Black Wednesday

Discussion in 'Trading' started by ssternlight, May 23, 2006.

  1. Any takers? :)
  2. pardon my ignorance.... but whats so special about this wednesday?
  3. What?? You don't know what is special about this wednesday?? It is very special one. It's in middle of the week and it will the 24th of June. It is a very bad sign for the markets...
    Definitely it will be black wednesday. At least yellow one. But definitely not pink...
  4. lol...that's probably the post of the thread. :)

    Having said that, the futures are certainly ending at the bottom and we had a rather large reversal off the rebound.
  5. im not into calling 4000 point correrctions - but it does feel ominous. nothing can catch a bid...
  6. For intraday traders, black or white days won't make difference. Always be ready to collect as more greenbucks if opportunities come and hand out minimum if playing for fun. Yes, seems to me Wednesday looks not that good (down day). It is simple, if smart money is buying, market is up and if selling, down.:cool:
  7. When the ERM was set up in 1979, Britain declined to join. This was a controversial decision as the Chancellor of the Exchequer Geoffrey Howe, despite his economically 'dry' credentials, was a convinced pro-European. His successor Nigel Lawson was also a believer in a fixed exchange rate, and although he was a mild Eurosceptic he admired the low inflationary record of West Germany, attributing it to the strength of the Deutsche Mark and the management of the Bundesbank. Thus although Britain had not joined the ERM, for several years the Treasury followed a semi-official policy of 'shadowing' the Deutsche Mark.

    At the same time, and in addition to open market trading of currencies, the Treasury's main tool in attempting to control the exchange rate was through the setting of the value of Sterling. As a consequence, interest rates were set with consideration of the domestic demand and inflation environment as only a secondary consideration. This led to a number of years of lower interest rates than would have otherwise been the case, and hence[1] to rising inflation.

    Matters came to a head in a clash between Margaret Thatcher's economic advisor, Alan Walters, and Lawson, when Walters claimed that the Exchange Rate Mechanism was "half baked". This led to Lawson resigning as chancellor to be replaced by his old protégé John Major, who, with Douglas Hurd, the then Foreign Secretary, pressured Margaret Thatcher to sign Britain up to the ERM in October 1990, effectively guaranteeing that the British Government would follow an economic[2] and monetary policy that would prevent the exchange rate between the pound and other member currencies from fluctuating by more than 6%. The pound entered the mechanism at 2.95 Deutsche Mark to the pound. Hence, if the exchange rate ever neared the bottom of its permitted range, 2.778 marks, the government would be obliged to intervene. With UK inflation at three times the rate of Germany's, interest rates at 15% and the "Lawson Boom" about to bust, the conditions for joining the ERM were not favourable at that time.

    From the beginning of the 1990s, high German interest rates, set by the Bundesbank to counteract inflationary effects related to excess expenditure on German reunification, caused significant stress across the whole of the ERM. The UK and Italy had additional difficulties with their double deficits. Issues of national prestige and the commitment to a doctrine that the fixing of exchange rates within the ERM was a pathway to a single European currency inhibited the adjustment of exchange rates. In the wake of the rejection of the Maastricht Treaty by the Danish electorate in a referendum in the spring of 1992, those ERM currencies that were trading close to the bottom of their ERM bands came under speculative attack in the foreign exchange markets by currency speculators.

    [edit] The currency speculators' attack
    The fundamental sterling problem in September 1992 was that the dollar was rapidly depreciating against the deutschmark. Tied as it was to the ERM, the pound was hence appreciating to unsustainable levels against the US currency. With a large proportion of British exports priced in dollars, a pound/dollar correction was well overdue. ERM membership was preventing this from happening. In anticipation of the inevitable dam-bursting, speculators hastened the process by borrowing pounds (and also lire) and selling them for DM, in the expectation of being able to repay the loan in devalued currency and to pocket the difference.

    On September 16 the British government announced a rise in the base interest rate from an already high 10% to 12% in order to tempt speculators to buy pounds. Despite this and a promise later the same day to raise base rates again to 15%, dealers kept selling pounds, convinced that the government would not stick with its promise. By 19:00 that evening, Norman Lamont, then Chancellor, announced Britain would leave the ERM and rates would remain at the new level of 12%.