You need to recheck your facts. JFK did not invade Cuba. He encouraged some brave cubans to try to retake their country, promised them air support, then abandoned them on the beach to be chopped up. Nixon's "cut and run" was purely the product of a democrat congress that was determined to see a communist victory and hang the loss on nixon. And last time I looked, taiwan was not part of china.
Captain, "redeployment" IS cutting and running. How is it not? American troops leave....to where? Point is, they're gone from Iraq before, as the Dems are more than happy to point out, the Iraqis are capable of handling the security situation themselves. And maybe I've only been hearing from the moonbats, but the cries certainly seem to be to close Gitmo. If you could point me to reasonable Dems who are saying otherwise, I'd appreciate it.
Moonbat revisionism. "Professor," PLEASE tell us you do not "teach" history at whatever institution of "higher learning" you are supposedly employed at.
So Kissinger was negotiating with the North Vietnam on behalf of the Congress? Get real! The official US position since Nixon has been that Taiwan is part of China. That's why Taiwan was booted out of the UN, and many other world organizations. Imagine having Taiwan, instead of Red China, as a permenant member of the Security Council...
Here is an excerpt from the 1972 Republican Platform: The Republicans then seemed to eager to claim credit for cut and run from Vietnam.
Lol, Zing. Hap probably won't respond, but if he does, I wonder if he could sketch out any remotely plausible scenario in which the terrorists 'destroy America' because of American disunity? (Note to hap: you'd have to show how under those circumstances unity, itself, could save America.)
Scary. You can revise history, but you can't change it. I suggest you go read Kissinger's book. The Democrats pulled the rug out from under Nixon, cut off money for bombing, etc. Kissinger had nothing to negotiate with and the north Vietnamese knew it. They had violated the peace accord within months and there was nothing we could do about it. We abandoned brave people who stood with us to death in Hanoi's concentration camps. As for Taiwan, there are a set of principles that define our position. "Taiwan is part of China" is not one of them. If it were, why would we be constantly sparring with the Chinese over it? What Nixon did was open up our relations with mainland China, which had been on ice since the Korean War. You may think that was a mistake, but most people would disagree.
Who said it was a mistake? Here is the original text in the Shanghai Communique (emphasis mine): Although quoted out of context it gives some wiggle room (we "acknowledged" but didn't endorse). But reading the whole text it was a clear acceptance of the one-China policy. Furthermore, this policy was clearly reflected by our action to break the diplomatic relation with Taiwan in 1979 (I know that was Carter but he was just finishing off what Nixon started): We were sparing over Taiwan to show the right wing nuts that we haven't abandoned them. We have given up on the legal basis for protecting Taiwan more than 30 years ago. As for Vietnam, go back and read the 1972 Republican platform. If it were all Democrat's fault, why were the Republicans so eager to claim credit for it?
The original Communique indicate only that we accepted that China took that position, not that we took it. Similarly, we accepted that the communists were the government of China, to abandon the position of Chang Kai-sek's followers that they were the legitimate government of mainland China. While we pay lip service to the "One China" policy, that does not mean we consider Taiwan to be currently part of China. That is for negotiations between the parties to decide. You are correct that Carter sold out the Taiwanese totally when he broke relations with them. It was one of the many shameful actions he took around the world, such as handing Iran over to the islamists radicals, giving away the Panama Canal and inviting the Russians to piss all over us. As for the current US position on Taiwan, it is muddled and nuanced to be sure, but we do not accept use of force for reunification. ************************************* Overview of U.S. Policy Toward Taiwan James A. Kelly, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Testimony at a hearing on Taiwan, House International Relations Committee Washington, DC April 21, 2004 Mr. Chairman, it is a pleasure to appear before you and the other members of the Committee today. I welcome the opportunity to provide an overview of U.S. policy toward Taiwan, as well as the Administrationâs assessment of relations across the Taiwan Strait, the current situation in Taiwan, and the challenges that lie ahead. This month we mark the 25th anniversary of the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA). The TRA, along with the three U.S.-China Joint Communiqués and our one China policy, form the foundation for the complex political and security interplay among China, Taiwan, and the United States. Looking back over the past three decades, I think we can congratulate ourselves on crafting a policy that has been THE key to maintaining peace and stability in the western Pacific while helping to ensure Taiwan's prosperity and security. Without denying the challenges and difficulties that remain, I can confidently report that because of the leadership of seven U.S. Presidents and active participation of the Congress, our relations with both China and Taiwan -- economic, political, cultural, and social -- are far closer and deeper than most would have ever predicted. Equally important, our policy and the TRA have made vital contributions to easing tensions between Taiwan and the P.R.C. and creating the environment in which cross-Strait people-to-people exchanges and cross-Strait trade are flourishing and creating, we hope, the necessary conditions for peaceful resolution of cross-Strait differences. Core Principles It is useful to reiterate the core principles of our policy: The United States remains committed to our one China policy based on the three Joint Communiqués and the Taiwan Relations Act; The U.S. does not support independence for Taiwan or unilateral moves that would change the status quo as we define it; For Beijing, this means no use of force or threat to use force against Taiwan. For Taipei, it means exercising prudence in managing all aspects of cross-Strait relations. For both sides, it means no statements or actions that would unilaterally alter Taiwanâs status; The U.S. will continue the sale of appropriate defensive military equipment to Taiwan in accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act; and Viewing any use of force against Taiwan with grave concern, we will maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion against Taiwan. Our foremost concern is maintaining peace and stability in order to advance U.S. interests, spare the region the dangers of war, safeguard Taiwan's democracy, and promote Chinaâs constructive integration into the global community as well as the spread of personal freedom in China. Because the possibility for the United States to become involved in a cross-Strait conflict is very real, the President knows that American lives are potentially at risk. Our one-China policy reflects our abiding commitment to preserve peace in the Taiwan Strait so long as there are irreconcilable differences. ........ .
I agree with your point that our Taiwan policy has so far been a success (if that's the point that you're making). However, my original point was that the step Nixon took to make up with the communist China which effectively sold out Taiwan (booting them out of the UN, breaking diplomatic relation - don't tell me that Nixon didn't see it coming), was not consistent with his earlier anti-communist rhetoric. If not for Watergate, I would consider Nixon as one of the great presidents, simply for the fact that he did the right thing and didn't stick to his anti-communist ideology. On the opposite side, I think the Bay of Pigs was a mistake, and so was Johnson's Vietnam policy.