This has to be the dumbest thing ever written by anyone in history. You have been fear mongering about Covid and then its variants for 5 hours a day for over a year. Were they conducting gain of function research on Corona viruses? Could that have been "successful" if Covid 19 leaked out? morons and marxists... can't see the truth or admit it.
You have no realistic evidence that any Gain of Function bio-weapon research was done on COVID-19 in Wuhan. Just the typical conspiracy nonsense. Was it possible that it leaked out of the lab inadvertently? Yes. But this is not deliberately creating a bio-weapon.
You are the biggest fucking lying marxist asshole liar in the history of dickheads. They were doing gain of function research on bat viruses... you idiot. It was banned and Fauci cancelled the ban. https://www.nature.com/news/engineered-bat-virus-stirs-debate-over-risky-research- 1.18787 Engineered bat virus stirs debate over risky research Lab-made coronavirus related to SARS can infect human cells. Declan Butler 12 November 2015 Article tools Rights & Permissions An experiment that created a hybrid version of a bat coronavirus — one related to the virus that causes SARS (severe acute respiratory syndrome) — has triggered renewed debate over whether engineering lab variants of viruses with possible pandemic potential is worth the risks. In an article published in Nature Medicine1 on 9 November, scientists investigated a virus called SHC014, which is found in horseshoe bats in China. The researchers created a chimaeric virus, made up of a surface protein of SHC014 and the backbone of a SARS virus that had been adapted to grow in mice and to mimic human disease. The chimaera infected human airway cells — proving that the surface protein of SHC014 has the necessary structure to bind to a key receptor on the cells and to infect them. It also caused disease in mice, but did not kill them. Although almost all coronaviruses isolated from bats have not been able to bind to the key human receptor, SHC014 is not the first that can do so. In 2013, researchers reported this ability for the first time in a different coronavirus isolated from the same bat population2. Related stories Viral-research moratorium called too broad US suspends risky disease research Biosafety in the balance The findings reinforce suspicions that bat coronaviruses capable of directly infecting humans (rather than first needing to evolve in an intermediate animal host) may be more common than previously thought, the researchers say. But other virologists question whether the information gleaned from the experiment justifies the potential risk. Although the extent of any risk is difficult to assess, Simon Wain-Hobson, a virologist at the Pasteur Institute in Paris, points out that the researchers have created a novel virus that “grows remarkably well” in human cells. “If the virus escaped, nobody could predict the trajectory,” he says. Creation of a chimaera The argument is essentially a rerun of the debate over whether to allow lab research that increases the virulence, ease of spread or host range of dangerous pathogens — what is known as ‘gain-of-function’ research. In October 2014, the US government imposed a moratorium on federal funding of such research on the viruses that cause SARS, influenza and MERS (Middle East respiratory syndrome, a deadly disease caused by a virus that sporadically jumps from camels to people). The latest study was already under way before the US moratorium began, and the US National Institutes of Health (NIH) allowed it to proceed while it was under review by the agency, says Ralph Baric, an infectious-disease researcher at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, a co-author of the study. The NIH eventually concluded that the work was not so risky as to fall under the moratorium, he says. But Wain-Hobson disapproves of the study because, he says, it provides little benefit, and reveals little about the risk that the wild SHC014 virus in bats poses to humans. Other experiments in the study show that the virus in wild bats would need to evolve to pose any threat to humans — a change that may never happen, although it cannot be ruled out. Baric and his team reconstructed the wild virus from its genome sequence and found that it grew poorly in human cell cultures and caused no significant disease in mice. “The only impact of this work is the creation, in a lab, of a new, non-natural risk,” agrees Richard Ebright, a molecular biologist and biodefence expert at Rutgers University in Piscataway, New Jersey. Both Ebright and Wain-Hobson are long-standing critics of gain-of-function research. In their paper, the study authors also concede that funders may think twice about allowing such experiments in the future. "Scientific review panels may deem similar studies building chimeric viruses based on circulating strains too risky to pursue," they write, adding that discussion is needed as to "whether these types of chimeric virus studies warrant further investigation versus the inherent risks involved”. Useful research But Baric and others say the research did have benefits. The study findings “move this virus from a candidate emerging pathogen to a clear and present danger”, says Peter Daszak, who co-authored the 2013 paper. Daszak is president of the EcoHealth Alliance, an international network of scientists, headquartered in New York City, that samples viruses from animals and people in emerging-diseases hotspots across the globe. Studies testing hybrid viruses in human cell culture and animal models are limited in what they can say about the threat posed by a wild virus, Daszak agrees. But he argues that they can help indicate which pathogens should be prioritized for further research attention. Without the experiments, says Baric, the SHC014 virus would still be seen as not a threat. Previously, scientists had believed, on the basis of molecular modelling and other studies, that it should not be able to infect human cells. The latest work shows that the virus has already overcome critical barriers, such as being able to latch onto human receptors and efficiently infect human airway cells, he says. “I don't think you can ignore that.” He plans to do further studies with the virus in non-human primates, which may yield data more relevant to humans.
you truly are a fucking idiot... Engineering a deadly virus that was not infecting humans into a virus capable of infecting humans... is weaponizing. This... scientists explains... just how dangerous what they did is... "But other virologists question whether the information gleaned from the experiment justifies the potential risk. Although the extent of any risk is difficult to assess, Simon Wain-Hobson, a virologist at the Pasteur Institute in Paris, points out that the researchers have created a novel virus that “grows remarkably well” in human cells. “If the virus escaped, nobody could predict the trajectory,” he says."
Let's quote the reality from the Nature article... "The latest study was already under way before the US moratorium began, and the US National Institutes of Health (NIH) allowed it to proceed while it was under review by the agency, says Ralph Baric, an infectious-disease researcher at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, a co-author of the study. The NIH eventually concluded that the work was not so risky as to fall under the moratorium, he says."
correct... that is what he said... yet they made a coronavirus chimera which was designed to and was capable of infecting humans. by the way this is a quote from the article... "But other virologists question whether the information gleaned from the experiment justifies the potential risk. Although the extent of any risk is difficult to assess, Simon Wain-Hobson, a virologist at the Pasteur Institute in Paris, points out that the researchers have created a novel virus that “grows remarkably well” in human cells. “If the virus escaped, nobody could predict the trajectory,” he says."
If this was intended as bio-weapons research why do you suppose i was reported in the primary literature? I'll give you the answer. It's because the goal is not new bio-weapons but basic research on virus, particularly virus that may infect humans.
How binary is your thinking? This research was by definition Dual Use Research... Do you see Fauci's name below . See his balancing test? He not only put this info into the hands or a potential terrorist... he funded the research... in a lab owned by China's military... Come motherfuckers cease defending this... As human being we all have to be on the same page. This is not democrat vs republican... Fauci broke his own test...for who knows what reasons... And quite possible millions of lives were lost. Fauci's own balancing test: " Yet since transmissibility of a virulent virus was increased, this constitutes dual-use research of concern (DURC), which is shown on this poster.\1\ If a particular research experiment is identified as DURC, that designation does not necessarily mean that such research should not be published, nor should it even be prohibited in the first place. However, it does call for us, as you mentioned, to balance carefully the benefit of the research to the public health, the biosafety and biosecurity conditions under which the research is conducted, and the potential risk that the knowledge gained from such research might fall into the hands of those with ill intent." https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-112shrg75273/html/CHRG-112shrg75273.htm BIOLOGICAL SECURITY: THE RISK OF DUAL-USE RESEARCH ======================================================================= HEARING before the COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS UNITED STATES SENATE ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION __________ APRIL 26, 2012 __________ Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov/ Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 75-273 WASHINGTON : 2012 ----------------------------------------------------------------------- For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, http://bookstore.gpo.gov. For more information, contact the GPO Customer Contact Center, U.S. Government Printing Office. Phone 202�09512�091800, or 866�09512�091800 (toll-free). E-mail, gpo@custhelp.com. COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut, Chairman CARL LEVIN, Michigan SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii TOM COBURN, Oklahoma THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware SCOTT P. BROWN, Massachusetts MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas JOHN McCAIN, Arizona MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri ROB PORTMAN, Ohio JON TESTER, Montana RAND PAUL, Kentucky MARK BEGICH, Alaska JERRY MORAN, Kansas Michael L. Alexander, Staff Director Christian J. Beckner, Associate Staff Director for Homeland Security Prevention and Protection Carly A. Covieo, Professional Staff Member Nicholas A. Rossi, Minority Staff Director Brendan P. Shields, Minority Director of Homeland Security Policy Jared F. Golden, Minority Professional Staff Member Trina Driessnack Tyrer, Chief Clerk Patricia R. Hogan, Publications Clerk Laura W. Kilbride, Hearing Clerk C O N T E N T S ------ Opening statements: Page Senator Lieberman............................................ 1 Senator Collins.............................................. 3 Prepared statements: Senator Lieberman............................................ 29 Senator Collins.............................................. 32 WITNESSES Thursday, April 21, 2012 Anthony S. Fauci, M.D., Director, National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, National Institutes of Health, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services........................ 5 Daniel M. Gerstein, Ph.D., Deputy Under Secretary for Science and Technology, U.S. Department of Homeland Security............... 7 Paul S. Keim, Ph.D., Acting Chairman, National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity, National Institutes of Health, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services........................ 11 Thomas V. Inglesby, M.D., Chief Executive Officer and Director, Center for Biosecurity, University of Pittsburgh Medical Center 14 Alphabetical List of Witnesses Fauci, Anthony S., M.D.: Testimony.................................................... 5 Prepared statement with attachments.......................... 34 Gerstein, Daniel M., Ph.D.: Testimony.................................................... 7 Prepared statement........................................... 53 Inglesby, Thomas V., M.D.: Testimony.................................................... 14 Prepared statement........................................... 63 Keim, Paul S., Ph.D.: Testimony.................................................... 11 Prepared statement........................................... 59 APPENDIX Letter from Michael T. Osterholm, Ph.D., M.P.H., Director Center for Infectious Disease Research and Policy, University of Minnesota, to Amy P. Patterson, M.D., Associate Director for Science Policy, National Institutes of Health, dated April 12, 2012, submitted by Senator Lieberman........................... 76 Response to post-hearing questions for the Record: Dr. Fauci.................................................... 83 Dr. Gerstein................................................. 88 Dr. Keim..................................................... 96 BIOLOGICAL SECURITY: THE RISK OF DUAL-USE RESEARCH ---------- THURSDAY, APRIL 26, 2012 U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Washington, DC. The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:06 a.m., in room SD-342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph I. Lieberman, presiding. Present: Senators Lieberman and Collins. OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN LIEBERMAN Chairman Lieberman. The hearing will come to order. Good morning, and thanks very much to our really distinguished panel of witnesses. We use the word ``distinguished'' around here very easily, but it actually does relate to this panel and I thank you for being here. If I may begin by looking back a bit, in 1851, a revolution in medicine already underway was crystallized in a letter Louis Pasteur wrote to a friend, ``I am on the edge,'' he said, ``of mysteries and the veil is getting thinner and thinner.'' Thanks to the work of Pasteur and succeeding generations of scientists, the mysteries of the microbial world have slowly been revealed and we are all a lot healthier and living a lot longer as a result. Childhood diseases like polio and measles have, in many ways, been vanquished. Scientists were able to identify the acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS) virus, which helped lead to treatments. And according to one of our witnesses today, the real possibility of a cure for AIDS is in sight. The last global pandemic, the Spanish Flu pandemic, which killed on a massive scale, at least 50 million people, was almost a century ago. I remember this because it deprived me of ever knowing one of my grandmothers, my paternal grandmother who died as a young woman in New York in that pandemic. But in addition to all the medical miracles that were underneath that veil Pasteur began to peel back, there were, of course, also dangers. Research that could lead to cures, extending life for millions, also could kill many if a rogue pathogen were released either by accident or because it fell into what I will call evil hands. And it is this paradox of dual-use research that we gather together today to consider at this hearing. Last fall, the world was shaken by the news that two research teams, working independently had been able to engineer a new strain of the H5N1 virus, which we know as Bird Flu, that could easily infect humans. Epidemiologists have long feared that if the H5N1 virus ever made the jump from a virus mostly confined to birds to one easily transmitted among humans, it could swiftly cause a pandemic. The mortality rate for the few reported cases in humans who have been infected is as high as 60 percent. By contrast, the Spanish Flu, which I mentioned earlier, had a mortality rate of about 2 percent. The researchers that I referred to, based both at Erasmus University in the Netherlands and at the University of Wisconsin, announced that they were going to publish the results of their studies in the journal, Science and Nature. This set off what I would call a global ethics debate in the scientific community about whether to publish or not publish these results, and if the experiments, which were funded by the National Institutes of Health (NIH), should have been undertaken at all. On the one hand, there are those who say that getting this information out could help other scientists better understand the mutant strain so they could prepare for a possible pandemic by looking for natural mutations and developing vaccines and medications. The fact that these two research teams were able to create this new strain from existing genetic material means that nature could create it, as well. In fact, many scientists said that that was quite likely. But given the lethality of the virus, others argued that publishing the results would create a huge security risk because it would offer a blueprint for a deadly biological weapon to rogue states or terrorists, and, of course, that is where this Committee's interest is drawn because of our responsibility for homeland security. In a recent speech at a biological weapons conference in Geneva, Secretary of State Clinton warned that al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula had, in fact, issued a call for ``brothers with degrees in microbiology or chemistry to develop a weapon of mass destruction.'' And, of course, there is also a danger that the manufactured strain might somehow escape, so to speak, from the laboratory, which is something we have worried about in the past. Last December, at the request of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB), was asked to review the H5N1 research papers. The NSABB concluded that more needed to be known before the research was made public and they asked the editors of Science and Nature to delay publication. Last month, after further review, the NSABB withdrew its objections and voted unanimously to allow the University of Wisconsin study to be published, and by a divided vote of 12-6 to allow the Netherlands study to be published with some revisions and clarifications. One of the things that apparently influenced the Board's decision was the revelation that the modified strains of H5N1 had become less lethal. But as the members of the panel know, I am sure, that decision has drawn criticism from Dr. Michael T. Osterholm, Director of the Center for Infectious Disease Research and Policy at the University of Minnesota and an NSABB Board member himself. In a letter to the NIH, he wrote that the NSABB had deliberately ignored the voice of scientists who believed publication of the H5N1 research was dangerous, and I quote from his letter. ``I believe there was a bias toward finding a solution that was a lot less about a robust science and policy-based risk-benefit analysis and more about how to get out of this difficult situation.'' He then added, ``We cannot just kick the can down the road without coming to grips with the very difficult task of managing,'' and I know he was referring to dual-use research. So this is a serious charge, which I hope as the morning goes on the panel will respond to. The publish or not publish debate continued earlier this month during a 2-day conference of the world's leading scientists convened by the Royal Society in London. One point I learned that most of the attendees seemed to agree on is that we need to put in place better systems to track this kind of research at each experimental stage rather than waiting until it is ready for publication to make decisions about what can be revealed. That is another question that I hope our panelists will discuss today. Although this particular controversy about publication appears to have been resolved, it is going to recur and, as Dr. Osterholm said, we cannot just kick the can down the road and deal with it on an ad hoc basis. What systems to monitor dual- use research that could produce dangerous results were in place at the time these experiments were begun? What new systems are being in place now? Are more needed? And how do we balance these against our obvious valuation of the valuing of the question for knowledge, of free scientific inquiry? Etched into the National Academy of Sciences headquarters wall are the words of Einstein, one of Einstein's many phases that are quoted often, ``The right to search for truth implies also a duty. One must not conceal any part of what one has recognized to be true.'' But, of course, this matter before us this morning raises another question that is relevant, which is what if peeling away nature's veil, in Pasteur's term, unleashes dangers to the world? Those are difficult questions to balance, and again, I repeat that we ask them here in this Committee because of the direct connection between the scientific work and the homeland security of the American people, which it is our first responsibility to protect. I really look forward to your testimony and the question and answer period, and again, I thank you for being here. Senator Collins. OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COLLINS Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It has been almost a century since the 1918 Spanish influenza virus infected one-fifth of the world's population, killing more than 50 million people and claiming some 600,000 American lives. Yet virulent strains of influenza are still a major threat. The H1N1 strain, more commonly known as the Swine Flu, claimed more than 18,000 lives during the 2009 outbreak and exposed gaps in our preparedness capabilities for response to a global pandemic, especially in the development, production, and distribution of life-saving vaccines. In 2008, this Committee held a hearing on the report by the Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction, which examined the security of biological pathogens on the select agent list. The testimony by the Chairmen of the Commission, former Senators Bob Graham and Jim Talent, helped to raise awareness on the issue of biosecurity and the need to ensure that deadly pathogens and the research carried out on them are contained in secure lab facilities. This Committee has also held numerous hearings on the Nation's efforts to prevent, prepare for, and mitigate the impact of a pandemic influenza outbreak. In 2009, the Administration's failure to ensure that the government was prepared to rapidly distribute vaccines was and remains a cause for great concern. Preparedness also requires investing in critical life sciences research to expand our knowledge base and technologies to help us better respond to the next potential global pandemic. Such a pandemic could be even more communicable than the 1918 influenza virus or as virulent as the Avian Flu virus. The World Health Organization (WHO) has documented 576 human cases of Avian Flu infection worldwide since 2003, 339 of those cases resulted in death. Recently, research funded by the National Institutes of Health and conducted in Wisconsin and the Netherlands resulted in genetic changes to a strain of Avian Flu that allowed its airborne transmissibility. The NIH-funded researchers planned to publish their full findings in two academic journals. Now, publication, peer review, and replication of findings are obviously important steps in a vigorous scientific process. But others have expressed concern that the publication of the methodology and some of the data could help create a road map for terrorists and others seeking to further modify the virus into a bio-weapon. That is why a government advisory board, the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity, recommended in late December that partial information be withheld from publication. Late last month, however, the Board--with some dissenters-- reversed course, and is now advocating for the full publication of the research done in Wisconsin as revised, and the publication of a revised paper on the research performed in the Netherlands. The decision and its reversal have been part of a larger debate within the scientific and national security communities and there are important arguments being made on both sides. When the American people pay for scientific research intended for the common good, they have a right to expect that their money will not be used to facilitate terrorism. These are not hypothetical threats. Before he was killed, Anwar al-Awlaki reportedly sought poisons to attack the United States. Adding to these concerns, the new leader of al-Qaeda has a medical background. Therefore, he may have an even greater interest in pursuing chemical and biological terrorism. At the same time, there is a legitimate concern about government censorship that could chill academic freedom and scientific inquiry or even limit the sharing of information necessary to save lives or improve public health. Recently, NIH released a new policy for the oversight of dual-use research of concern. This policy is intended to improve our awareness of current and proposed dual-use research of concern and provide some guidelines for mitigating the associated risks. This new policy, however, is only the beginning of what must be a straightforward dialogue among science, health, national security, and government experts and leaders in order to promote scientific research while protecting the safety of Americans and others around the world. I look forward this morning to hearing and reviewing the testimony of our witnesses about these challenging issues and how we can strike the right balance. I do want to apologize that I will, however, have to leave early due to a markup in the Appropriations Committee that begins at 10:30, but I will certainly review the transcript of this hearing. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Lieberman. Thank you, Senator Collins, for that thoughtful statement. I am sure whether it is at this particular hearing, Appropriations, or others, you will be watching out for the budgets of NIH, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and others that may be recipients on the panel. Senator Collins. Absolutely. Chairman Lieberman. That is your record, I know. Our first witness is Dr. Anthony Fauci--really a national hero, at least a hero of mine and I am sure others--Director of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases at NIH. I really appreciate that you are here today and we look forward to your testimony now. TESTIMONY OF ANTHONY S. FAUCI, M.D.,\1\ DIRECTOR, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF ALLERGY AND INFECTIOUS DISEASES, NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES Dr. Fauci. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and Senator Collins. Thank you for the opportunity to testify today on the NIH mission of performing biomedical research for the purpose of preparing for and responding to naturally emerging and reemerging infectious diseases and the relationship of this type of research to biological security. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ The prepared statement of Dr. Fauci with attachments appear in the Appendix on page 34. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- As you mentioned in your statement, the issue at hand is the ongoing threat of the emergence of an H5N1 pandemic influenza and the research that was supported by the NIH to address this threat. The publication of the results of such research in the form of the two manuscripts that you mentioned has focused considerable public attention on the issue of dual- use research, namely research that is directed at providing new information critical to the public health, but at the same time has the potential for malevolent applications. My written testimony is submitted for the record, and in my few minutes of time, I will highlight just a few important aspects of this issue. First, the public health challenge. Seasonal influenza is an ongoing threat to public health worldwide and is among the leading global causes of death due to infectious diseases. Each year, influenza causes more than 200,000 hospitalizations and up to 49,000 deaths in the United States and up to a half-a- million deaths globally. Yet influenza has animal reservoirs, especially in birds, and these viruses can undergo extensive genetic changes and jump species, resulting in an influenza virus to which humans are highly vulnerable. Such an event can and historically has led to global disasters, such as the one you mentioned, the prime example being the 1918 global influenza pandemic that killed up to 100 million people worldwide and caused enormous social and economic disruption. There is a clear and present danger that we will have another influenza pandemic, since these viruses continue to circulate in the world and are constantly evolving toward pandemic capability, as we have seen in 1957, 1968, and 2009. Over the last decade, a highly pathogenic H5N1 influenza has emerged among chickens. Rarely, the virus spreads to humans. Since 2003, approximately 600 confirmed cases have occurred in humans in more than a dozen countries shown in red on this poster.\1\ Nearly 60 percent of those reported cases have resulted in death. Should the virus mutate to transmit more efficiently to and among people, a widespread influenza pandemic could ensue. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ The poster referenced by Dr. Fauci appears in the Appendix on page 48. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Indeed, nature itself is the most dangerous bioterrorist, and even as we meet today, H5N1 and other influenza viruses are naturally mutating and changing with the potential of a catastrophic pandemic. This is not a theoretical danger. It is a real danger. For decades, NIH has supported basic influenza research included on transmissibility, host adaptation, and virulence. The goal is to anticipate what the virus is continually trying to do on its own in the wild and to prepare for it. Such goals were pursued by the NIH-funded scientists Kawaoka and Fouchier and could have important positive implications for pandemic influenza prediction, prevention, diagnosis, and treatment. Kawaoka and Fouchier constructed variants of H5N1 avian influenza in order to identify which genetic mutations might alter the transmissibility of the virus. In their studies, they employed a standard influenza animal model, namely the ferret. This poster shows the basic design of the experiments,\2\ in which the virus was modified to allow for aerosol transmission from one ferret to another. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \2\ The poster referenced by Dr. Fauci appears in the Appendix on page 50. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- I might point out that one of the causes of the public misunderstanding was the widespread belief that the virus that was transmitted by aerosol from one ferret to another actually killed the ferrets when, in fact, that was not the case. We feel that these studies provide critical information and it was important to determine if H5N1 virus that has this enhanced transmissibility would remain sensitive to existing anti-influenza drugs and vaccines. In addition, and importantly, knowledge of the genetic mutations that facilitate transmission may be critical for global surveillance of emerging influenza viruses. Yet since transmissibility of a virulent virus was increased, this constitutes dual-use research of concern (DURC), which is shown on this poster.\1\ If a particular research experiment is identified as DURC, that designation does not necessarily mean that such research should not be published, nor should it even be prohibited in the first place. However, it does call for us, as you mentioned, to balance carefully the benefit of the research to the public health, the biosafety and biosecurity conditions under which the research is conducted, and the potential risk that the knowledge gained from such research might fall into the hands of those with ill intent. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ The poster referenced by Dr. Fauci appears in the Appendix on page 51. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- In this regard, the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity was asked to advise the U.S. Government on the publication of these manuscripts. You will hear in detail from Dr. Paul Keim, the Chair of that group, about the Board's deliberations. Importantly, the public attention and concern generated by this issue has triggered a voluntary moratorium or pause on this type of research on the part of the influenza research community as well as a fresh look at how the U.S. Government handles DURC, as manifested by a formalization of a government-wide policy to address the issue. This policy, which was released on March 29, strengthens and formalizes ongoing efforts in DURC oversight and is described in my written testimony. The ultimate goal of the NIH in its embrace of this new policy is to ensure that the conduct and communication of research in this area remain transparent and open at the same time as the risk-benefit ratio of such research clearly tips towards benefitting society. The public, which has a stake in the risks as well as in the benefits of such research, deserves a rational and transparent explanation of how these decisions are made. The upcoming dialogue related to this policy certainly will be informative and, hopefully, productive in its goal of benefiting the public with the fruits of such research while ameliorating the associated risks. Thank you. Chairman Lieberman. Thanks very much, Dr. Fauci. That was an excellent introduction to the topic and I look forward to asking you some questions. Next, Dr. Daniel M. Gerstein, Deputy Under Secretary for Science and Technology at the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, obviously sharing with the Committee the concern about whether this research represents a real threat to our homeland security, and if so, what we should do about it. Thanks so much for being here, and we welcome your testimony now. TESTIMONY OF DANIEL M. GERSTEIN, PH.D.,\2\ DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY FOR SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY Mr. Gerstein. Thank you. Good morning, Chairman Lieberman and Senator Collins. I thank you for the opportunity to testify today regarding dual-use life science research of concern. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \2\ The prepared statement of Mr. Gerstein appears in the Appendix on page 53. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- My testimony today will describe both Department of Homeland Security mechanisms for addressing and mitigating dual-use concerns arising from internal life sciences research that DHS funds or performs as well as DHS involvement in U.S. Government and other efforts to address security concerns arising from the life sciences research. As the Department considers the DURC issue, several principles help guide our thinking. First, DURC is an extremely complex issue for the scientific research and development community, balancing our Nation's need to excel in science and exploration of robust technologies with ensuring our Nation's security by preventing the misuse of such technology. Second, almost all research conducted today in bioscience and biotechnology contains some degree of dual-use application. Third, dual-use concerns must be addressed at a variety of different levels, from research funded by governments, to research funded privately, to experimentation done by individual scientists. And finally, there are both domestic and international dimensions to the DURC issue, as the recent H5N1 papers have clearly demonstrated. DHS performs research which might be considered DURC through a variety of different mechanisms, including our internal laboratories, such as the National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center (NBACC), and Plum Island Animal Disease Center (PIADC). We also sponsor and collaborate with other departments. Additionally, we provide funding to colleges and universities, primarily through our DHS Centers of Excellence Program. One vignette that demonstrates the degree to which dual-use research is both ongoing and critical to the DHS mission is the development of a recombinant foot-and-mouth (FMD) disease vaccine. The recombinant vaccine components are being developed through our DHS Center of Excellence at Texas A&M. The material is then shipped to Plum Island, where it is used in challenge tests employing live FMD virus. At Plum Island, DHS and the U.S. Department of Agriculture are working shoulder to shoulder in this effort. Once approved for licensure, a commercial company will produce the vaccine. This cross-cutting project demonstrates the importance of collaborative efforts in dual- use research. DHS's primary objective in funding activity in the life sciences is to meet our homeland security mission. We, therefore, exercise control of the information where necessary through non-publication or non-disclosure mechanisms. Research conducted or funded by DHS in the areas of biological and chemical defense undergo particular scrutiny and high-level departmental review because of the potential to raise concerns regarding security, nonproliferation, and treaty compliance. At DHS, our approach to dual-use research is multi- dimensional. At the lowest levels, project managers are trained to understand and assess their programs for possible dual-use implications. The National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity, definition of DURC embodied in the NSABB's seven experiments of concern serves as the basis for this understanding. These same criteria have been identified for use in the new Federal-wide DURC policy. The DHS Compliance Assurance Program Office (CAPO) reviews projects that are to be conducted. This review divides potential projects into tiers based on whether they include NSABB experiments of concern, raise perceptions of noncompliance with arms control agreements, utilize select agents or toxins, have the potential to generate or reveal national security vulnerabilities, or provide information on threat agent production or dissemination. At the highest levels of the Department, our Compliance Review Group (CRG), chaired by our Deputy Secretary with full participation across the staff, reviews all DURC with a particular eye toward ensuring compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention and Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). DHS routinely contracts for life science research that involves use of select agents and toxins or that require special biosafety provisions. In all cases, we ensure that contracts contain clauses to ensure conformity with applicable laws, regulations, and internal policies. In addition, research contracts for life sciences work typically provide for DHS to object to publication or disclosure. Further, depending on the type of proposed publication or disclosure, the information to be released must go through an internal review process. In the unlikely event that sensitive or classified material is produced from research projects funded through grants to academia, DHS requires grant recipients to create information protection plans which detail how the information would be identified and secured. Now, I have been discussing the internal management of DURC within DHS. Let me now turn briefly to the broader DURC issue. DHS has been an extremely active participant in the formulation of the U.S. Government policy on the dual-use research, including the March 29 government policy for DURC oversight. We are in complete agreement that strengthening DURC oversight and establishing regular reviews of U.S. Government funded or conducted research is both necessary and a responsible approach. However, even with the kind of internal DHS oversight policies described previously and the U.S. Government-wide policy on oversight of U.S. funded life sciences research, DHS believes that security-related concerns to DURC cannot be entirely resolved by formal U.S. Government policies. The international nature of life sciences research, coupled with the explosion in biotechnology funded by private sources, means that much of the DURC being conducted is not under direct U.S. Government control. Advances in the life sciences will undoubtedly create technological capabilities that will be of tremendous benefit to humankind but will also require careful stewardship, including development of appropriate regulations and policies, as well as continued emphasis on strong bio-risk management programs that emphasize biosafety, biosecurity, and bioethics. In working through this issue, we must find ways to mitigate risk associated with the potential malicious use of DURC while at the same time allowing for open and unfettered innovation by our Nation's scientists and laboratories. At the end of the day, the DURC issue comes down to a risk-benefit evaluation of whether the balance is in favor of sharing the information for the good of humankind for public health, medical, or biotechnology advancement versus the potential for misuse. Ultimately, the international life sciences community must appreciate the DURC problem and internalize these concerns while developing and conducting research. In this regard, the H5N1 papers have served as a necessary wake-up call for the life sciences community. Thank you for giving us the opportunity to testify today and we look forward to your questions. Chairman Lieberman. Thanks, Dr. Gerstein. Just clarify for the record, and for me, what the role of the Department of Homeland Security is with regard to dual-use research happening outside of DHS grantees. Mr. Gerstein. Well, Senator, we sit as part of the interagency body that deliberates, and so we have a strong voice. And in fact, as I am sure we will talk more about later, the March 29 policy actually reflects much of the work that we have been doing previously in fulfilling our Biological Weapons Convention requirements. We made use of the NSABB's seven experiments of concern. We have always looked at the select agent program to make sure that we are in accordance with the requirements and the reporting requirements. So we do that tiered process in order to make sure that experiments do fall in full compliance with the BWC. What we have done, though, is because of the alignment of the March 29 policy and the work that we have done previously, we essentially have a leg up on the implementation of the March 29 policy. Chairman Lieberman. And just to take this one step further, the board on which you sit, is this to determine government- wide policy or also to approve and evaluate particular research projects? Mr. Gerstein. These are internal boards that are designed to look at the Department's experimentation, the projects that we are to be conducting. Chairman Lieberman. And then, finally, just give us a sense, and I do not think you have to get into too much detail here, about how widely dual-use research projects are being carried out or funded in the Federal Government. In other words, the natural place to think about it is NIH, but I presume DOD is also funding projects, etc. Mr. Gerstein. Well, Senator, I would like to stick to my Department and just tell you what we are doing in the Department of Homeland Security. Through our review process, our Compliance Review Group looks at a total of about 200 projects that fall into what we call Tier One, just regular experiments that do not rise to the level of concern. In the Tier Two, ones that could perhaps have some issues with perception---- Chairman Lieberman. Right. Mr. Gerstein [continuing]. We do 12 to 15 experiments. And then in the highest category, we do 5 to 10 experiments. So a total of about 225 experiments per year, of which all run through our Compliance Review Group process. Chairman Lieberman. And those are all funded within DHS? Mr. Gerstein. They are, yes. Chairman Lieberman. So maybe, Dr. Fauci, you are the one to turn to to give us for the record a kind of broader sense of how widely dual-use research is either being done in Federal agencies or funded by Federal agencies. Dr. Fauci. So that is a very good question, Mr. Chairman, and it is important, as you did yourself, to distinguish between dual-use research and dual-use research of concern. Chairman Lieberman. Right. Dr. Fauci. Almost any time you even go near a microbe, it is dual-use research. If you are talking about dual-use research of concern, just for this purpose, as part of the implementation of the March 29 government-wide policy, we did an inventory of what we do both with our own scientists at the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID) as well as the external extramural grantees and contractors. And just to give you some examples, when we did an inventory of what we do mostly on our Bethesda campus and in our Rocky Mountain campus, there were 404 intramural projects that could be dual-use plus 147 manuscripts and none were found to be dual-use research of concern. When we did the extramural inventory of all of the grantees--there were 381 grantees or contractors--10 of those grants were designated as DURC. Seven of them were in influenza, one in anthrax, one in plague, and one in botulism. So out of 381, there were only 10, and those are the ones we are now going through the process that is delineated very carefully in the new policy. So that is the scope of what we are doing at NIAID. Chairman Lieberman. That is very helpful. And just generally, am I right to assume there may be dual-use research projects of concern, for instance, funded by the Department of Defense? Dr. Fauci. I would hesitate to make a statement about the Department of Defense, but we collaborate a lot with them---- Chairman Lieberman. Yes. Dr. Fauci [continuing]. And yes, I cannot imagine that they are not doing some. Chairman Lieberman. Good enough. Dr. Fauci. But probably a really small amount. But they clearly are doing some. Chairman Lieberman. So most is probably coming through NIH? Dr. Fauci. Right. Chairman Lieberman. Thanks very much. Next, Dr. Paul Keim, Acting Chairman of the aforementioned National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity. We thank you very much, Dr. Keim, for being here, and please proceed with your testimony now. TESTIMONY OF PAUL S. KEIM, PH.D.,\1\ ACTING CHAIRMAN, NATIONAL SCIENCE ADVISORY BOARD FOR BIOSECURITY, NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES Mr. Keim. Chairman Lieberman, thank you for holding this hearing on ``Biological Security: The Risk of Dual-Use Research.'' I am Paul Keim, the Acting Chair of the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity. I appreciate the opportunity to speak to you about dual-use research and in particular about the Board's activities and our recent evaluation of two scientific papers concerning the H5N1 influenza virus. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Keim appears in the Appendix on page 59. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- It has been recognized for many years that science and technology can be used for both good purposes and bad. It is this two-sided coin that we refer to as dual-use research. The problem is that all biological research can be construed as having potential bad applications as well as their good ones. The NSABB created a new term, dual-use research of concern to distinguish normal research from that with exceptionally high potential to be misused. The parameters defining DURC would include the magnitude of any danger and the immediacy of any threat as balanced against the overall benefits of the work. Over the last 8 years, the Board has advised the U.S. Government on best practices and policy approaches for research communication, personnel reliability standards, codes of conduct, and international engagement for issues associated with DURC. The Board has recognized that good policy needs to protect us from scientific misuse and protect the scientific enterprise from being overburdened with unnecessary regulation. Both are essential for our country to be safe, productive, and remain a global leader. The National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity is comprised of well respected scientists, lawyers, infectious disease experts, scientific editors, and public health experts. We have an 8-year track record of protecting academic freedom while seeking policy recommendations that will minimize the misuse of biological sciences research. With that in mind, recognize the significance for the Board to unanimously recommend against the publication of two scientific papers in November 2011 due to their potential to be misused. The U.S. Government asked the Board to review two NIH- funded studies reporting mutations that allowed a highly dangerous bird flu virus to transmit from one ferret to another. By a split vote, the Board instead recommended to the government that key elements of the studies not be published and that only redacted papers were acceptable for general distribution. These recommendations were based upon the Board's finding that if this avian influenza virus acquires the capacity for human-to-human spread and retained its current virulence, the world could face a pandemic of significant proportions. We found that the potential risk for public harm to be of unusually high magnitude. The Board has published its recommendations to the U.S. Government along with its rationale. Importantly, we pointed out that an international discussion was needed amongst multiple societal components to develop policy in this arena of high-consequence DURC. I would further note that in the few months since our recommendations were released, there has been a flurry of U.S. and international meetings to discuss the risks and benefits of these experiments. The research issues and policy consequences are now commonly known and being debated. This continuing global conversation is important for the scientific endeavor and for our biosecurity. In late March 2012, the U.S. Government tasked NSABB with reviewing revised versions of the two original manuscripts. This was coupled with a face-to-face meeting such that the Board could hear directly from the investigators about their research. In this meeting, the Board received non-public information about the risks and benefits of the research from the international public health and research community as well as from the U.S. Government intelligence community. In a classified briefing from national intelligence counsel and National Counterterrorism Center representatives, the Board heard an assessment of the risk for misuse and of the global political ramifications associated with these papers. The details of these briefings are classified, but I can tell you that many of the Board were left with the impression that the risk of misuse did not appreciably increase with full publication, and there is a high likelihood of undesirable political consequences to not publishing. In addition, the U.S. Government has recently issued new policy guidelines targeting high consequence DURC. This was based upon the NSABB's own definition of DURC and seven categories of experiments that warrant special consideration and targeting particular high-consequence pathogens. It is in this context that the Board arrived at different recommendations for the revised manuscripts. One paper was unanimously recommended for full publication while the other was recommended by a split vote of 12-6. In balancing the risks against the benefits of the revised manuscripts in the context of additional information and new U.S. Government policy, the Board shifted its position. In my opinion, the split vote is highly significant and signals that the Board still believes that there is great potential for misuse of information generated by these types of experiments. The majority of the Board members voted for publication, but they were clearly still troubled by this research and its potential to be misused. It is fair to say that the Board believes that these types of experiments will arise again and that these issues are not fully settled. As one Board member noted, we have only kicked this can down the road and will be dealing with it again in the future. It is critical that we establish policy that intensely monitors high potential DURC research from cradle to grave in order to protect us from misuse, but also to free low-potential DURC research from onerous regulations. We must be careful that we do not destroy the scientific enterprise as we try to protect against misuse of some research. Thank you. Chairman Lieberman. Thanks very much, Dr. Keim. Let me just ask you, while the phrase is in my mind, what did you mean when you said or referred to undesirable political consequences from not publishing? Mr. Keim. This information was conveyed in a classified briefing and we cannot talk about it in detail, but there are many international collaborative projects here in public health to try to control, predict, and understand influenza pandemics. Some of those political agreements are very fragile, and I think that it is fair to say that not releasing this information was seen by the intelligence community as having a detrimental effect upon those fragile relationships. Chairman Lieberman. Understood. Thank you. Our final witness is Dr. Thomas Inglesby, Chief Executive Officer and Director, Center for Biosecurity, University of Pittsburgh Medical Center. Welcome back. TESTIMONY OF THOMAS V. INGLESBY, M.D.,\1\ CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR BIOSECURITY, UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH MEDICAL CENTER Dr. Inglesby. Mr. Chairman, thank you for the chance to speak to you today. My name is Tom Inglesby. I am the Director for the Center for Biosecurity of University of Pittsburgh Medical Center. I am an infectious disease physician by training, and over the last two decades, I have seen many patients with influenza die despite excellent medical care in American hospitals. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ The prepared statement of Dr. Inglesby appears in the Appendix on page 63. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- For many years, my Center colleagues and I have been studying avian pandemic flu and the public health actions that need to be taken to protect us from those challenges, and like all of you, I am deeply concerned that H5N1 is a major global threat. I have been opposed to the publication of the revised Fouchier manuscript. The breakthrough in that work was making H5N1 transmissible through the air between ferrets. Just as wild type H5N1 kills ferrets when instilled into their tracheas, this engineered virus also kills ferrets the same way. So there is no evidence that I have seen publicly presented that this engineered virus would have less virulence in humans than wild type H5N1 infection would. Were this virus to cause a human infection, it could acquire new, unpredictable virulence properties. So if this work were replicated after publication and if it led to human infection following accident or misuse, we cannot rule out the chance that it would lead to high case fatality in a spreading epidemic difficult to stop with quarantine, vaccine, or antivirals. As you noted, there are others in the scientific and public health communities who share this concern. That said, I appreciate that a deliberative process has taken place in the last 6 months. The majority of NSABB members, the U.S. Government agencies, and the journal, Science and Nature, have decided that this work should be published. I am concerned about this, but I recognize this decision has been made. So now it is time to look ahead and anticipate the future of H5N1 mammalian transmissibility research, which scientists are now poised to pursue. Here are some brief thoughts on benefits and risks of further pursuing this line of research. Will further engineering H5N1 mammalian transmissible viruses help improve surveillance? In my view, in the short term, it is unlikely. Genetic mutation data is not widely collected in avian flu surveillance systems. Very few sequences are analyzed in real time. Even if we could identify experimental mutations in birds in real time, the prescribed response would still be the same: Culling of infected birds, all flocks, regardless of the mutations of the virus. Until we have a surveillance system in place that collects far more genetic sequence, does so in time frames that are meaningful, and have predictive value sufficient to lead to additional action in the field, this action seems unlikely to practically improve surveillance. Nor is this research necessary to making H5N1 vaccine for reasons I explain in my written testimony. What could go wrong with mammalian transmissible H5N1? Could an accident occur? Biosafety at modern labs is generally excellent. Accidents are uncommon, and most pathogens have little capacity for societal spread. But the accidental escape of an engineered mammalian transmissible H5N1 could result in catastrophe. Although it is uncommon, accidents do happen. In 1977, H1N1 caused a mini-pandemic, probably from a lab escape. Nine years ago, during the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) outbreak, there were at least three incidents in which researchers working in Biosafety Level 3 (BSL-3) or BSL-4 labs in Singapore, Taiwan, and China accidentally infected themselves with SARS. I am not meaning to single out laboratorians for criticism. Mistakes are made by all types of professionals, doctors, pilots, rocket scientists, all of us, because we are human. We have to factor the possibility of human error, surprise, and accidents into our calculations of the risk of this research. Can we assure this research will not be replicated and deliberately misused? No. We can hope no potential adversary will have the competence or the intention to pursue this, but we cannot accurately predict the chances this work will be replicated by a malevolent or disaffected scientist somewhere in the world, or a terrorist group or a Nation State. What happens if a mammalian transmissible H5N1 starts to spread? Seasonal flu infects 10 to 20 percent of the world every year, as much as a billion people or more. The case fatality rate of wild H5N1 in the WHO database is nearly 60 percent, as you indicated. So if a strain of H5N1 with that fatality rate were engineered to spread like seasonal flu, hundreds of millions of people's lives would be at risk. Even a strain 100 times less lethal would place at risk millions of people's lives. So what should be done about H5N1 mammalian transmissible research going forward? First, I would extend the moratorium that Dr. Fauci discussed. The reasons many experts agreed with the moratorium are still valid. Before proceeding, we should have more confidence this research will lead to practical benefits, and we should look for other ways to study transmissibility that do not require engineering mammalian transmissible strains. If this work is allowed to continue, we should limit it to the smallest number of labs. My understanding is that the United Kingdom and Canada have indicated their concern by deciding this work can only be performed in BSL-4 labs. We should have these discussions in an open, transparent way that includes the scientific and public health communities. Second, let us decide if there are red lines that should not be crossed. For example, should increased lethality be engineered into mammalian transmissible strains in order to understand virulence? Should other avian flu strains be engineered for mammalian transmissibility? Should transmissible H5N1 strains be engineered to make them resistant to vaccines or antivirals so we can understand the genetics of those problems? We should decide now if there are any uncrossable lines. And third, the United States should continue to strengthen its pandemic preparedness efforts. Priorities should include the capacity to manufacture flu vaccine on a large scale--a universal flu vaccine and new antivirals--and better surveillance and culling of infected flocks. Preparing for pandemic and avian flu is critically important. Let me turn to the policy for DURC that was recently announced. This policy is a good step towards addressing the kinds of issues raised by the H5N1 controversy. The success of the policy will depend on how it is implemented. In my written testimony, I provide recommendations for success of the policy and I will highlight four of them here. First, implement effectively at the local level. Scientists, their institutions, and their institutional biosafety committees will be crucial to the success of this policy. This is new territory for them, so training and education will be key. They will also need new members, new resources, and a clear process for elevating concerns. Second, learn from experience. This process will need to evolve as we learn. I understand that the NIH review of the portfolio found that 10 experiments warranted further risk management. It would be a valuable learning tool for the science community to understand these 10 cases. What caused the concerns? How were risks mitigated? I think this could be done in an unidentified way to protect the scientists. It would also be useful to learn as much as we can from the H5N1 risk assessment and risk management process. How were risks assessed? How were conflicts of interest managed? How did the process ensure all relevant judgments were considered and data seen? Going forward, the success of the DURC policy will depend on these issues. Third, attend to the regulatory burden. This new policy will add another process to be navigated by a scientific community that is already heavily regulated. We have to make sure we do not impose such a regulatory burden that scientists cannot continue their important work. And so to this end, I would recommend asking the National Academies to examine the effects of existing policy and regulatory burdens on U.S. scientists. And last, reaffirm the role of NSABB. It deserves a lot of credit for its work. NSABB members have done substantial public service. They have prepared valuable dual-use guidelines and spent a great deal of energy, intellect, and time on this H5N1 debate. An independent and strong NSABB should have an important role in DURC policy implementation going forward, and I hope that the NSABB will rarely be in the position of getting invited into the process after manuscripts have been submitted. I think we all agree in this room that the risk assessment and management process should happen early in the research process. To conclude, scientists who research influenza and other infectious diseases are working to improve our understanding of biology and to better the world. The United States needs to continue supporting entrepreneurial and talented scientists with the best ideas. At the same time, we need to acknowledge there are rare situations where the consequences of an accident or misuse are so serious that special processes are needed to manage the risk to the public, and this new DURC policy is a good step in that direction. Chairman Lieberman. Thanks, Dr. Inglesby. When we hear about accidental escape of pathogens from laboratories, we get alarmed. Talk a little more about it. Does that normally happen? Dr. Inglesby. No. Chairman Lieberman. Because the example you have stated, the infection of workers or personnel in the labs---- Dr. Inglesby. Yes. In all the cases that I mentioned and in other cases, that is typically the way that an infection would escape a lab. A laboratorian would get infected. Usually when laboratorians are infected, though, they do not spread it to anybody else. Chairman Lieberman. Right. Dr. Inglesby. So the risk really is primarily to the person working in the laboratory. It is rare for the laboratorian to pose a risk outside the lab. Chairman Lieberman. Right. Dr. Fauci, I assume that all the regulations, both before and after March 29, were intent on limiting the possibility of exposure to personnel? Dr. Fauci. Definitely, Mr. Chairman. In general, definitely. And specifically, in the two cases that we are discussing as prototypes here today, the two laboratories, one in Wisconsin and one at Erasmus University, were very highly qualified, inspected multiple times, and given a rating of ``meet or exceed'' the standards for the kinds of protection we are talking about. Chairman Lieberman. Good. Dr. Keim, let me ask you first about the two laboratories that were the subject of this concern. To the extent that you can, why was the ultimate decision unanimous in the case of Wisconsin and then mixed in the case of Erasmus University? Mr. Keim. The underlying science and approaches that each laboratory took for doing these experiments were different. While the two studies lumped together a lot in our discussions, they were distinct. We viewed Dr. Yoshihiro Kawaoka's approaches as having a greater biological control of the risks. It is one of the aspects that we have instituted routinely in biosafety experiments in the United States, where these types of experiments are performed in a biological context that would be less dangerous. For example, if we do an experiment where we add a novel gene or biological property to an organism, we prefer to do it with a pathogen that has been disarmed, or attenuated, to lessen the risk. And so in distinguishing the two research groups and their scientific approaches, the biggest difference is that one worked on a biological platform, the H1N1 virus that was viewed as less risky, and not as virulent than the other one. In contrast, taking the wild type H5N1 avian influenza virus, the raw material from nature, and then directly changing the transmissibility on that genetic platform was viewed as a potentially very risky experiment. Chairman Lieberman. And if I understand, that difference had more to do with the scientific decisions of each team as opposed to differing levels of safety standards that they were operating under in their respective institutions or countries. Mr. Keim. Yes. As Dr. Fauci has already pointed out, both institutions were heavily regulated, heavily reviewed, and both exceeded the current requirements for biological safety that are required to perform these types of experiments. Chairman Lieberman. Dr. Keim and Dr. Fauci, I want to give you an opportunity to respond to the dissent in the letter which was, I gather, originally a confidential letter and then was leaked, from Michael Osterholm in his criticism of the NSABB decisions.\1\ And to some extent, Dr. Inglesby expressed some concern about the decision. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ The letter referenced by Senator Lieberman appears in the Appendix on page 76. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Dr. Keim, please begin. Mr. Keim. So first off, we are a Board of almost 25 highly qualified individuals and we rarely agree 100 percent on anything. Chairman Lieberman. It sounds like Congress. [Laughter.] Mr. Keim. I know. Chairman Lieberman. Although we may not be highly qualified. [Laughter.] Mr. Keim. I must say that we actually embrace this dissent, we use it and we actually cherish the different members and their differing opinions. This is true for this particular example, as well. I believe that this letter that was meant for an internal constructive criticism process, and to help us to understand in a retrospective fashion what we had done and what we had just come through as a board. As such, I view it as a very constructive type of communication. It was unfortunate that it was leaked and it became part of the public dialogue. The public nature of the ensuing debate has made it harder to have a constructive and proactive type conversation. That aside, many of the things that he said are worth carefully examining. One point made in the letter is that there was a bias in the witness list. I think that is true. The primary briefers that were brought to the hearing, were, in fact, the investigators themselves. They are inherently biased with an easily identifiable conflict of interest. They wanted their work published in these prestigious journals. In addition, we brought in a third investigator who has been collaborating with two primary research groups. His report and work was on how you use the mutation information for surveillance purposes. Again, this was an individual who would like to see their work published and, it can be argued, that they would see the benefits far clearer than the risks. However, I do not think this is of great concern, Mr. Chairman. The Board is comprised of experienced scientists and what we routinely do in our profession is look at scientific data and critically examine other scientists' work. And so the biases that were inherent in those types of witnesses, I think, were not a problem for us. In fact, I think, that we dealt with the briefers' conflict of interest very well. We had ample opportunity to ask very tough questions of the investigators. Dr. Ron Fouchier, for example, was in front of us for over 2 hours with lots of intense questioning about his work. In the end, I think that those inherent biases were something the Board could and did deal with quite well. One part of Dr. Osterholm's letter criticized the intelligence briefing. This was a classified briefing that was presented by the U.S. Government intelligence community. Most of the Board members came into the briefing as academic scientists and we pretty much had to take this assessment on faith. We could not examine the data or assumptions and had to assume that the assessments of the risks and the political consequences were fact. This is an environment where the Board is perhaps a little bit naive and did not have the capability to look behind these assessments in a critical fashion. The briefing was held at the ``secret'' level before we were told that the supporting information was at a higher level of classification. The intelligence community briefers were quite confident, and suggested to us that the risks of publishing these papers were minimal while the political consequences of not publishing were great. I think that this briefing had a great effect upon individual Board members' deliberations and our ultimate decisions. Dr. Osterholm's criticism of the briefing is hard for me to evaluate. I think that summary-type classified briefings may be unavoidable. At some level, all advisory boards will be faced with accepting such an evaluation at face value. The March 29 and 30 Board meeting was never set up to be a point-counterpoint debate but rather a fact finding endeavor with heavily emphasis on the researchers themselves. So we did not have time in the 6 hours to hear from every witness in the world. But we did succeed in hearing the most important witnesses, even if they were inherently biased. Chairman Lieberman. Interesting. So if you had it to do over again---- Mr. Keim. Absolutely, I would do many things different, Mr. Chairman. For one, I would make sure that DURC review was being performed long before it ever came to the Board. We were brought these papers under a very tight timeline back in October, 2011. Chairman Lieberman. Right. Mr. Keim. In retrospect, the amount of effort it took to review this science was too large for the time line we were on. The process and the number of hours we put into reviewing these two papers was massive. It is clear that the new government policy for identifying DURC early in the research cycle is going to be critical for moving much of this evaluation early on, before it is submitted for publication. Chairman Lieberman. Yes, that is a very important point. I mean, I agree with you that the dissent, even to some extent the bias, is not of itself of concern, particularly in scientific debate and discussion. But, obviously, from a homeland security point of view, we are concerned about the impact. Am I right that you are essentially, to the best of your ability, providing assurances that information is not going to be released in the two studies, particularly in the Fouchier study, that would significantly increase the risk of deliberate or accidental release of H5N1? Mr. Keim. The Board was pretty confident in the case of the Kawaoka paper and the vote was unanimous. In the case of the Fouchier paper, it was a split vote. The vote was 12-6 and there were strong feelings on both sides. In this type of an advisory Board process, each of us had to weigh the evidence and it was not black and white. There were great uncertainties in this research. A relatively small number of ferrets were actually used in these experiments making the data less than definitive in some cases. Our understanding the biological properties of these viruses is not 100 percent certain. In the end, the 18 Board members had to weigh the evidence as best they could. And I will tell you, you will not find a better group of people to do this. This Board is extremely qualified and capable to do this assessment. We worked very hard at understanding the risks and benefits, but were not unanimous and came to a split vote on the Fouchier paper. Chairman Lieberman. Dr. Fauci, do you want to respond to the Osterholm complaints, and to some extent, to Dr. Inglesby's concerns? Dr. Fauci. Sure. Well, with regard to the letter, as you probably know, because I am sure that your staff or you have a copy of the letter, there were several issues that were brought up in there. I have to say that I agree with many of the things that Dr. Keim said in the sense of this is a strong Board, a really good Board. We have worked with them for a long time and I do not think they are going to be significantly influenced by what they might perceive as a bias. So if they did, I believe, as Dr. Keim has done in the past, if you have an issue with something, you bring it up. The letter was sent to the Executive Secretary of the NSABB, who is at NIH, Dr. Amy Patterson. We have responded on a point-by-point basis to everything in that letter, so we would be more than happy to make that response available to you so that you could see the point-by-point discussion. Again, there were important issues about looking forward. There were several things in there that I must say, quite frankly, Mr. Chairman, that I actually disagree with, one of which was the concern about the security briefing. I have a great deal of trust in the Director of the National Intelligence to tell us what we need to know. So that is just one example. The idea, as you mentioned, about the picking of people who would be on the agenda, we did not get any indication from Dr. Osterholm of people that he wanted to see there that were not there. So rather than go tit for tat on that, I can just say that I think the general principles that were brought up by Dr. Keim, I totally agree with. I just have to say for the record that I disagree with many of the things in his letter. Chairman Lieberman. No, I appreciate that directness and I thank you for it. Do you have a reaction to Dr. Inglesby's suggestion that the moratorium should be extended, and if so, for how long? Dr. Fauci. I totally agree with Dr. Inglesby about an extension of the moratorium. The real critical issue is for how long. Chairman Lieberman. Right. Dr. Fauci. This is a voluntary moratorium, and I think that is something that the public needs to understand. This is a voluntary moratorium on the part of the scientific community. Chairman Lieberman. Right. Dr. Fauci. I had discussions with the influenza scientists and encouraged them and actually, to their credit and to the discussion that Dr. Keim himself had in the NSABB, this was something that they agreed upon. Exactly when to call it off, we are very actively involved in pushing forward the principles and the implementation of the March 29 government-wide DURC policy. That is going to have an important impact on when we can feel comfortable that we can then go on, as long as people understand both the principles and the implementation mechanisms of how you address DURC. Several of the labs that are involved understand that now. We need to make sure that is broadly understood. So I definitely agree with that. I just want to make one point---- Chairman Lieberman. Go ahead. Dr. Fauci [continuing]. Of minor disagreement, if you want to call it that, with what my esteemed colleague, Dr. Inglesby, says. If we only looked at the short-term benefit of research, we would not do a lot of research at the NIH because you very often have a situation where it is incremental and you build up into something that really becomes important. So although I understand the point that is being made, if you look at what immediate benefit those mutations are going to have right now, sure, you can say that there is not a lot of surveillance capabilities of high sequencing, etc. But the incremental accumulation of knowledge is one of the fundamental principles that the NIH research agenda is built upon. So I think there is a little bit of a disagreement on that. I do not think you need to have an absolute immediate benefit for research to be ultimately important to do and to publish. Chairman Lieberman. Do you want to respond? Dr. Inglesby. Yes. Well, actually, I completely agree with what you just said, so I do not think we disagree on that. I agree that fundamental research into understanding biological principles is critical and it is a critical part of the science mission. I think this is just one very specific and rare example where I think the bar for whether to proceed with this line of research should be beyond a deeper fundamental understanding of biology. In general, I completely agree that the test for basic science should not be whether it has practical benefits in the next year. But in this case, a lot of the proponents of the research have been arguing for urgent practical benefit, and in my view, I just have not seen a compelling case for that. Chairman Lieberman. It is not worth it. This leads me to ask you, Dr. Fauci, and anybody else who wants to answer--and in some sense, it is a question at the margins--when considering future research that would be seen as DURC, can you imagine instances in which you would conclude that research should not be undertaken under any circumstances? Dr. Fauci. I do. I think it would be scientific hubris for scientists to say we can do anything that we want to do, regardless, just for the curiosity of it, for understanding it. So I do think there are some experiments that would better not be done. I think that would be a very rare situation, Mr. Chairman, I mean, you can fantasize about ridiculous and dangerous experiments just for the sake of doing it. Those, we do not even bother with. But in the realm of trying to keep up with something that is a clear and present danger of happening in nature itself--that is the critical thing that we are dealing with here and that is the reason why we agree so much on it, and yet all of us at the table know that this is a delicate issue. If you are doing something in an experimental fashion that you might be pushing the envelope of creating something that would give you some information but it is not really addressing any danger, then I think that is very ill advised to go there. But when you have a situation where nature itself is already doing some of the things that you are trying to stay ahead of, that is when you really have to seriously consider it. The short answer to your question, the principles of the new government-wide DURC policy that we put out on March 29 actually put that into the consideration. So when you look at the number of experiments that you can do--there are now seven classic experiments, that if they come up, you have to decide if you have a risk mitigation for that particular result or experiment. One of the risk mitigations very well may be to not do the experiment. So it really falls very nicely into the answer to your question. It is built into the new government-wide DURC policy, that is, in fact, an option. Chairman Lieberman. So I presume that this is not an area where you can draw a very clear red line, right? In other words, what you have described are the standards adopted in the policy, and particularly with regard to risk mitigation, and that in a given case, the decisionmakers might decide that in the interest of risk mitigation, the research simply should not be conducted. Dr. Fauci. It is essentially a continual evaluation of risk-benefit. Chairman Lieberman. Right. Dr. Fauci. And you take each individual case and you look at it, and it could turn out that, clearly, the risk and our ability to mitigate the risk might be such that it is just not worth doing. Chairman Lieberman. Dr. Gerstein, from a homeland security point of view, talk to us a little about whether you think that there ought to be clearer red lines here or whether this is an area of scientific inquiry where it is simply impossible to state a red line unless you see it in a particular proposal for a research project of concern. Mr. Gerstein. Well, Senator, I agree exactly with what Dr. Fauci said. I think there are some experiments that should not be done. In fact, that is actually the intent of the Compliance Review Group---- Chairman Lieberman. Right. Mr. Gerstein [continuing]. Looking at the NSABB seven experiments and looking at the type of pathogens we routinely work with in this sort of threat analysis and characterizations that we do. So we look at these very hard. We make sure that all of them are needed. We make sure that we are doing them in the safest possible ways, in the appropriate facilities. But at the end of the day, we recognize that DHS needs to look at some of these different capabilities and assess what sort of threats they pose. Still, we are doing them in the highest containment. For the Department, we do most of our internal work in our facilities, the Fort Detrick facility, NBACC, and then the Plum Island facility, PIADC. So we are very keen on that. Chairman Lieberman. We have talked so far about the U.S. Government response to this challenge of dual-use research of concern, but, obviously, scientific research is global, and in this case one team is in Wisconsin, and one team is in the Netherlands. So help the Committee understand for the record, what is the state of the discussion of standards internationally? Are there international scientific bodies that are moving to adopt standards such as the March 29 U.S. policy? Are there national standards being adopted in individual countries throughout the world? What is happening, because obviously we are talking here about a fear, in one sense, of a global pandemic. So if something wrong happens in a laboratory halfway around the world, it could still affect the lives of people here in the United States. Dr. Fauci. Let me take a shot at that, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Lieberman. Please. Dr. Fauci. It is very interesting, because this gets into what we refer to as the culture of responsibility, a global culture of responsibility. Back in the 1970s when the revolution in DNA technology took place globally, but fundamentally here in the United States, scientists got together--it is strikingly similar to the challenges that we are facing now--and came up with what we ultimately have right now, the DNA Recombinant Advisory Committee (RAC). And although that only pertains when you talk specifically about government-funded research here in the United States, what has happened is that the fundamental principles, the codes of conduct, and the culture of responsibility that was engendered by the discussions back in the 1970s regarding recombinant DNA technology, without any capability of enforcing it globally, essentially permeated the global approach towards recombinant DNA technology. So although we did not have any enforcement capability, it became something that was widely shared throughout the world. Now, other countries, including the Netherlands right now, are addressing in a very serious manner how they are going to approach this because it was one of their scientists. But this is also going on in the United Kingdom, in France, and places like that. So what we hope and what we envision is that as a result of this, there will be a culture of responsibility that even though we do not have the carrot and the stick of funding and withdrawing funding, that these kinds of principles will actually be implemented throughout the world. We are all hoping for that, and I actually have confidence that it will. Chairman Lieberman. Good. Dr. Gerstein, I know that Secretary Janet Napolitano and people in the Department now are developing ongoing relations with homeland security departments or comparable departments around the world. Is there discussion of this particular concern in those international meetings? Mr. Gerstein. Senator, there is. We have had a number of bilaterals, for example, in the Directorate of Science and Technology (S&T). We have 12 nations with whom we have bilateral discussions. Chairman Lieberman. Right. Mr. Gerstein. And we have had these discussions. The nations feel very similar to us, but there is not all good news as far as this is concerned, and I would take you back to the Biological Weapons Convention. Some interesting things come out when you look at that. There is a London-based Verification, Research, Training, and Information Center (VERTIC), and in one analysis they did a couple of years ago, they discovered that very few nations of the 87 that they surveyed even had laws or definitions of what a select agent is, and they did not have laws against developing, stockpiling, or storing biological material. And the news does not get any better when you talk about export control measures. So it highlights the fact that we may be working very hard in this country and we may put in place the proper provisions, but it is important that we do the international outreach, especially into some of the countries that may not have the same sense of the life science issue and the DURC issue that we do. Chairman Lieberman. Yes, Doctor. Dr. Inglesby. Can I just add to the good news side of the story. Chairman Lieberman. Yes. Dr. Inglesby. First of all, I think the H5N1 debate, as painful as it has been in the last 6 months, has been somewhat useful internationally because people are all paying attention to this issue. So I think that one good consequence of this has been enlightenment or awakening in many places in the world which were not paying attention to this. The second point is at a science meeting 2 weeks ago when this question came up and there was concern that private foundations would not follow the lead of the U.S. Government in the new policy, a representative from one of the most important science foundations stood up and said, let me make very clear, if the U.S. Government is going to pursue this policy, we absolutely intend to follow it ourselves, and I imagine that others will. And the third point of good news was an article published in the journal Nature yesterday, one of the most important science journals in the world, said that the United States is taking an important leadership position on this DURC policy and that other nations should follow suit. So there are some indications that maybe this will move in a direction where other people are doing similar things. Chairman Lieberman. Well, that is encouraging. Let me go to a different aspect of the DURC policy which interested me, which is that it requires departments and agencies to report to the White House National Security Staff in the next several months on their current DURC projects and on risk and mitigation measures. The National Security Council (NSC) staff is probably larger than most people think, but it is still relatively small for the range and responsibilities it is given, particularly those on the NSC staff that work on biosecurity and bioterrorism issues. And I wonder whether you have a sense of how the information is going to be used to support oversight of such research and whether any of you expect your agencies and/or the NSABB will be asked to support the oversight that the White House National Security Staff is charged with carrying out here. Maybe I will start with you, Dr. Gerstein. Mr. Gerstein. Well, Senator, that would be somewhat speculative. I would just like to take you back to the deliberations to date. We have used those deliberations to better understand what has gone on with the papers. We have been briefed on the science. We have been briefed on the policies, the issues that have surfaced. And I think what has come out of the March 29 White House-led effort is a good first start. What we expect is that this will continue, that this is not an end point, so to speak, but it is the beginning of a process that we will continue to look and try to ensure that our policies with regard to DURC are as good as they can be to ensure national security, but also homeland security as well as ensuring scientific work goes on unfettered. So in that regard, we are very hopeful. It is a reporting requirement. All departments and agencies are submitting to that. And we have not come up with the next step, so to speak, in trying to finalize the policy. This has generated, though, incredible discussions across the interagency where departments are getting together and discussing how they are handling it. We received several phone calls to see how we were dealing with our university grants program and the language that we have inserted that provides us at least a stop-gap measure should it be necessary to ensure that publication of certain materials would not proceed. So this has actually been a very positive outcome, I think, across the government. Chairman Lieberman. Good. Dr. Keim, do you anticipate that the NSABB may be asked to help the White House in these reviews? Mr. Keim. We do whatever the Administration asks us to do and we do not do anything they do not. [Laughter.] Chairman Lieberman. A good standard. Thank you for that. Dr. Fauci, do you want to comment on that at all? Dr. Fauci. Well, I actually agree with what Dr. Gerstein said. If you look carefully at the DURC policy--the part about within 60 days to give an inventory, within 90 days to determine how you are going to do risk mitigation--that was really the first cut at making sure we know what is going on right now. I think this is going to be an evolving process. Ultimately, we are going to try and make sure that when you get down to the local level of the institutional biosafety committees, a lot of the kinds of monitoring that will be done will be essentially automatic by well-trained people. Chairman Lieberman. I agree. Let me ask this question. In your testimony, Dr. Fauci, you discussed NIH-funded efforts to develop a universal influenza vaccine, and Dr. Inglesby highlights the ongoing efforts to develop vaccines focused on H5N1. I wonder whether the findings of these kinds of studies will lead NIH and other organizations that fund vaccine research to increase the priority that you are placing on these kinds of research efforts? Dr. Fauci. The answer is a resounding yes. There are a couple of ways of getting rid of this problem. One of them, I think, Dr. Inglesby mentioned in his testimony, certainly in some discussions we have had, is to just kill the chickens that have H5N1 and make sure that we just get rid of the reservoir. That is very difficult to do because you have countries that are not necessarily interested for economic and other reasons. The other thing is to have available countermeasures that actually work really very well. The idea of getting a universal influenza vaccine is not only going to be very important for seasonal influenza, so we do not have to keep chasing each year getting the right combination and matching it with what is circulating out there, but also, it is a major countermeasure against the emergence of a pandemic. So we are putting a considerable amount of effort, and we have had some very encouraging scientific advances over the past year and a half to 2 years on understanding much better the type of immune response that you need to induce in an individual to cover virtually all strains. We are not there yet, but this is something that we see as the light at the end of the tunnel. It is always risky to predict when you are going to get a vaccine for whatever, but unlike it was a few years ago, we now see that we have the scientific mechanisms and wherewithal that we are on the road to developing a universal flu vaccine. Chairman Lieberman. Well, that is tremendously encouraging, and, of course, that is exactly the kind of work even in a budget-constrained atmosphere that I hope we will find adequate funds for. Do you want to comment at all on that, Dr. Inglesby? Dr. Inglesby. I would say that it is extremely encouraging. It is exciting. If we had a universal flu vaccine, it would change the risk equation for everything we have talked about today in the realm of influenza. So I would just strongly support the efforts that are going on at NIH by the industry on that. Chairman Lieberman. I have a final question, which is the kind of question, I must say for the benefit of staff, that my friend and colleague from Delaware, Senator Carper, would normally ask if he were here. Incidentally, I learned a lot from the testimony today and, overall, I am reassured by the government policies that have been put into effect. Even at the far end that we have set up a decisionmaking process that considers and values risk mitigation and says, in some cases, it may be that there will be a decision that research should not proceed because it is impossible to adequately mitigate the risks. So the question Senator Carper would ask, I believe, if he were here, is if you were a member of the Committee, is there anything more that we, with our primary concern about homeland security, ought to be either asking the government to do or doing ourselves, either by way of encouraging regulation or, in the extreme, some kind of legislation? Dr. Inglesby. Dr. Inglesby. I do not see at this point any legislative or regulatory proposal that would substantially improve the situation. I do think it is very useful to have oversight like this on the development of the new policy because I think there are a lot of things along the way that are going to be challenging. I think, for example, understanding the criteria for risk assessment and how we manage those risks is going to be very important. I think the composition and responsibilities of the NSABB will be very important. So asking reasonable questions of the government about how this new DURC policy is working as it evolves is very important, and I think, in particular, paying attention to the very specific case of H5N1 mammalian transmissibility research. While the decision has been made to move on to publication for this experiment--which I am concerned about--I think the next issue is going to come up relatively soon unless there is a change in course. I think that will come up again, so I think you just have to pay attention to that. Chairman Lieberman. Thank you. Dr. Keim. Mr. Keim. I would just reiterate what Mr. Davis just said, that how the new policy is implemented is going to be very key. One important role that the NSABB has played is that we are an independent body. We are non-government. Chairman Lieberman. Right. Mr. Keim. And I think it is very important that we have ``external eyes'' as a part of this new policy's implementation. There are inherent conflicts of interest between the funding agencies and the investigators, and the investigators themselves. While the board has infectious disease researchers, we were outside the small influenza research community and we were independent of the funding agencies. We are able to look at this problem in a way that is unique, and I think that is an important part to what needs to happen in the future. Chairman Lieberman. I agree. Dr. Gerstein. Mr. Gerstein. Thank you, Senator. Well, I will go back to the original remarks I made, that I think it is a very complex issue. It requires balancing outcomes. We do not want to do something precipitously that is going to have a deleterious effect on the science. On the other hand, we have a very important mission in Homeland Security that we must ensure is well served. We do have to avoid red lines because the minute you put out a red line, somebody is going to figure out a way to cross it. And so the best way to do it is through very thoughtful, very judgmental type bodies like the NSABB that has played an extraordinarily important role in getting us through these two papers and understanding what was going on with those papers. So it really does come down to a matter of judgment. On the direct question, do we need legislation right now or regulations, I would say the Executive Branch has a lot of work to do to work through the policies. As we talked about, the March 29 government policy is a first step. We are making great headway. We are continuing those deliberations. We are learning from each other. We think in DHS we have a lot of good policies that we have implemented. We are sharing those to the maximum extent possible. So I would like to put down a marker that says that perhaps later, after we have had some more time working through the March 29 policy and adding more meat to the bones, that we come and consult with Congress on this very critical issue. Chairman Lieberman. That makes sense. I hope you will do that. Dr. Fauci. Dr. Fauci. Yes. Mr. Chairman, I do not see any immediate legislative issue that would be appropriate at this point. But I think when you asked, if I were on the Committee, what would I do, I think what you just did today was really a very important thing. That is really very beneficial to this difficult process that we are going through, particularly with the new policy and trying to get it right and implemented right. And the fact that an important Committee like this Committee, with yourself as Chairman, is actually interested in the subject, is looking at us--we know that we will come back to you sometime, and maybe soon, to just give you follow-up about how we are progressing on the implementation of this policy. So you have already done something, I think, that is very important and valuable to us, because not only here in the United States, but globally, people are aware that the U.S. Senate and this Committee are interested in this problem, and that adds a degree of seriousness to it which we appreciate. Chairman Lieberman. Well, I appreciate you saying that, and that clearly is our intention. So let us agree we will keep in touch. As you know, we want the benefits of scientific inquiry. We need them. We also need to mitigate risk, and I think the policy that we have now is clearly aimed at doing exactly that. So we will follow it to see how it is going. Maybe we will come back again and do one more hearing toward the end of the year. But I thank you very much for the work you did on your prepared testimony, which will be entered into the record of the hearing, and for the testimony this morning. We are going to leave the record of the hearing open for 15 days for any additional questions or statements. With that, I thank you very much and the hearing is adjourned.