Good summary - I appreciate it. I can genuinely see why you believe what you do along with your underlying assumptions. I can see you are devoted to logic and rational thought and some of the discussions made me see my own bias in certain areas. It's hard to see when you're right in the middle of it. Yes, I admit my bias. It's difficult for me to contain needless to say. And I'm on one end of the continuum strictly because of what you would call "spiritual" considerations/events. Good luck and good trading, SSB (Yes, Longshot has what I would call a sort of WWF debating style.)
Don't belittle my old buddy axe. I'm trying to figure some way of complimenting him without him disagreeing with me. Anyway he isn't dull ( as in the opposite of bright).
All religions are ancient monuments to superstition, ignorance, ferocity; and modern religions are only ancient follies. Baron D'Holbach
Found here http://www.arn.org/boards/ubb-get_topic-f-13-t-000451.html Chris Langan Member # 928 posted 11-09-2002 02:22 PM -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- First, let me make it clear that although some ID proponents believe that standard evolutionary theory contains nothing of value, I happen to disagree with them. To some extent, natural selection is tautological; the natural environment does indeed exert pressure on organisms, and this pressure can indeed be expected to affect survival and reproduction. Because mutations propagate through reproduction by survivors, natural selection is a natural fact. Accordingly, at least for the purposes of this post, we may consider natural selection per se a legitimate if somewhat trivial scientific hypothesis...and a well-confirmed one at that. However, itâs only half the story. There is also the generative half of DE...the part concerning ârandom mutationâ. In its classical usage, "randomness" refers to either subjective uncertainty or objective indeterminacy (acausality). Where it refers to uncertainty, it is merely superficial and allows the possibility of causal âhidden variablesâ or hidden principles; where it refers to indeterminacy, on the other hand, it precludes the action of causality entirely. In the former case it is incomplete because it leaves the hidden variables and principles unspecified, and in the latter it is unscientific, because it leaves the phenomena to which it supposedly applies with no hope of scientific explanation. Such phenomena pop spontaneously into existence with all the ânaturalnessâ of magic coins pulled from the ears of bewildered children. Randomness has always been considered a problematic concept, particularly after Richard von Mises defined it mathematically in a way amenable to both statistical (distributional) and inductive (predictive) interpretation. Von Mises asserted that the irregularity of any random sequence should be confined to local scales, with symmetry holding in the large; that is, while the law of large numbers says that any very long random bit sequence should contain roughly equal numbers of 1âs and 0âs, it forces subsequences to display no such regularity. Local irregularity precludes any way of predicting the next bit in any sequence or subsequence, and this is where the inductive aspect of mathematical randomness resides. However, since predictive limitations ultimately say nothing of causality, mathematical randomness cannot be substituted for causality in any scientific hypothesis. The DE hypothesis thus boils down to two âsemihypothesesâ: (1) natural selection, as much like a tautology as an a posteriori feature of the natural world can be (and therefore inarguable but trivial), and (2) ârandom mutationâ, regarding which there are just two possibilities: (a) randomness equates to predictive uncertainty and conceals an underlying causality, in which case DE is incomplete, or (b) randomness equates to indeterminacy, in which case DE is acausal and unscientific. It follows that DE is either incomplete, or acausal and unscientific. Either way, it fails to qualify as a complete causal theory of evolution, and it cannot justify the exclusion of better-grounded hypotheses. What constitutes a âbetter-grounded hypothesisâ? One that (a) specifies the causal variables and principles omitted by predictive (or for that matter acausal) randomness, and (b) has a tentative but plausible theory and model in which these variables and principles are mutually related and mapped into reality. Is there any evolutionary hypothesis that meets these two criteria? Yes: ID. Standard ID replaces von Mises randomness with a definite causal principle called intelligent design and provides a tentative probabilistic model of its recognition in nature. The CTMU version of ID, on the other hand, offers not only all of the benefits of standard ID, but a global design principle called teleology (telic recursion) and a theory-model ensemble offering a general explanation for teleology and its implementation. On these grounds alone, any strain of ID rationally incorporating natural selection is superior to DE as a scientific hypothesis. It is often said that DE yields âpredictionsâ while ID yields none. But if so, then they are mainly trivial, and there is no assurance that they accurately reflect the hidden variables underlying any meaningful interpretation of ârandomnessâ. Indeed, the only way to prevent a modern, streamlined version of ID from claiming them as baseline predictions of its own, and simply augmenting them with further predictions involving intelligent or teleological phenomena, is by showing at last that there is no causality beyond the laws of nature. But this is a meaningless assertion where the laws of nature are not fully specified and explained, and because these laws are what science supposedly aims to find out, no scientific viewpoint is permitted to take them for granted. This means that if DE wants to qualify as science, it needs to face its hidden variables problem and open its arms to hypotheses aimed at their specification. The hidden variables of DE â the causal variables which underlie its version of ârandomnessâ, and without which it is irrevocably committed to indeterminacy and thus to scientific absurdity - can be of only one of two types. Either they come down to distributed laws of nature, or they are localized and ad hoc in character. If the former, then complete specification and explanation of the laws of nature are required; otherwise, DE has no way of establishing that the âlaws of natureâ are in fact where these variables reside, or that the âlaws of natureâ do not themselves involve a higher-order set of such variables and principles. And if they are localized and ad hoc in character, then DE lacks anything resembling an explanation for their occurrence, tentative or otherwise. In this case, it must obviously move aside and let other frameworks be constructed and tested. Thus, DE must either (1) specify and explain the laws of nature without excluding the possibility that they were themselves designed, or (2) move its rear to the end of the lab bench. Will DE ever assent to a union with ID? Probably not. For although DEists everywhere seem to be shouting at the tops of their lungs about irrational sectarian âridersâ that have been attached to the essential ID hypothesis, they are missing two important points. First, they have an irrational rider of their own, namely the historically problematic concept of randomness. And meanwhile, an increasing number of ID theorists are willing to carry the hypothesis forward without acknowledging a priori indebtedness to sectarian agendas or scriptural interpretations promoting various strains of fundamentalism (or scriptural literalism, which ironically seems to vary by degree as well as content). The form of ID championed by this new breed of theorist is not susceptible to DEist sermons regarding the supposed evils of specific religious agendas, and DEâs own trivial âpredictionsâ, if we may call them that, are insufficient to change this one iota. The scientific inadequacy of DE naturally raises a question: do DEists have a philosophical agenda of their own? Some DEists appear to rest their philosophical case on something called âmetaphysical naturalismâ, which says that the natural world is âall that there isâ, a closed system that is self-sufficient and needless of explanation. This viewpoint has three strengths and one fatal weakness. The strengths: metaphysical naturalism seems to acknowledge that nature possesses a metaphysical dimension, displays closure and is self-sufficient. Logically, the CTMU would have to be considered the essence of this viewpoint. However, the assertion that nature requires no explanation is not only unscientific, but absurd. Why? Because science is explanation. For example, if one explains an observed phenomenon in terms of the laws and structure of the natural world, but excludes any explanation of the natural world itself, then oneâs explanation simply terminates on objects of direct perception; going any farther necessarily involves an appeal to natural laws and structures largely inferred through attempts to explain the natural world. If one has previously called the natural world âneedless of explanationâ, then one does not have a self-consistent viewpoint. Even if, by some weird quirk of fate, ID were to turn out to be mistaken about the exact nature of the hidden causal variables of DE, DE would still fail to qualify as scientific due to its mathematically ill-defined ârandomnessâ clause. So why all the arm-waving and name-calling by DE proponents? Only a hard-core DEist can say for sure. I merely submit that where tire meets road, we should not be surprised to find that the DE agenda comes down to something other than âscienceâ. And this, of course, will say something about the true degree of traction possessed by the Darwinian âhypothesisâ. Chris Langan
Honest discussion and critique of various origins models, including various Christian origins models, can have a positive impact on furthering scientific endeavor as a whole. Entrenched dogmas and political correctness have for many years only hampered progress toward building a body of knowledge. The restrictive atmosphere seems palpable at times, as many professors and researchers I have met can attest. Herein lies an opportunity to exemplify the freedom that exists in Christ. Truth holds no threat for the Christian. Truth in the scientific arena, which can be directly or indirectly tested, will always be consistent with truth in the spiritual arena. And, despite protestations from all sides, truth in nature must be connected with something, or Someone, beyond the natural realmâthe something or Someone responsible for natureâs existence and characteristics. The most important feature of the creation model approach is that it challenges spiritual vagueness and subjectivism head on. It demonstrates, as well as defends, the legitimacy of biblical authority and the truth-claims of Jesus Christ. The bottom line for me and for my colleagues at RTB is this: truth always points the truth-seeker to its Source, the one person in history who could make and back up the claim, âI am the truth.â Thatâs what makes science so fun and fascinating. Hugh Ross ______________________________ After many, many years in actual genetic experimentation and production and also being a Christian, this pretty well describes my position. From many observations in the genetic field I stated earlier that science is process driven and Judeo-Christianity is event driven and the two must agree at some point.