Everyone on this thread fighting for the sake of your livelihood , trading. I suggest you put ZDREG on ignore. His comments are never helpful and plain negative and unoriginal. I appreciate everyone doing there best and put your voice forward to fight this transaction tax.
Here is the member who sent the IMF the ET link. What the hell were you smoking that made you think that was a good idea?
Yes, it is important to stay on point with what they are looking for. Read the Lipsky interview if clarity on this issue is required: http://www.bi-me.com/main.php?id=43378&t=1&c=38&cg=4&mset=
http://business.timesonline.co.uk/t...ectors/banking_and_finance/article6999771.ece Emerging fear of inter-national disunity: "if everyone does their own thing": "Darlingâs big worry is that Obamaâs bombshell proposals, based on ideas set out last year by Paul Volcker, former chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, will shatter the consensus within the G20 nations on banking reform". "If everyone does their own thing it will achieve absolutely nothing. The banks are global â they are quite capable of organising themselves in such a way that if the regime is difficult in one country they will go to another one, and that doesnât do anyone any good.â Lord Myners, the City minister, will host a meeting at 11 Downing Street tomorrow to discuss long-term solutions to the âtoo-big-to-failâ dilemma. He is gathering senior representatives from each of the G7 nations, along with officials from the International Monetary Fund, the Bank of England and the Financial Services Authority. Myners convened the meeting to discuss the best way to ensure banks will not need taxpayer bailouts in any future crisis. One plan is to force them to pay into a global insurance fund that could support the sector in times of stress. Another is a tax on all financial transactions, known as a Tobin tax. Some of Wall Streetâs biggest banks are examining ways to duck out of the restrictions. Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley are believed to be in talks with the US Treasury about changing their legal status to avoid the new rules".
you are correct when u say the game is not over because of this rule change.I was saying that for a number of traders it would be the breaking pt. of course the transaction tax is the main issue. that is the make or break issue for traders. there is no way a professional trader could survive a transaction tax based upon the value of the transaction. anybody who checks the math will come to this conclusion.
It sounds like the celebs are going to be throwing a lot of money into their British campaign for the trans tax . . . Movie theaters and billboards? Really??? <b>"Starting soon, in movie theaters, advertisements, and billboards, St. Madonna will appear, like a vision, and explain that there should be a transaction tax on the banks."</b> http://trueslant.com/laurieessig/2010/01/22/st-madonna-saves-us-from-greed/
Darling is right on in times online. There is no magic too big too fail amount, activity or concept. It's the connectivity. Little AIG Financial Products was the corner stone that cracked and crashed the castle. Trading is used by banks to reduce risk as much as take risk. Does anyone really think that Obama who never spent anytime in financial services or business or even economics understands one iota about how wall street works. Obama does know acorn and Chicago-style corruption. So he automatically thinks that wall street must be a bunch of Chicago-style political crooks too. Obama panicked with Scott Brown and rolled out the volcker rule without proper coordination with the UK and G20 as was previously agreed too. Geithner was in line and leading us well. Certainly the US was supposed to wait for the IMF April report and the G20 was supposed to decide on issues together. Darling and others including banks are probably all fuming at Obama. Geithner must be embarrassed and cut off at the knees after his hard work to forge cooperation. The Obama financial bombshell was faster than bush jumping ahead of the UN in Iraq and certainly as unilateral. Has Obama fallen so hard and so fast that he could lose it in just a month's time? It's clear from news today about Axelrod's all political hands on deck that the white house is panicking about the midterms. Too bad this has reopened the FTT on all forums in the UK. Still think the IMF will say insurance levy over fee or tax and they may want to hold some of those premiums not trusting governments to safeguard the cash. Boycott celebrities that call for a FTT saying you need to redirect that socially useless money for their entertainment to these new taxes. iPhone
Point taken. But you see, the IMF editors/moderators turned out to be rather selective... With the 95%+ rejection rates in mind, I submitted several letters, all equally technical and all containing insights not really that far intellectually behind those that were eventually published (the 'What the fcuk' comment nothwithstanding: - Estimating Tobin tax revenue (the US example) - Estimating the "fair" rate for the financial transactions tax - RegT cap on house market leverage; counter-cyclical Basel and while they replied to the first one I sent, they selected for publication only the (abstract of) the middle one. Perhaps it's as simple as exceeding the user quota (I am naive enough not to use multiple identities - but I'm learning from you benwm, or perhaps there is something more to their selectivity than meets the eye... So given the apparent limits, can you submit yet another comment of mine (the one you see below), which is hopefully adequately general and macro-level, and completely avoids our usual obsession with Prof. Tobin's wishes. More importantly, it comes from the corporate sector, which is the only disinterested party in this case. No more banking sector complaints about leverage limits, no more governments and NGOs praising transaction taxes to help them out of their current funding crisis (and get re-elected to boot). It is a rather technical review of policy recommendations contained in a recent McKinsey report on deleveraging. Oh, and it would suit your blog rather nicely, don't you think? __________ A recent report "Debt and deleveraging: The global credit bubble and its economic consequences" published by McKinsey Global Institute (McKinsey & Co's research arm established in 1990) includes several suggestions for regulators seeking to increase financial markets stability (see URL: http://www.mckinsey.com/mgi/publications/debt_and_deleveraging/index.asp, p. 46-8). The report argues in favor of the following stability-enhancing measures, all of which are targeting "excessive" build-up of leverage in the financial system and in the real economy, placing constraints on such build-up to avoid "over-leveraging" and ease the deleveraging process required afterwards: 1) a high-granularity (sector-level), internationally standardized system for tracking leverage should be maintained by the Financial Stability Board or the IMF, which would facilitate early identification of potentially developing credit bubbles (with sector-level leverage being proxy for such bubbles), 2) a new regulation should be incorporated in the Basel II framework, requiring banks to adjust their internal risk models to reflect levels of leverage in the relevant sectors (or ideally even narrower borrower groups) they are exposed to; this would effectively force banks to increase capital reserves in anticipation of any increases in default rates, rather than merely reacting to volatility increases when the deleveraging process is already underway (note that this assumes leverage is a leading indicator of volatility, which may be contested by banks forced to implement such models at their own expense), 3) because it would be "impractical and undesirable" for regulators to intervene at a very micro level of detail, macroprudential policy should be used instead to control leverage levels in specific (overheated) sectors of the real economy; an example of such intervention, albeit still at a national level, is a comprehensive set of "overexuberance" metrics (with readily available datasets) and a systemic risk "surcharge" over the existing microprudential bank capital requirements, recently proposed by the Bank of England (see pages 17-19 of their November 2009 discussion paper "The role of macroprudential policy", URL: http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publ...ability/roleofmacroprudentialpolicy091121.pdf ), 4) national regulators should reassess the need for further increases in bank capital ratios, given that the leverage of the US commercial banks has already reached average pre-crisis levels by the third quarter of 2009 (the ratio of risk-weighted assets to Core Tier 1 capital is around 13.3, i.e. below the 15-year average of 13.8) and further regulation-induced compulsory deleveraging would restric credit supply to the real economy or raise the cost of credit; if this long-term leverage level were to be used as a regulatory leverage limit (i.e. if banks were required to maintain at least 7.5% of tangible common equity to secure their risk-weighted assets), then 3/4 of the banks in financial distress would have weathered the recent financial crisis, 5) central bankers should include leverage in their monetary policy objectives, on top of the traditional inflation targets, thus preventing the development of asset bubbles, not only in financial markets but also in real estate; this can be also achieved with more precisely targeted regulatory tools, such as margin requirements propagated through the broker-dealer industry (already implemented or under discussion, such as the new leverage limits recently proposed by the US regulators) or maximum loan-to-value ratios permitted in mortgage lending (however difficult they may be to implement for political reasons), 6) policy makers should reconsider the highly preferential tax and capital treatment of residential mortgages, because most bank loans are extended to finance real estate purchases (and asset bubbles), at the cost of small and medium-sized enterprise loans; moreover, equity financing should receive equal treatment with corporate debt issuance (which currently enjoys preferential tax treatment), 7) regulators should analyze and possibly limit all incentives for households to take on debt (broadly defined, not restricted to tax incentives, because they were not required for overleveraging to develop in countries such as Spain), making it more difficult to access credit, especially for less creditworthy borrowers (this should include limiting loan-to-value ratios on broadly defined household debt).