.... The question arises as to what form this quasi-fiscal role on the part of the ECB will take going forward. Warren Mosler has come up with the idea of ârevenue sharingâ proposal on the part of the European Central Bank, and this strikes me as the most technically feasible proposal, as well as one that will be consistent with the recent strictures set out in Germanyâs Constitutional Court decision brought two weeks ago. The proposal is for the ECB to distribute trillions of euros annually to the national governments on a per capita basis. The per capita criteria means that it is neither a targeted bailout nor a reward for bad behavior. This distribution would immediately adjust national government debt ratios downward which eases credit fears without triggering additional national government spending. This serves to dramatically ease credit tensions and thereby foster normal functioning of the credit markets for the national government debt issues. The trillions of euros distribution would not add to aggregate demand or inflation, as member nation spending and tax policy are in any case restricted by the Maastricht criteria. Furthermore, making this distribution an annual event greatly enhances enforcement of EU rules, as the penalty for non compliance can be the withholding of annual payments. This is vastly more effective than the current arrangement of fines and penalties for non compliance, which have proven themselves unenforceable as a practical matter. Yes, it means that the ECB loses some of its âprofitabilityâ because it pays interest on reserves at the national central banks. In any case, as a short term measure, the ECB can easily manufacture âprofitsâ if it continues to buy the bonds of these distressed PIIGS and then doesnât allow them to default, although clearly this program would stop once the revenue sharing begins. There are no operational obstacles to the crediting of the accounts of the national governments by the ECB. What would likely be required is approval by the finance ministers. I see no reason why any would object, as this proposal serves to both reduce national debt levels of all member nations and at the same time tighten the control of the European Union over national government finances. This looks legal to me, and still the obvious/best solution? It also helps with their problem of enforcing the growth and stability pact which, whatever one thinks of the questionable economics underlying it, was the only way that the concept of the euro could have been sold politically in Germany. Arguably, the revenue sharing proposal would enhance the SGP and thereby help to entrench Germanyâs âstabilityâ culture in the euro zone. I suspect that the Germans might ultimately find the revenue sharing proposal more palatable on a number of grounds. As I indicated, it doesnât violate the âno bailoutâ rule (in fact, Germany is the biggest recipient of the funds if itâs done on a per capita basis). Even if you said the money credited to the national central banks could only be used to retire existing public debt (which I think is the only way you could sell it politically in Germany), you would deal effectively with the national solvency issue. Think of it like a rights issue for a heavily indebted company: Company X has a debt to equity ratio of 200% and the markets wonât fund it because of perceived solvency concerns. Somehow, said Company X launches a 1 for 1 rights issue and gets the debt to equity down to 100%. Market concerns about bankruptcy are alleviated and the capital markets open up to the company again. Likewise if you do the revenue sharing. You donât solve the problem of aggregate demand, but you reduce the solvency concerns and reopen the capital markets to the euro zone countries again. And the other way you sell it to the German public is that (as Wolfgang Munchau of the FT has rightly argued), it makes the SGP more credible and enforceable because now you are providing a mechanism to ensure compliance. Rather than fining a miscreant company (try getting an EU official to go to Athens to collect a fine today for violating the SGP; heâd be lucky to get out alive), you withhold funds. Credit the national central bank accounts to a sufficient degree to bring the ratios down to, say, 60% levels required by the SGP and then enforce it rigorously. Yes, there is no economic logic to the SGP, but itâs the only way youâd ever get the Germans to agree to this proposal and, in any case, a 3% deficit in a normalised economic environment does give you some growth. You could still cut off the âprofligatesâ such as Greece if you thought they werenât complying or enforcing desired âstructural reformsâ, but eliminate the contagion risk by continuing to credit other countries (and letâs be honest: other than the die-hard Hellenist romantics, nobody in the euro zone could care less what happens to Greece except insofar as it creates contagion threats for other members of the euro zone). To repeat: the revenue sharing proposal would be non-inflationary. Whatâs inflationary with regard to monetary and fiscal policy is actual spending. These distributions would not alter the annual actual government spending and taxing as demanded by the austerity measures and ongoing growth and stability pact. They simply address the solvency issue, which has effectively cut the PIIGS off from market funding (because the markets believe they are insolvent). Under the proposal, member nations remain bound to their current spending and taxing imperatives. Bonds get retired and replaced with reserves, which we know does not lead to inflation either because reserves arenât lent out. The problem with the European Financial Stability Fund (EFSF( solution is that the EFSF only has a limited life and the German Constitutional Court decision means that you cannot replace it with a permanent mechanism, such as the proposed ESM And the EFSF is a dishonest fig leaf, since all of the money ultimately comes from the ECB anyway, as the sole creator of euros. The ECB is probably ill-suited to conduct quasi-fiscal operations over the longer term, but itâs the only game in town now. Everybody now recognizes that fact. At least the operations under the revenue sharing proposal are conducted with a clear set of consistent rules, rather than the discretionary, non-transparent manner in which the ECB is conducting its bond buying operations right now. Itâs an effective interim mechanism (which wonât violate the German Constitutional Court), but provides the euro zone time to develop a fully fledged fiscal union with debt issuance power, which is ultimately what is required. Yes, this idea seems radical, but two years ago, so too did the idea of buying sovereign debt in the secondary markets by the ECB. During the panic of May 2010, the ECB bought â¬16.5 billion the first week, â¬10 billion the second, and â¬8.5 billion, â¬6.50 billion, â¬4 billion, and â¬4 billion for each successive week, ending with â¬1 billion for its last real week of activity on 9 July 2010 for a total of â¬54.5 billion seven weeks of operation. Read the rest: http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2011/09/marshall-auerback-the-ecb-v-germany.html?