Hillary's pathetic defense of Slick Willy

Discussion in 'Politics' started by hapaboy, Oct 1, 2006.

  1. Hillary, speaking in the aftermath of the Fox interview:

    "I'm certain that if my husband and his national security team had been shown a classified report titled 'Bin Laden determined to attack inside the United States,' he would've taken it more seriously than history suggests it was taken by our current president and his national security team."


    On page 128 of the 9/11 Commission Report:

    The following is the text of an item from the Presidential Daily Brief received by President William J. Clinton on December 4, 1998...

    SUBJECT: Bin Ladin Preparing to Hijack US Aircraft and Other Attacks.

    1. Reporting [---] suggests Bin Ladin and his allies are preparing for attacks in the US, including an aircraft hijacking to obtain the release of.....

    I guess Hillary didn't get the memo that Slick Willy had indeed received such a briefing, and Slick Willy hasn't bothered to correct her. I mean, to do so would be....honest.

    Footnote: What were the results of that briefing? Guess...
  2. Hillary is absolutely right:

    On Friday, December 4, 1998, the CIA included an article in the Presidential Daily Brief describing intelligence, received from a friendly government, about a threatened hijacking in the United States. This article was declassified at our request.

    The same day, Clarke convened a meeting of his CSG to discuss both the hijacking concern and the antiaircraft missile threat. To address the hijacking warning, the group agreed that New York airports should go to maximum security starting that weekend. They agreed to boost security at other East coast airports. The CIA agreed to distribute versions of the report to the FBI and FAA to pass to the New York Police Department and the airlines. The FAA issued a security directive on December 8, with specific requirements for more intensive air carrier screening of passengers and more oversight of the screening process, at all three New York City area airports.112

    The intelligence community could learn little about the source of the information. Later in December and again in early January 1999, more information arrived from the same source, reporting that the planned hijacking had been stalled because two of the operatives, who were sketchily described, had been arrested near Washington, D.C. or New York. After investigation, the FBI could find no information to support the hijack threat; nor could it verify any arrests like those described in the report. The FAA alert at the New York area airports ended on January 31, 1999.113

    With alarms sounding, members of the Small Group considered ideas about how to respond to or prevent such attacks. Generals Shelton and Zinni came up with military options. Special Operations Forces were later told that they might be ordered to attempt very high-risk in-and-out raids either in Khartoum, to capture a senior Bin Ladin operative known as Abu Hafs the Mauritanian-who appeared to be engineering some of the plots-or in Kandahar, to capture Bin Ladin himself. Shelton told us that such operations are not risk free, invoking the memory of the 1993 "Black Hawk down" fiasco in Mogadishu.115


    Hapa, does that sound like a 5 week long vacation at Crawford to you?
  3. maxpi


    That Clinton was a real man of action. He issued a security alert and actual talks were initiated about going after Bin Laden. He should be getting royalties from his action figure.

  4. Those measures were the right thing to do at the time (pre 9/11), if Bush took similar actions in August 2001 who knows, 9/11 may have been prevented. But Bush was too busy packing for his 5 week long Crawford vacation, who can blame him, certainly not Chris Wallace and Foxnews.
  5. No she's not. She said "if," not "when." I know you understand the difference.

    No, it sounds like a lot of talk and zero action. Nothing. Zilch. Zip. Nada.


    Here's another thing:

    Clinton cited Richard Clarke over and over during the interview, and said that he ""left a comprehensive anti-terror strategy" for incoming Bush officials when he left office.

    So let's hear what Clarke had to say about this:

    Wednesday, March 24, 2004

    WASHINGTON — The following transcript documents a background briefing in early August 2002 by President Bush's former counterterrorism coordinator Richard A. Clarke to a handful of reporters, including Fox News' Jim Angle. In the conversation, cleared by the White House on Wednesday for distribution, Clarke describes the handover of intelligence from the Clinton administration to the Bush administration and the latter's decision to revise the U.S. approach to Al Qaeda. Clarke was named special adviser to the president for cyberspace security in October 2001. He resigned from his post in January 2003.

    RICHARD CLARKE: Actually, I've got about seven points, let me just go through them quickly. Um, the first point, I think the overall point is, there was no plan on Al Qaeda that was passed from the Clinton administration to the Bush administration.

    (Furthermore, to Clinton's claim the Bush Administration "did nothing"):

    Richard Clarke: Over the course of the summer — last point — they developed implementation details, the principals met at the end of the summer, approved them in their first meeting, changed the strategy by authorizing the increase in funding five-fold, changing the policy on Pakistan, changing the policy on Uzbekistan, changing the policy on the Northern Alliance assistance.

    ]And then changed the strategy from one of rollback with Al Qaeda over the course of five years, which it had been, to a new strategy that called for the rapid elimination of Al Qaeda. That is in fact the timeline.

    QUESTION: When was that presented to the president?

    CLARKE: Well, the president was briefed throughout this process.

    QUESTION: But when was the final September 4 document? (interrupted) Was that presented to the president?

    CLARKE: The document went to the president on September 10, I think.

    QUESTION: What is your response to the suggestion in the [Aug. 12, 2002] Time [magazine] article that the Bush administration was unwilling to take on board the suggestions made in the Clinton administration because of animus against the — general animus against the foreign policy?

    CLARKE: I think if there was a general animus that clouded their vision, they might not have kept the same guy dealing with terrorism issue. This is the one issue where the National Security Council leadership decided continuity was important and kept the same guy around, the same team in place. That doesn't sound like animus against uh the previous team to me.

    JIM ANGLE: You're saying that the Bush administration did not stop anything that the Clinton administration was doing while it was making these decisions, and by the end of the summer had increased money for covert action five-fold. Is that correct?

    CLARKE: All of that's correct.

    ANGLE: OK.

    QUESTION: Are you saying now that there was not only a plan per se, presented by the transition team, but that it was nothing proactive that they had suggested?

    CLARKE: Well, what I'm saying is, there are two things presented. One, what the existing strategy had been. And two, a series of issues — like aiding the Northern Alliance, changing Pakistan policy, changing Uzbek policy — that they had been unable to come to um, any new conclusions, um, from '98 on.

    QUESTION: Was all of that from '98 on or was some of it ...

    CLARKE: All of those issues were on the table from '98 on.

    ANGLE: When in '98 were those presented?

    CLARKE: In October of '98.

    QUESTION: In response to the Embassy bombing?

    CLARKE: Right, which was in September.

    QUESTION: Were all of those issues part of alleged plan that was late December and the Clinton team decided not to pursue because it was too close to ...

    CLARKE: There was never a plan, Andrea. What there was was these two things: One, a description of the existing strategy, which included a description of the threat. And two, those things which had been looked at over the course of two years, and which were still on the table.

    QUESTION: So there was nothing that developed, no documents or no new plan of any sort?

    CLARKE: There was no new plan.

    QUESTION: No new strategy — I mean, I don't want to get into a semantics ...

    CLARKE: Plan, strategy — there was no, nothing new.


    Doesn't fit with Slick Willy's hysterics to Chris Wallace now does it? And this from the same source Clinton emphasized to Wallace lover and over during the interview.
  6. Yes she is, :) She said "if my husband and his national security team had been shown a classified report titled 'Bin Laden determined to attack inside the United States,' he would've taken it more seriously..." Her husband was not shown a classified report titled "Bin laden determined to attack inside the US", that's why she said "if", not "when". When her husband was shown another similarly titled classified report her husband and his team did take it seriously and the attack was thwarted.

    LOL, I suppose when Bush/Cheney/Rusmsfeld play with terror alert colors - that's real action to you but when Clinton boosts airport security, activates the police, FAA, CIA and FBI and does prevent the attack - that's "nothing, zilch, zip, nada".

    Do you think in order to prevent THAT attack Clinton should have invaded Iraq in 1998? Would that have worked better than the measures that he took, that did actually work and did prevent the hijacking?
  7. Puhleeze, dddooo, even you know if this were the case she would have said, "When my husband was shown a classified report stating bin Laden wanted to attack the US, he did this and this and that and this....." She would have rubbed Bush's face in this if she could have. That she didn't only shows there was no substance she could back that up with.

    "Does prevent the attack..."??? Are you fucking kidding me? He did not prevent the attack!! He could have prevented the attack several times, by taking bin Laden out, but he didn't.
    Good grief, your partisan blinders are really showing here. Every time I think you're somewhat lucid you come up with one of these whoppers.

    He did not prevent the hijacking!! Clinton's intelligence ASSUMED the hijacking was going to be a standard one, but of course it was not. The 9/11 report says: "After investigation, the FBI could find no information to support the hijack threat; nor could it verify any arrests like those described in the report."

    What would have worked? Getting his shit together, and that of his agencies, and taking bin Laden out on the multiple occasions he had an opportunity to do so.

    And oh, any comments about what your boy Richard Clarke said? Or will you conveniently ignore them?
  8. Also from the 9/11 Report:

    In February 1999,another draft Memorandum of Notification went to President Clinton. It asked him to allow the CIA to give exactly the same guidance to the Northern Alliance as had just been given to the tribals: they could kill Bin Ladin if a successful capture operation was not feasible. On this occasion, however, President Clinton crossed out key language he had approved in
    December and inserted more ambiguous language. No one we interviewed could shed light on why the President did this. President Clinton told the Commission that he had no recollection of why he rewrote the language.


    "No recollection." Yeah, this is the US Prez who was keenly focused on Al Qaeda.
  10. More from the 9/11 Report:

    At the beginning of February, Bin Ladin was reportedly located in the vicinity of the Sheikh Ali camp, a desert hunting camp being used by visitors from a Gulf state. Public sources have stated that these visitors were from the United Arab Emirates.

    Reporting from the CIA’s assets provided a detailed description of the hunting camp, including its size, location, resources, and security, as well as of Bin Ladin’s smaller, adjacent camp.152 Because this was not in an urban area, missiles launched against it would have less risk of causing collateral damage. On February 8, the military began to ready itself for a possible strike. The next day, national technical intelligence confirmed the location and description of the larger camp and showed the nearby presence of an official aircraft of the United Arab Emirates. But the location of Bin Ladin’s quarters could not be pinned down so precisely.154 The CIA did its best to answer a host of questions about the larger camp and its residents and about Bin Ladin’s daily schedule
    and routines to support military contingency planning. According to reporting from the tribals, Bin Ladin regularly went from his adjacent camp to the larger camp where he visited the Emiratis; the tribals expected him to be at the hunting camp for such a visit at least until midmorning on February 11.155

    Clarke wrote to Berger’s deputy on February 10 that the military was then doing targeting work to hit the main camp with cruise missiles and should be in position to strike the following morning.156 Speaker of the House Dennis Hastert appears to have been briefed on the situation.157

    No strike was launched. By February 12 Bin Ladin had apparently moved on, and the immediate strike plans became moot.158 According to CIA and Defense officials, policymakers were concerned about the danger that a strike would kill an Emirati prince or other senior officials who might be with Bin Ladin or close by.Clarke told us the strike was called off after consultations with Director Tenet because the intelligence was dubious, and it seemed to Clarke as if the CIA was presenting an option to attack America’s best counterterrorism ally in the Gulf. The lead CIA official in the field, Gary Schroen, felt that the intelligence reporting in this case was very reliable; the Bin Ladin unit chief, “Mike,” agreed. Schroen believes today that this was a lost opportunity to kill Bin Ladin before 9/11.
    #10     Oct 2, 2006