 2007 9:55 AM
The notion that the world was designed and that there was therefore a designer needn't be scientifically verified to be rational; it need only be logically inferred. Science is defined by its specific method, not by any exclusive association with logic or validity of evidence.
Then by those same standards, it is a straightforward matter to be equally rational and hold a logically inferred notion that the Earth is flat . That can be successfully achieved by simply looking out to the horizon from a tall building. The specific method of science employs logic and validity. The notions that the world was designed and that there was therefore a designer, or that the horizon is damn near a straight line therefore the Earth is flat, do not. Science would be the very thing to validate those notions, but both can stubbornly remain only capable of being "logically inferred" .... if one wants them to
The problem is the whole argument for ID is an appeal to metaphore, not logic. "This is like a motor. Motors are designed. Therefore, this is designed." This is why logic should be a high school requirement- people know just enough (maybe not enough?) logic to be easily fooled.
Drtomaso says: Wrong. The ID perspective is: this is a motor. ID makes no necessary claims that anything must be designed. But design is the prima facie interpretation when confronted with a machine.
Then ID is wrong. The fact that it is *not* a machine. Its something you found in nature that is *like* a machine. You can remove the word "like" all you want when discussing it- its still just a metaphore.
drtomaso said: Consider the F-ATP synthase, where Science News reported "With parts that resemble pistons and a drive shaft, the enzyme F1-ATPase looks suspiciously like a tiny engine. Indeed, a new study demonstrates that's exactly what it is." Science News vol 151, p173 In fact, an expert on this machine observed, "These exciting results led to the conclusion that the F1-ATP synthase is the smallest electrical machine created by Nature and a number of technical terms previously unknown to enzymology such as: rotor, shaft, stator, torque, clutch are now widely used to describe the enzyme's operation." See http://www.protein.bio.msu.ru/biokhimiya/contents/v64/full/64111443.html I agree that while mechanical metaphors and analogies render biochemical systems familiar and more tractable to thought, they do not transform these systems into artifacts. Yet, there is little reason to think a molecular machine is only analogous to a machine rather than being a literal machine. I challenge you to demonstrate that any ID proponent is being misled by analogy. Merely pointing out that you see things differently doesn't cut it. And remember I'm only explaining why I suspect design. I don't claim to have proven design. ID critics insist that the teleological terminology used by science is only metaphor and analogy. Maybe, but then maybe not. What matters is that someone can indeed interpret the terminology most literally. From a non-teleological perspective one might interpret the F1-ATPase to be like a machine, while from a teleological perspective one might interpret it to be a literal machine. Is there any evidence to indicate the teleological perspective is wrong? And more importantly, is there any evidence that a literal, rather than a metaphorical interpretation, could not guide scientific research?
Hmmm... it seems to be your opinion that what we're dealing with is a designed machine. Where's the proof? Exactly. It's a logical inference only for those who have a faith in a higher power.
Powerfade wrote: No one has given me a good reason to think that molecular machines are not literal machines. No one has given me any good reason to think a machine can originate via sheer dumb luck. I therefore suspect design. If you have any evidence to thwart my suspicion, let's hear it.